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 Abstract 
This dissertation consists of three essays focusing on wage inequality and education 
policy. Essay 1 considers growth in the variance of wages. Prior work has documented that the 
college premium plays a major role in explaining wage variance growth. This essay examines the 
extent to which this role can be attributed to an increase in the dispersion of occupation-specific 
returns to post-secondary education. Using the variance components approach and CPS data 
between 1979-1981 and 2003-2005, the essay shows that the variation in the college premium 
across occupations has increased over time, and this variation expansion explains about five 
percent of the growth in wage variance across the two periods. By dividing the sample workforce 
into professional and nonprofessional groups, the results suggest that the increased variation in 
the return to post-secondary education particularly caused the wage gap between the professional 
and non-professional workers to increase. 
Essay 2 applies quantile regression methodology to the study of the determinants of the 
wage distribution among natives and immigrants in the U.S., using PUMS from 1990 and 2000, 
and ACS from 2006. Among other findings, the immigrant/native wage gap is concentrated at 
the lower end to the median of the wage distribution, and the primary source of the wage gap is 
the relative lack of labor market skills among immigrants. A cross-time comparison shows that 
the recent immigrant/native wage gap after controlling for skill variables first decreased from 
1990 to 2000 and then expanded from 2000 to 2006. The growth is concentrated at the two ends 
of the wage distribution, and the reason for growth is that the recent immigrants in 2006 are 
younger and thus have less market experience than their counterparts of 1990. 
Essay 3 is coauthored with Dr. Blankenau. We analyze the impact of changes in college 
admission standards on the skilled labor distribution, skilled firm distribution, and the match of 
skilled labor with skilled firms. We propose a model of schooling with heterogeneous labor and 
firms, in which firms’ decisions in creating skilled jobs are conditioned on the supply of skilled 
labor. The model shows that lowering standards without providing incentives to acquire skills 
does not necessarily motivate accumulation of human capital or expansion of skilled industry. 
Lower standards tend to create a mismatch of educated labor with unskilled positions. In some 
specifications, lower standards can lower firms’ willingness to create skilled positions, leaving 
more skilled workers underemployed.  
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CHAPTER 1 - Variation in Return to Post-secondary Education and 
Increasing Wage Inequality 
1.1 Introduction 
The growth of wage inequality in United States since the 1970s has received considerable 
attention in various economic studies. The first wave of studies in the early 1990s suggested that 
the growth of wage inequality could be attributed mainly to the residual inequality, or the wage 
dispersion within skill groups defined by sex, education, and experience.1 For example, the 
widely cited study by Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (JMP, 1993) shows that, while both observable 
and unobservable skill premium growth contributed to wage inequality growth, the majority of 
the growth between 1963 and 1989 is due to a greater return to the unobservable components.2 
Latter studies criticized the decomposition method in JMP because it did not fully 
account for the variety of sources generating wage variance. New methods are developed and 
applied to examine the reasons for wage inequality growth in the context of the full wage 
distribution. (e.g., DiNardo et al., 1996; Chay and Lee, 2000; Melly, 2005; Autor, Katz and 
Kearney, 2005; Lemieux, 2006a & 2006b). In contrast to the JMP conclusion, these later studies 
argued that increasing returns to labor market skills and the distributional change of the skills 
primarily explain the wage inequality growth in U.S. For example, Melly (2005) shows, using 
quantile regression to estimate the counterfactual distribution for decomposition, that only 20 
percent of the wage inequality growth in the U.S. between 1973 and 1989 comes from residuals, 
while more than 50 percent of the growth is due to the distributional change of labor market 
skills, or namely the composition effect.  
Recent evidence also suggests that rather than being uniform, the growth in wage 
inequality is disproportionately concentrated at the top of the wage distribution (e.g., Piketty and 
Saez, 2002; Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2005). In addition, studies on the causal effect of 
education on earnings show that log wages are an increasingly convex function of years of 
education, indicating a relative wage growth for more educated workers that enlarges the wage 
                                                            
1 The residual inequality is so named as it was measured by the distribution of residuals from a Mincerian wage 
regression, e.g. in Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993).  
2 Katz and Autor (1999) provide a summary of the early wage studies focused on residual inequality.  
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gap between college graduates and high school graduates (e.g., Mincer, 1997; Murphy and 
Welch, 2001; Deschênes, 2001). As these two findings are potentially related, Lemieux (2006a) 
uses a variance components approach and Current Population Survey (CPS) data to measure the 
effect of the increasing returns of schooling on the “polarized” inequality growth. His results 
show that the majority of the rise in wage inequality from 1973 to 2005 is explained by the 
increased returns to post-secondary schooling. 
A question then arises from this conclusion as to “why the post secondary education, as 
opposed to other observed or unobserved measures of skills, plays such a dominant role in wage 
inequality” (Lemieux, 2006a). A possible answer to this question is contained in the hypothesis 
that there is unbalanced demand growth in some fields of study of higher education, which 
causes returns to education to be increasingly unequal among college graduates.3 Such gaps in 
the returns to higher education would be more crucial in explaining wage inequality as more of 
the labor force has higher education. Inspired by the question raised in Lemieux (2006a), this 
paper empirically examines whether the variance of return to different fields of education has 
become larger, and, more importantly, how this variation in return to education affects the 
growth of wage inequality. Such imbalanced demand in different fields of study could potentially 
explain the dominant role of the return to higher education in explaining the growth of wage 
inequality. 
The intuition of our hypotheses is straightforward: returns to higher education reflect the 
prices of skills associated with different fields of study of post-secondary education. Post-
secondary education is different from earlier education stages because the training is specialized. 
By choosing major fields of study, students acquire different skills, and thus the wage return to 
college education can be different for these fields, reflecting the price differences for skills. 
Theoretically, a wider distribution of returns to higher education is supported by the 
theory of the skill-biased technical change (SBTC) (e.g., Acemoglu, 2002), which argues that 
technology development particularly increases the demand of skilled workers and thus increases 
their wage return more than for non-skilled workers. The story applies to the different fields of 
education as well. For example, as personal computers were more widely used during the 1980s 
and the demand for computer skills increased greatly, college graduates in computer science 
                                                            
3 Another possible hypothesis is that the relative demand for post-secondary education has increased dramatically 
over time, which enlarges the wage gap between college-educated workers and non-college ones. 
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could obtain relatively higher returns from college education, than say those in English, whose 
real returns from a college education were likely to remain stable during the same time. Such 
unbalanced demand due to the technology development would particularly increase the wage 
inequality among the workers with college degrees.  
As the intuition and theory suggest, when the impact of college premium on wage 
inequality is assessed, the skills acquired in college should be controlled for in measuring the 
college premium. However, there is no available data recording workers’ college majors. Thus, 
we use occupations as a proxy to control for the skill differences acquired during the post-
secondary education, because the majors are likely to be relevant to occupations. 
Specifically, to empirically test the variance growth in returns to college education, this 
paper measures how much of the growth of the wage variance is caused by the variation in the 
college premium, controlled for by occupations. Our objective is to find whether the cross-
occupation variation in the return to post-secondary education can explain the major role of the 
college premium in explaining the growth of wage inequality. The present paper extends 
Lemieux (2006a) by examining how the variation, in addition to the increase, in wage returns to 
higher education has contributed to wage inequality growth. 
The results of our research suggest that between the two periods being compared (1979-
81 and 2003-05), the return to higher education became more diversified across occupations, and 
this variation expansion accounts for about five percent of total wage variance growth over time. 
This share is relatively small compared to the wage variance growth due to the increase in the 
returns to post-secondary education. In addition, after controlling for occupational differences in 
the return to post-secondary education, the portion of wage variance growth explained by the 
return to post-secondary education decreased from more than 50 percent to about 36 percent, and 
the composition effects are actually the dominant factor that boosts wage inequality growth. 
Finally, when the occupations are grouped into professional and non-professional groups, the 
five percent variance growth due to the increase of the variation of college premium is shown to 
stem from a wider return gap in education between the two occupation groups. The advantage in 
the education premium of the professionals has been growing relative to the non-professionals.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section two introduces the CPS data for our analysis. 
Section three uses OLS and quantile regressions to diagnose graphically the occupation effect on 
the wage gap growth. Section four introduces the variance component approach and uses it to 
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decompose the growth of the wage variance to the determinants of wage inequality. In this 
section, the variance change in the professional and non-professional occupations is compared to 
examine the difference in wage variance growth. Section five summarizes and concludes. 
1.2 The CPS data  
The Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (MORG) from the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) is used to examine the role of the college education premium in relation to hourly wages 
and wage inequality. The data are organized and made available by National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER). Two periods are selected to gauge the growth of wage inequality, 
1979-81 as the base period and 2003-05 as the end period.4  
Following existing wage studies using CPS data, our sample in each period includes the 
white male workers aged 18 to 64 years who have positive potential experience.5 In addition, to 
sample only full time workers, we require that all included observations must work 35 hours or 
more per week. Hourly wage is used for our wage rate measure, because it is more representative 
than weekly wage as a measure of the price of labor (JMP, 1993). In the CPS data, not all 
workers report wages based on hourly payment, as they can choose to report either hourly or 
weekly wages. For those who report only weekly wages, their hourly wages are calculated by 
dividing their weekly wages by the usual number of working hours per week. To eliminate 
extreme values, the hourly wages are trimmed to a range from $1 to $100 in 1979 dollar value.6 
Following the standard in wage studies using CPS data, the wage rates labeled as “top-coded” in 
CPS data are multiplied by 1.4. 
CPS data contain different measures for education before and after 1992, making the 
education codes in the two periods inconsistent. The MORG data by NBER recodes education 
information after 1992 to make the variable consistent over time. We use this recoded education 
measure for the 2003-05 period. Similarly, the occupation codes in the CPS changed after 1992, 
so we regrouped the occupation code in the base period 1979-81 according to the codes in 2003-
05. These adjusted occupation codes are presented in Appendix 1.  
                                                            
4 1979 yearly data is the earliest MORG available; the end period was chosen to be close to Lemieux (2006a) for 
comparison purpose. 
5 Potential experience is measured as “age - education - 6” 
6 The inflation rate is calculated using the inflation calculator provided by Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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A summary of the data is presented in Table 1.1, which is arranged based on occupations 
and education. As shown in Table 1.1, pooling three years of CPS data yields large samples in 
both periods. The base period has 222,661 observations and the end period has 189,655. In terms 
of education, the end period is better educated than the base period. In the end period, more than 
50 percent of observations have at least 12 years of education, and more than 30 percent of them 
have at least 16 years of education. The two figures for the base period are 43 percent and 23 
percent, respectively. This represents an expansion of the college-educated labor force. 
The second column for each period summarizes the weight of each occupation in the total 
sample. For most occupations, its weight in total labor is about the same in the two periods, as 
the difference is less than one percentage point. Several occupations experienced greater changes 
proportionally. The construction and production occupation (Occ.=19+21), the largest weighted 
occupation in both periods, decreased six percentage points over time. Repair and maintenance 
(Occ.=20) decreased 4.8 percentage points. Architecture and engineering (Occ.= 4) decreased by 
about 2.4 percentage points. Among the occupations whose weight became larger, sales (Occ.= 
16) increased by four percentage points, computer and math science (Occ.=3), food (Occ.=13) 
and transportation occupation (Occ.=22) each increased more than two percentage points.  
When we divide the occupations into two groups: Occ. Codes from 1 to 10, except 6, as 
professional occupations, and 11 to 22 and 6 as service and production occupations, there was a 
slight growth in the weight of professional occupations and a slight decrease of services and 
production occupations. The proportion of the professional workforce in the end period increased 
0.69 percentage points. 
In Table 1.1, the last two columns under each period summarize the numbers of workers 
who have received post-secondary education in each occupation and their weight in the total 
sample.7 If we divide all labor into two groups, the professional occupations have a higher 
participation rate for post-secondary education in both periods. The labor share of those having 
more than 12 years of education in the professional occupations is on average 86.4% in the base 
period and 89.8% in the end period. The rates for the services and production group are 37.7% 
and 45.3%. To summarize, the professional occupations in both periods are more likely to have 
completed at least one year of the post-secondary education than the non-professional group, but 
                                                            
7 Beyond twelve years of education is picked because this is the start of post-secondary education, and it is where 
the wage gap starts growing (see Figure 1.1). 
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the later group experienced a faster growth rate in education. To show this trend more clearly, 
Table 1.2 presents the average education and experience level for the two groups. Both groups 
experienced a growth in the average level of education and experience, but the growth is larger 
in the production and services group.  
1.3 Diagnostic evidence by OLS and quantile regressions 
In this section, we use basic regression techniques to show that our data features the 
characteristics highlighted in prior wage inequality studies. We first show that the return to 
higher education has increased over time and the increasing return or convex-shaped return to 
education only exists in the later period. This increasing return to education is then shown to be 
primarily accountable for the growth of wage inequality. Finally, we show the return to 
education across occupations has been more diversified in the end period, and illustrate the effect 
of this diversified return to wage inequality using graphs. 
To see the cross-time change of returns to skill characteristics, OLS regressions are 
applied to each period. Following the literature, we include quadratic terms for education and 
quartic terms for experience in the OLS regressions, to account for the nonlinear returns to 
education and experience.8 The first regression equation considers: 
ݓ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ כ ݁݀ݑ ൅ ߚଶ כ ݁݀ݑଶ ൅ ߛଵ כ ݁ݔ ൅ ߛଶ כ ݁ݔଶ+ߛଷ כ ݁ݔଷ ൅ ߛସ כ ݁ݔସ ൅ ߝ  (1) 
where ݓ is log hourly wage, ߙ is a constant, ݁݀ݑ is years of education, ݁ݔ is years of experience, 
and ߝ is the residual. The estimates from the base period for equation (1) are presented in Table 
1.3. In the base period, ߚଶ= 0.0015, so there is a small increase in the return to an additional 
year of education. According to the estimates, during the base period a college graduate (݁݀ݑ 
=16) earns an hourly wage that is 25% higher than a high school graduate (݁݀ݑ =12), when other 
things equal.9 
To make of the difference in returns between the post-secondary and pre-college 
education more apparent, a linear spline model as shown in equation (2) is estimated:  
ݓ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ כ ݁݀ݑ ൅ ߚଶ כ ݄݅ ൅ ߛଵ כ ݁ݔ ൅ ߛଶ כ ݁ݔଶ+ߛଷ כ ݁ݔଷ ൅ ߛସ כ ݁ݔସ ൅ ߝ  (2) 
                                                            
8 Lemiux (2006a) used the same equation for quantile regressions. The same setting fits well to my data to account 
for the nonlinear functional form of log wage on the skill characteristics.  
9 The 25% wage difference is calculated by plugging in 16 and 12 years education into equation (1), while other 
things are equal. 
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where ݄݅ is the years of post-secondary education.10 According to the spline model, the return to 
pre-college education is measured by ߚଵ, and the return to the post-secondary education is 
measured by ߚଵ+ߚଶ, because ߚଶ measures additional return to post-secondary education relative 
to pre-college education. The estimates for 1979-81 are presented in the third column of Table 
1.3. 
In the base period, the return to one year of post-secondary education is only 0.04% (as 
ߚଶ=0.0004) higher than one year of education before college, and ߚଶ is not statistically different 
from zero. While the estimates based on equation (2) still indicate a 25% increase in hourly wage 
for college graduates compared to high school graduates, the result by equation (2) indicates that 
this wage increase is due to an increase in the number years of education, rather than a higher 
payoff for post-secondary education relative to earlier education. 
Equations (1) and (2) are estimated for the end period to examine the changes in wage 
composition over time, particularly the growth of returns to post-secondary education. The 
results are shown in the third and fourth column of Table 1.3. In the end period, a worker with 
college education (݁݀ݑ=16) earned an hourly wage 41% higher than a high school graduate 
(݁݀ݑ=12), a larger change compared to the 25% premium in the base period. 
Based on the estimates from equation (2), in the end period, one year of college education 
returns 0.045 log wage points (ߚଶ=.045) higher than one year of pre-college education, and, in 
contrast to the base period, this payoff difference is statistically significant. The marginal return 
to one year of pre-college education is 0.063 log wage points, so the return to post-secondary 
education is about 70% higher than the return to pre-college.11  
Because our interest is to examine the variation in returns to post-secondary education by 
occupation, interactive variables between college education and occupation are added to equation 
(2) to get equation (3): 
ݓ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ כ ݁݀ݑ ൅ ߚଶ כ ݄݅ ൅ ∑ ߣ௝ܱܿ ௝ܿ ൅ ∑ ߜ௝ܱܿ ௝ܿ כ ݄݅ ൅ ߛଵ כ ݁ݔ ൅ ߛଶ כ ݁ݔଶ ൅ ߛଷ כ ݁ݔଷ ൅ ߛସ כ
݁ݔସ ൅ ߝ  (3) 
where ܱܿ ௝ܿis an occupation dummy of occupation ݆, and the coefficients for the occupation 
dummies, ߣ௝, control for the wage differences by occupations. The estimators of interest are the 
                                                            
10 For the individuals whose education is less than or equal to 12, this term is zero. For the ones that have more than 
12 years of education, it is in a range of 0 to 6, depending on the years of post-secondary education. 
11 “A 70% increase” is the additional return to college divided by return to earlier education, or 4.5%/6.2%. 
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coefficients ߜ௝, which measures the occupation-specific return to one year of post-secondary 
education. The estimates of ߜ௝ and the absolute return of post-secondary education for each 
occupation are presented in Table 1.4. 
By adding occupation related variables, the adjusted ܴଶ is larger compared to using 
equation (2), especially in the later time period. In addition, both the Wald test and LR test reject 
the hypotheses that all ߜ௝’s or ߣ௝’s are equal to zero. Because the ߜ௝’s are measured relative to the 
occupation dropped to avoid dummy trap, the absolute returns to post-secondary education are 
computed and presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.4, so the comparison could be 
demonstrated more vividly. For example, the return to post-secondary education in occupation ݆ 
is computed by adding up the common return of education and the relative return by occupation, 
or ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ ൅ ߜ௝.
12  
As shown at the bottom of Table 1.4, the average and the standard deviation of the 
occupation-specific returns to post-secondary education are both larger in the end period. The 
occupation average return to post-secondary education increased from 0.048 to 0.071 over time, 
a 46% increase. The standard deviation increased by 35%. If weighted by each occupation’s 
share in the sample, the average return increased by 38%, and the standard deviation increased 
by 15%. The larger variation in the college premium, the growth of the standard deviation, 
suggests that the variation can enlarge the wage inequality among college-educated workers. 
Evidence of occupation effect based on quantile regressions 
To examine the role of the returns to education in explaining the growth of wage 
inequality along the wage distribution, quantile regressions are applied to measure the returns to 
education at different wage levels of the wage distribution. Equations (1), (2) and (3) are 
estimated for the 10th, 50th and 90th wage percentiles, and the estimates are used to graph wage 
functions against education. The occupation effect on wage inequality is graphed by comparing 
the estimated wage gaps with occupations controlled to the gaps without occupations controlled. 
Note that though the same equations estimated by OLS also applied to quantile regressions, 
quantile regression estimates need to be interpreted differently. The coefficients by quantile 
regressions are the returns to the skill characteristics at different percentiles of the wage 
                                                            
12 ߚଵ plusߚଶ is the return to post-secondary education of the dropped occupation, which is food operation (occ.=13) 
in our sample. 
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distribution (i.e., Buchinsky, 1994). For example, for each equation of (1) to (3), ߚଵ and ߚଶ are 
estimated from the quantile regressions at the 90th percentile of the wage distribution, measuring 
the return to education at the top 10 percent wage distribution.  
The estimates of the quantile regressions with equation (1) and (2) are presented in Table 
1.5. Consistent with the results from OLS, in the base period, higher returns to post-secondary 
education relative to earlier education exist at the 90th percentile of the wage distribution. In 
contrast, all three wage percentiles in the end period show positive additional returns to post-
secondary education. 
Based on the estimates shown in Table 1.5, the graphs in Figures 1.1a and 1.1b show the 
fitted log wage as a function of education at each wage quantile. All wage functions are 
computed assuming a fixed 20 years of experience. The resulting log wages are normalized 
relative to the median wage with 12 years of education and 20 years of experience. In other 
words, the fitted log wages are the relative values to the same period’s median wage of average 
workers with 12 years of education and 20 years of experience, whose wage rate is normalized to 
zero. 
Figure 1.1a shows that the wage functions of education in all three wage percentiles 
become more convex in the end period, compared to the more linear shape of the base period.13 
The convexity is especially obvious when education exceeds 12 years for the 90th wage 
percentile, so the return difference between post-secondary and pre-college education is 
particularly pronounced for the top wage quantile.  
Because of this more convex function of education in the end period, the wage gap 
between the 90th and 10th wage percentiles (referred as 90-10 gap from here on) in the end period 
grows as the number of years of education increases, particularly after 12 years of education. In 
contrast, the 90-10 wage gap was stable in the base period. As the wage functions are computed 
with a fixed number of years of experience, the graphed wage gap is due to the differences in the 
returns to education. It means that the differences in the return to post-secondary education are 
capable of replicating the growing wage gap concentrated at the top end of the wage distribution.  
Figure 1.1b is graphed based on equation (2). Figure 1.1b has a convex shape of wage 
functions that is less smooth then Figure 1.1a, because the linear spline model restricts the 
                                                            
13 Similar findings and graphs can be found in Mincer (1998), Deschenes (2002), and Lemieux (2006a). 
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education return to be different than only after 12 years of education. The purpose of Figure 1.1b 
is to make a comparison to Figure 1.1c, in which case occupation effect is controlled for.  
The growing 90-10 wage gap due to returns to education shown in Figures 1.1a and 1.1b 
indicates that the returns to higher education is more widely distributed in the end period than in 
the based period. It can be evidence of unbalanced demand growth for the skills acquired through 
higher education. Thus, we will focus on the variation in the return to education beyond twelve 
years and its impact on wage inequality growth. 
To see the change in wage functions when occupations are controlled for, equation (3) is 
estimated with the same quantile regressions. Equation (3) controls for cross-occupation wage 
differences, so quantile regression estimates by equation (3) account for the variation by 
occupations as well as by different wage levels. The results are presented in Table 1.6 and the 
corresponding Figure 1.1c.  
To compare the two cases with and without occupation effects, we compute fitted log 
wages in Figure 1.1c by assuming all workers at the same level of the wage distribution earn the 
same average return to post-secondary education regardless of occupation by leaving out the 
term ∑ ߜ௝ܱܿ ௝ܿ כ ݄݅ in equation (3). In this way, the occupations’ diversification effect on the 
college premium is left out, but the general trend with the mean of returns is retained. In other 
words, Figure 1.1c shows the wage function as if there were no difference in the college 
premium across occupations. Similarly, only the average of occupation-specific constants is used 
when wage functions are computed, and the variation by occupation dummies is left out. Thus, 
Figure 1.1c is actually computed using the same formula of equation (1), but the coefficients 
estimated from equation (3). Because the occupation effect is not excluded in Figure 1.1b, a 
comparison of Figure 1.1b to Figure 1.1c illustrates the effect of occupation on the wage 
distribution. 
The difference between Figure 1.1b and 1.1c is not easy to read, because both show 
larger wage gaps at the high value of education in the end period. To show the occupation effect 
precisely, the wage gap growth at each education level from Figure 1.1b and 1.1c is compared, 
and the result is graphed in Figure 1.2. According to Figure 1.2, up to 16 years of education, the 
wage gap becomes smaller after controlling for occupation effect. Accordingly, the variation by 
occupation in the returns to the post-secondary education is a positive factor for the growth of the 
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wage gap up to 16 years of education, but it becomes negative for more than 16 years of 
education. 
In summary, the results by OLS and quantile regressions show that an increasing return 
to post-secondary education relative to earlier education is responsible for the growth of wage 
inequality on the top end of the wage distribution. Meanwhile, the returns to the post-secondary 
education were distributed wider across occupations in the end period. These two findings 
suggest that the increased variation by occupation could, at least partially, explain the growing 
gap in the college premium. As shown in Figure 1.2, the variation by occupations affected the 
size of the wage gap. These results serve as descriptive evidence suggesting a positive effect of 
variation in college premium on the growth of wage inequality. To quantitatively measure its 
contribution to the wage gap growth, variance decomposition with a variance components model 
is applied. 
1.4 Variance decomposition model  
The three-step wage variance decomposition approach introduced by Lemieux (2006a) is 
applied to decompose the growth of the wage inequality to the wage distribution determinants, 
including the returns to skills, the heterogeneous return components, and the composition effect. 
The variance components (VC) model consists of three estimation steps. First, the means and the 
variance of the wage distribution are measured by an OLS regression of wages. Second, the 
marginal effects of the skill variables on the means and the variances of wage are estimated by 
nonlinear least squares (NLS). The estimates from NLS are then used to compute the variance 
decomposition. The advantage of the VC model is that it simultaneously estimates the 
conditional mean and the conditional variance of log wages, so the distribution of returns across 
heterogeneous individuals is modeled at the same time as the means of the returns.  
As explained in Lemieux (2006a), the commonly used Mincer wage equation implies 
strong restrictions on the sources of wage variances. For example, consider the following Mincer 
regression: 
ݓ௜ ൌ ߙ כ ܽ௜ ൅ ߚ כ ݁݀ݑ௜ ൅ ߛ כ ݁ݔ௜ ൅ ߝ௜  (4) 
where ܽ௜ represents unobserved ability, ߙ is its return, ߚ and ߛ are the mean of returns to 
education and experiences.14 This simple model restricts the returns to education and experience 
                                                            
14 The return to unobservable skill in equation (4) is the payoff of basic skill to a worker without education and 
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to be the same for all workers at a given time. As individuals are actually heterogeneously 
rewarded with the same education or experience, this simple model ignores a possible source for 
wage variance. Therefore, it cannot be consistent with our earlier findings shown in Figure 1.1 
that wage dispersion increases at higher values of education. To incorporate the heterogeneous 
returns to education and experience, the following random coefficient model is introduced: 
ݓ௜ ൌ ߙ כ ܽ௜ ൅ ߚ כ ܾ௜ כ ݁݀ݑ௜ ൅ ߛ כ ܿ௜ כ ݁ݔ௜ ൅ ߝ௜. (5) 
In equation 5,  ߚ, ߛ and ߙ account for the means of returns, thus they are the same for 
everyone at a given time. They capture the common trend in wage returns to skills. The 
individual specific parameters ܽ௜, ܾ௜ and ܿ௜ measure the individual returns for person ݅. They are 
so-called “heterogeneous return components,” as they address the person-to-person difference in 
returns to the same level of skills. Based on this formula, for example, one more year of 
education would pay differently for two workers if they have different ܾ௜. 
If we normalize the means of these heterogeneous return components (ܽ௜, ܾ௜ and ܿ௜) to be 
one, then the conditional mean of equation (5) would be: 
ܧሺݓ௜|݁݀ݑ௜, ݁ݔ௜ሻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ כ ݁݀ݑ௜ ൅ ߛ כ ݁ݔ௜ ൅ ߝ௜.  (6) 
In addition, if we assume the three skill characteristics are not correlated with each other, and 
treat the means of ߙ, ߚ and ߛ and the variables of education and experience as non-random 
variables, the conditional wage variance of equation (6) would be:  
ܸܽݎሺݓ௜|݁݀ݑ௜, ݁ݔ௜ሻ ൌ ߪ௔ଶ כ ߙଶ ൅ ߪ௕
ଶ כ ሺߚ כ ݁݀ݑ௜ሻଶ ൅ ߪ௖ଶ כ ሺߛ כ ݁ݔ௜ሻଶ ൅ ߪఌଶ  (7) 
where ߪ௔ଶ ൌ ݒܽݎሺܽ௜ሻ, ߪ௕ଶ ൌ ݒܽݎሺܾ௜ሻ and ߪ௖ଶ ൌ ݒܽݎሺܿ௜ሻ. The latter two are the variances of the 
heterogeneous return components for education and experience, respectively. Because we have 
no quantitative measure of unobservable skill, ߪ௔ଶ ൌ ݒܽݎሺܽ௜ሻ can be viewed as the variance of 
the unobservable ability. According to equation (7), the wage variance can be attributed to 
different wage determinants. For example, the measure of wage variance relevant to education in 
equation (7) is denoted by ߪ௕ଶ כ ሺߚ כ ݁݀ݑ௜ሻଶ. According to this measure, an increase in the wage 
variance by education could either be caused by an increase of average education return (ߚ), a 
growth of the variance of the heterogeneous return to education (ߪ௕ଶ), a boost in the level of 
education (݁݀ݑ௜), or a mix of these. Therefore, it is possible to incorporate the observed feature 
in Figures 1.1 so that the wage variance could be larger for more educated workers. 
                                                                                                                                                             
experience. This measure of unobservable ability is defined differently from the residual measure of unobservable 
ability as in JMP (1993), and thus the conclusion of its effect on wage inequality is different. 
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Equations (6) and (7) can be estimated simultaneously by nonlinear least squares (NLS). 
Before estimating the NLS model, we need to have the measures of the conditional means and 
conditional variances of the log wages, which are dependent variables in equation (6) and (7), 
respectively. The means and variances are estimated by an OLS regression: 
ݓ௜ ൌ ∑ ܦ௟݁௟௟ ൅ ∑ ܦ௝ݔ௝௝ ൅ ∑ ∑ ܦ௟௝݁௟ݔ௝௝௟ ൅ ݎ௜ ൌ ݓഥ௜ ൅ ݎ௜ .  (8) 
Equation 8 is a log wage regression on an unrestricted set of dummies that controls for years of 
schooling, potential experience, and interactive effects between schooling and experience. In 
equation (8), ݁௟ is a dummy for one education level, and ݔ௝ is a dummy for one experience 
level.15 These dummies divide the workforce into school-experience groups in which workers 
have a similar education and experience background. The fitted value of equation (8) assigns an 
average wage to each school-experience group, so ݓഥ௜ stands for the average wage of one group 
that a person ݅ belongs to, based on person ݅’s schooling and experience. The residual ݎ௜, as 
ݎ௜ ൌ ݓ௜ െ ݓഥ௜, stands for the difference between person ݅’s real wage and the group average 
wage.  
The residual ݎ௜ represents the wage difference within the school-experience groups, 
which is parallel to the 90-10 wage gap in the figures by quantile regressions. The estimated ݓഥ௜’s 
are used as the dependent variable of equation (6) because they are the expected wages 
conditional on education and experience. The residual squares, ݎ௜ଶ’s, are used as the dependent 
variable for equation (7), as the average of ݎ௜ଶ’s represent the within-group wage variance. After 
replacing with the ݓഥ௜ and ݎ௜ଶ, equations (6) and (7) become:  
ݓഥ௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ כ ݁݀ݑ௜ ൅ ߛ כ ݁ݔ௜ ൅ ߝ௜  (6a) 
ݎ௜
ଶ ൌ ߪ௔ଶ כ ߙଶ ൅ ߪ௕
ଶ כ ሺߚ כ ݁݀ݑ௜ሻଶ ൅ ߪ௖ଶ כ ሺߛ כ ݁ݔ௜ሻଶ ൅ ߪఌଶ . (7a) 
The residual ߝ௜ in equation (6a) is the wage difference that exists between the school-
experience groups, because this wage difference is not explained by the skill characteristics, so 
ܸܽݎሺݓഥ௜ሻ, or equally ܧሺߝ௜ଶሻ, is referred to as the between-group variance in the following 
discussion. The conditional mean of equation (7a),ܧሺݎ௜ଶሻ, represents the wage variance within 
the school-experience groups, so it is referred as within-group variance in the following 
discussion.  
                                                            
15 The 7 schooling dummies are for years of education of 0-6, 7-9, 10-11, 12, 12-15, 16 and more than 16, and the 9 
experiences dummies are from 0 to more than 40 years, with 5 years interval. The overall dummy groups are 79, but 
some of them are dropped in estimation due to being empty or too small group size. Later, as occupation dummies 
included, the total number of dummies in equation (8) is over 1000. 
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Finally, to allow nonlinear functional forms on the returns to education and experience, 
the education terms in equation (6a) and (7a) are extended to the linear spline model, and the 
experience terms are extended to be quartic:  
ݓഥ௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ כ ݁݀ݑ௜ ൅ ߚଶ כ ݄݅௜ ൅ ߛଵ כ ݁ݔ௜ ൅ ߛଶ כ ݁ݔ௜
ଶ ൅ ߛଷ כ ݁ݔ௜
ଷ ൅ ߛସ כ ݁ݔ௜
ସ ൅ ߝ௜  (9) 
ݎ௜
ଶ ൌ ߪ௔ଶ כ ߙଶ ൅ ߪ௕
ଶ כ ሺߚଵ כ ݁݀ݑ௜ ൅ ߚଶ כ ݄݅௜ሻଶ ൅ 
ߪ௖ଶ כ ሺߛଵ כ ݁ݔ௜ ൅ ߛଶ כ ݁ݔ௜
ଶ ൅ ߛଷ כ ݁ݔ௜
ଷ ൅ ߛସ כ ݁ݔ௜
ସሻଶ ൅ ߪఌଶ   (10) 
where ݄݅௜ measures years of post-secondary education. As there is only a small fraction of the 
workforce in each period that did not finish six years of primary education, education is 
normalized to be zero for six years of education.16 This normalization fits the model to the data 
of Figure 1 by letting component ߪ௔ଶ כ ߙଶ capture the stable wage dispersion at low values of 
education. Equations (9) and (10) are separately estimated for the base period and end period, so 
the variances of heterogeneous components are allowed to be different over time. Equations (9) 
and (10) are similar to the ones in Lemieux (2006a). To make a comparison of our results to 
Lemieux (2006a), this formula is estimated and the estimates are presented in Table 1.7.17 The 
variance decomposition result based on these estimates is shown in Table 1.8.  
The variance decomposition is computed as following: with the estimates of equations (9) 
and (10) in the base period, we can calculate the within- and between- group variances of the 
base period. Then, we can replace the coefficients of one wage determinant in the base period by 
the end period counterparts, and then calculate counterfactual wage variance after the 
replacement. The variance change between the counterfactual variance and the originally 
estimated variance is then attributed to the replaced coefficients. Specifically, for the base period 
ݐ = 1979-81, the observed within-group variance is ܧሺݎ௜,௧ଶ ሻ and the between-group variance is 
ܸܽݎሺ ݓഥ௜,௧ሻ. The sum of the within- and between-group variance is the overall wage variance in 
the base period. To calculate the counterfactual variance, we first plug in particular coefficients 
of one skill factor from the end period back into equations (9) and (10) while other elements are 
the same as in base period. We then re-compute the within- and between-group variance using 
                                                            
16 This normalization is following Lemieux (2006a). As the normalization applied, the interpretation of the constant 
becomes the return to the first six years of education and the unobservable ability that is common to everyone. So it 
is a measure a basic skill without experience and beyond 6 years of education. 
17 With equation (10), the implicit assumption is that the distribution of unobservable ability is the same for all the 
education-experiences groups. This could lead to an overestimation of effects by education and experiences to wage 
variances. Lemieux (2006a) paper dealing this problem by assuming the variance component for return to 
unobservable ability to be a linear function of education and experience, so people with high education or long 
experience could have higher unobservable ability. 
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the base period observations. For example, the change of the variance due to the price effect of 
experience is computed by plugging the relevant coefficients (which are ߛଵ, ߛଶ, ߛଷ,ߛସ) estimated 
from the end period into the base period equations. To translate it into equations: 
ݓഥ௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ כ ݁݀ݑ௜ ൅ ߚଶ כ ݄݅௜ ൅ ߛଵ,௧ଶ כ ݁ݔ௜ ൅ ߛଶ,௧ଶ כ ݁ݔ௜
ଶ ൅ ߛଷ,௧ଶ כ ݁ݔ௜
ଷ ൅ ߛସ,௧ଶ כ ݁ݔ௜
ସ ൅ ߝ௜  (9b) 
ݎ௜
ଶ ൌ ߪ௔ଶ כ ߙଶ ൅ ߪ௕
ଶ כ ሺߚଵ כ ݁݀ݑ௜ ൅ ߚଶ כ ݄݅௜ሻଶ ൅ ߪ௖ଶ כ 
൫ߛଵ,௧ଶ כ ݁ݔ௜ ൅ ߛଶ,௧ଶ כ ݁ݔ௜
ଶ ൅ ߛଷ,௧ଶ כ ݁ݔ௜
ଷ ൅ ߛସ,௧ଶ כ ݁ݔ௜
ସ൯
ଶ
൅ ߪఌଶ   (10b) 
where the subscript ݐ2 = 2003-2005. The variables and coefficients not subscripted with ݐ2 are 
from the base period. Based on equations (9b) and (10b), the counterfactual between- and within-
group variance is recomputed. Other things equal, if only the returns to experience are changed, 
the change in wage variance, calculated using the counterfactual variance minus the estimated 
variance, would be attributed to the change of the experience price.  
Note that the variance change attributed to unobservable ability is computed differently, 
because unlike education and experience, we have no quantitative measure of workers’ 
unobservable skill, but only a measure of its variance. Thus, we cannot completely separate the 
effect of the price change and the distribution of the unobservable skill. Instead, we compute the 
total variance change due to the unobservable skill by replacing the return to unobservable skill 
and the variance of its heterogeneous component at the same time. Finally, the composition 
effect is measured by the difference between the total variance change of the two periods minus 
all estimated variance change due to the price effects and the heterogeneous return effects. 
Table 1.8 shows a large increase in wage variance over time. As a benchmark, the total 
wage variance in 1979-81 was about 0.213. The 0.082 change represents an increase of 38 
percent. While both between- and within-group variance increased over time, the between group 
growth is more severe as the size doubled. From column one in Table 1.8, about 66 percent of 
the between-group variance growth is due to the increase of the return to post-secondary 
education. As a result, more than half of the total variance growth comes from the increase in the 
return to post-secondary education. This result is similar to the one presented in Lemieux 
(2006a), which suggested that 54 percent of the wage variance growth between the periods1973-
75 and 2003-05 was due to the increase in the return to post-secondary education. As shown 
later, once the occupation effect is controlled for, the proportion of the variance change 
explained by the return to post-secondary education would be smaller. 
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Our interest in this work is to measure the impact of the variation in the college premium 
across occupations on the wage inequality growth. To measure this effect, we add the interactive 
variables of higher education and occupation dummies to account for the effect of occupations 
on wage inequality. The empirical model is extended from equations (9) and (10) to equations 
(11) and (12): 
ݓഥ௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ כ ݁݀ݑ௜ ൅ ߚଶ כ ݄݅௜ ൅ ∑ ߣ௝ܱܿ ௝ܿ ൅ ∑ ߜ௝ܱܿ ௝ܿ כ ݄݅௜ ൅ ߛଵ כ ݁ݔ௜ ൅ ߛଶ כ ݁ݔ௜
ଶ ൅ ߛଷ כ ݁ݔ௜
ଷ ൅
ߛସ כ ݁ݔ௜
ସ ൅ ߝ௜  (11) 
ݎ௜
ଶ ൌ ߪ௔ଶ כ ൫ߙ ൅ ∑ ߣ௝ܱܿ ௝ܿ൯
ଶ
൅ ߪ௕
ଶ כ ൫ߚଵ כ ݁݀ݑ௜ ൅ ߚଶ כ ݄݅௜ ൅ ∑ ߜ௝ܱܿ ௝ܿ כ ݄݅௜൯
ଶ
൅ ߪ௖ଶ כ
ሺߛଵ כ ݁ݔ௜ ൅ ߛଶ כ ݁ݔ௜
ଶ ൅ ߛଷ כ ݁ݔ௜
ଷ ൅ ߛସ כ ݁ݔ௜
ସሻଶ ൅ ߪఌଶ   (12) 
where ܱܿ ௝ܿ are the occupation dummies. The interactive variables ∑ ߜ௝ܱܿ ௝ܿ כ ݄݅ measure the 
returns to a year of post-secondary education for different occupations. The coefficient of our 
interest, ߜ௝, is the occupation-specific return to the post-secondary education relative to the 
dropped occupation. After including occupation dummies, ߙ measures the return to unobservable 
skill common to the workers in one occupation, depending on which occupation is dropped. 
Similarly, ߚଶ can be viewed as an occupation-specific return to post-secondary education, 
depending on which occupation’s interactive variable is dropped. Therefore, ߚଶ ൅ ߜ௝  measures 
the additional return to the higher education relative to pre-college education for occupation ݆. 
Equations (11) and (12) are estimated for the base period and end period separately. Note that 
equation (8) is also re-estimated with equations (11) and (12), because the “school-experience 
groups” need to be re-defined as “school-experience-occupation groups” to be consistent with 
the added occupation dummies.18 
Table 1.9 shows that returns to education and experience both increased in the second 
period. The estimated return to post-secondary education is the additional return to education, 
and it is the return particularly for the dropped occupation. Therefore, to compute the total return 
to one year of post-secondary education for one occupation, we need to add the return to 
education, the return to post-secondary education and the additional return to post-secondary 
education in one occupation. For example, for occ.=3, the return to one more year of post-
secondary education in the end period would be the sum of 0.0667+(-0.0282)+0.0310 =0.0695 
log wage points. The computed returns to post-secondary education for occupations are listed in 
                                                            
18 As it can be helpful to estimate the variance precisely, we clustered occupations, assuming the wage variances 
within each occupation are not independent. The result does not change including this cluster or not. 
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the second and fourth columns of Table 1.9. The standard deviation of the occupation-specific 
returns increased from 0.019 to 0.026, and the increased variation is expected to be a positive 
contributor to the wage variance growth. 
The variances of the heterogeneous return component of unobservable ability and 
education both slightly decreased over time. In contrast, the variance of the heterogeneous return 
to experience has dramatically increased in the end period, indicating a more diversified return to 
the same experience level. The average return to unobservable ability, which is the average of 
the constant and the occupation dummies, is lowered. Because the constant and occupation 
dummies address the returns to the unobservable skill with six or less years of education in each 
occupation, the lower return indicates a less important role for the basic skills in determining the 
wage rate.  
The variance decomposition is presented in Table 1.10. As the education variables 
become complex, the computation of the counterfactual variance is adjusted. To compute the 
counterfactual variance due to a price change of post secondary education, the coefficients for 
higher education as well as the coefficients for the interactive terms of higher education and 
occupations are all replaced in the base period equation, which can be seen in the following 
equations:  
ݓഥ௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ כ ݌ݎ݁_݁݀ݑ௜ ൅ ሺߚଵ,௧ଶ ൅ ߚଵ,௧ଶሻ כ ݄݅௜ ൅ ∑ ߣ௝ܱܿ ௝ܿ ൅ ∑ ߜ௝,௧ଶܱܿ ௝ܿ כ ݄݅௜ ൅ ߛଵ כ ݁ݔ௜ ൅ ߛଶ כ
݁ݔ௜
ଶ ൅ ߛଷ כ ݁ݔ௜
ଷ ൅ ߛସ כ ݁ݔ௜
ସ ൅ ߝ௜  (11b) 
ݎ௜
ଶ ൌ ߪ௔ଶ כ ൫ߙ ൅ ∑ ߣ௝ܱܿ ௝ܿ൯
ଶ
൅ ߪ௕
ଶ כ ൫ߚଵ כ ݌ݎ݁௘ௗ௨௜ ൅ ሺߚଵ,௧ଶ ൅ ߚଵ,௧ଶ൯ כ ݄݅௜ ൅ ∑ ߜ௝,௧ଶܱܿ ௝ܿ כ ݄݅௜ሻ
ଶ ൅
ߪ௖ଶ כ ሺߛଵ כ ݁ݔ௜ ൅ ߛଶ כ ݁ݔ௜
ଶ ൅ ߛଷ כ ݁ݔ௜
ଷ ൅ ߛସ כ ݁ݔ௜
ସሻଶ ൅ ߪఌଶ   (12b) 
where ݌ݎ݁_݁݀ݑ௜is the years of pre-college education. Again, the variables without subscript ݐ2 
are from the base period. Thus, the variance change calculated from the price change of post-
secondary education includes the increase in the average price and the price change in every 
occupation. Based on (11b) and (12b), the variance change by the price effect of post-secondary 
education is 0.0263, about 32 percent of the total change (see Table 1.10). 
To separate the effect of cross-occupation variation in the college premium from the 
mean, the deviations of the occupation’s college premium from the same period’s average return 
are computed, and the deviations of the base period are replaced with those from the end period. 
This is shown in the following equations: 
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ݓഥ௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ כ ݌ݎ݁_݁݀ݑ௜ ൅ ܽݒ݁ כ ݄݅௜ ൅ ∑ ߣ௝ܱܿ ௝ܿ ൅ ∑ ௝݀,௧ଶ כ ܱܿ ௝ܿ כ ݄݅௜ ൅ ߛଵ כ ݁ݔ௜ ൅ ߛଶ כ ݁ݔ௜
ଶ ൅
ߛଷ כ ݁ݔ௜
ଷ ൅ ߛସ כ ݁ݔ௜
ସ ൅ ߝ௜  (11c) 
ݎ௜
ଶ ൌ ߪ௔ଶ כ ൫ߙ ൅ ∑ ߣ௝ܱܿ ௝ܿ൯
ଶ
൅ ߪ௕
ଶ כ ሺߚଵ כ ݌ݎ݁௘ௗ௨௜ ൅ ܽݒ݁ כ ݄݅௜ ൅ ∑ ௝݀,௧ଶ כ ܱܿ ௝ܿ כ ݄݅௜ሻ
ଶ ൅ ߪ௖ଶ כ
ሺߛଵ כ ݁ݔ௜ ൅ ߛଶ כ ݁ݔ௜
ଶ ൅ ߛଷ כ ݁ݔ௜
ଷ ൅ ߛସ כ ݁ݔ௜
ସሻଶ ൅ ߪఌଶ   (12c) 
where ܽݒ݁ is the estimated average return to post-secondary education, and ௝݀,௧ଶ is the deviation 
of the return to post-secondary occupation for occupation ݆ in the end period. The estimated 
average return is presented in the second and fourth columns of Table 1.9. The deviation for each 
occupation’s college return is the occupation-specific college return minus the average. In this 
way, if we only replace the estimated deviations, a general increase in the mean of return to post-
secondary education is controlled for, while the greater variation in the later period is accounted 
for when the counterfactual variances with the end period’s deviation is calculated. The 
counterfactual variance computed by equations (11c) and (12c) minus the observed variance 
would be attributed to the increasing variation in the return to post-secondary education. If this 
variation accounts for a big proportion of the wage variance growth due to the increase of college 
premium, it would explain the major role of the post-secondary education in wage variance 
growth. In Table 1.10, the variance change due to this cross-occupation variation of the college 
premium is about 0.0042, or 5.1 percent of the total change. 
As shown in Table 1.10, the total change of wage variance between the two periods is 
0.082, which is a 38.5 percentage increase from the base period. As the workforce is regrouped 
with occupations in addition to education and experience, the within- and between-group 
variance is re-defined and different from the decomposition result shown in Table 1.8. A greater 
portion of the total variance growth is sorted into the between-group component, because the 
groups are defined with the added dimension of occupation. 
The increase in the return to pre-college education accounts for 11 percent of total 
variance growth. This weight is about the same as the corresponding weight in Table 1.8. In 
contrast, the proportion of variance growth explained by the college premium is quite different. 
The increase in the return to post-secondary education accounts for 35 percent of the within-
group variance increase, and it accounts for 32 percent of the total change. Recall from Table 1.8 
that more than half of the total variance change was due to the increase of the return to post-
secondary education. This difference suggests that without controlling for the occupation effect 
in wage inequality analysis, some wage variance change caused by occupation differences was 
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mistakenly accounted by the return to the post-secondary education. This can be due to the 
correlation between the occupation and college background in determining the wage rate. 
In Table 1.10, the variance change due to the college premium is still much larger than 
the change due to the return to pre-college education. We hypothesize that because post-
secondary education facilitates different skills, the returns to the post-secondary education are 
diversified to reflect the prices for different skills. Using occupation to control for this skill 
difference [see equation (11c) and (12c)], the variation explains about five percent of the total 
variance increase. It is only about one-sixth of the variance increase explained by the return to 
post-secondary education. If there were no cross-occupation variation in the return to post-
secondary education, the return to the post-secondary education would still account for more 
than 25 percent of the overall wage variance increase, which remains a much larger variance 
change than the one for pre-college education. Therefore, the cross-occupation variation of the 
college premium, although an important factor that increases wage variance, is not the major 
factor that explains why the college premium change accounts for a major variance growth. In 
conclusion, this college premium variation, at least when we use the 23 occupation codes to 
verify skill characteristics, fails to explain the major role of the post-secondary education in 
wage variance growth. 
Though not large, the positive variance change due to the variation of the college 
premium still implies an interesting economic story: an unbalanced demand among different 
skills through post-secondary education exists, and it has promoted wage variance growth. The 
SBTC theory would suggest that technology development enlarges the demand gap among the 
workers who acquired different skills in college. Our result supports this hypothesis by 
confirming that the SBTC effect is observable throughout the returns to higher education.   
Among the other elements affecting the wage variances, the slightly higher return to 
experience accounts for about nine percent of the wage variance increase. Unobservable ability 
contributes negative 21 percent of the variance change. The negative effect comes from a lower 
return to the unobservable skill as well as the smaller variance of the unobservable skill 
distribution (see Table 1.9). It indicates that the unobservable skill becomes a less important 
factor to explain the wage rate, probably because the workforce generally has more education 
and experience. 
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The variances of the heterogeneous return components of education and experience 
account for 19 percent of the total variance increase. The variance of the heterogeneous return to 
education was smaller in the end period, so the variance increase must be due to the wider 
distributed returns to the same number of years of experience. 
The composition effect, which refers to the change of the distributions of the skill 
characteristics, is computed by subtracting the variance changes by the skill prices and variance 
components from the overall variance change. The composition effect accounts for about 50 
percent of the overall wage variance increases, the largest among all factors. The data in Table 
1.1 show that the composition change can be linked to labor force's better education and more 
experience in the end period. The average education has increased by more than .6 years, and 
average experience has increased by two years. Meanwhile, the variance of education also 
increased. 
Professional vs. Nonprofessional wage inequality growth 
To determine whether the professional and non-professional occupations exhibit the same 
pattern of variance change, we regroup the occupations into professional occupation (Occ. 1-10, 
except 6) and non-professional occupation group, including the production and services 
occupations (Occ. 11-22, plus 6). Equations (11) and (12) are estimated for the two occupation 
groups. Table 1.11 shows estimates for the professional occupation group and Table 1.12 shows 
the resulting variance decomposition. 
Table 1.12 shows that the wage variance in the professional group increased by 0.051, a 
25 percent increase compared to the base period. This variance growth over time is much smaller 
for the professional occupations than for the whole sample. According to the second column, the 
variance growth in the professional occupations is focused on the within-group component.  
The increase in the return to post-secondary education explains more than half of the total 
growth of wage variance. This growth due to the college premium is mainly located in the 
between-group variance component. The increase of the return to pre-college education 
accounted for 41 percent of the growth, but the variance increase is mainly found in the within-
group component. In summary, the increased return to education is the dominant force driving 
the growth of wage variance among the professional workforce, but the channels by which post- 
and pre-college education raise the variance are different. The former enlarges the wage gap by 
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raising the relative return to college-educated workers and the latter by widening the wage 
distribution of workers having similar education. 
Because the standard deviation of the returns to post-secondary education across 
occupations has doubled over time (see Table 1.11), it is surprising to find that this growth of 
variation in the college premium is a negative factor on the overall wage variance growth.19 It 
reduced the total wage variance change by 6 percent. According to equations (11c) and (12c), 
this negative change means that if the deviation of each occupation’s college premium from the 
average in the base period were the same as in the end period, and other things were equal, this 
end period college premium distribution across occupations would offset 6 percent of wage 
variance in the base period. If the result is not due to a measurement error, the explanation must 
be that the growth in education returns is greater among the workers in the base period whose 
returns from other skills are lower than the average. For example, the workers in the base period 
who were paid less for experience or unobservable skills received a greater-than-average 
increase in the return from post-secondary education in the end period. It remains to be 
understood, however, why the returns to higher education work in this way.  
Among other wage determinants shown in Table 1.12, the increasing return to experience 
increases the wage variance by 2 percent. The change in the return to the unobservable ability, 
which is also controlled for by occupation, is again negative in wage variance growth. This 
results from two elements oppositely affecting the wage variance. On the one hand, the smaller 
average of the occupation dummies means the unobservable skill required in professional 
occupations was generally paid less over time. On the other hand, the higher heterogeneous 
return component variance indicates that the variation of unobservable skill was increasing in 
professional occupations. The net outcome is that the unobservable skill becomes less important 
for explaining the change of the wage variance of professional workers. 
In contrast to the result observed for the whole sample, the variances of the 
heterogeneous return component of education and experience together made a small negative 
contribution to variance growth. The composition effect in the professional group is compressed 
to 20 percent of the total change. As shown in Table 1.2, the average level of education and 
experience in the professional group both increased, but both with smaller variances, so the 
composition effect is less important in professional occupations than in the whole sample. 
                                                            
19 Taking account of the weight of the occupations, the standard deviation still increases from 0.011 to 0.017. 
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In summary, in the professional occupations the college premium is the major source for 
the wage inequality growth. This is consistent with existing evidence that the college premium is 
more relevant to wage inequality growth at the top end of the wage distribution (Autor, Katz and 
Kearney, 2005). Another interesting finding is that although the cross occupation variation in 
college premium was enlarged, it did not enlarge the wage inequality among professional 
workers, because the increase in returns to higher education is larger among the workers who 
were paid less in other skills. 
Referring to the nonprofessional (production and services) group, Tables 1.13 and 1.14 
present the estimates and variance decomposition results. As shown in Table 1.13, the standard 
deviation of the returns to the post-secondary education is smaller in the end period, which is 
quite different from the cases of the professional occupations and the whole workforce.  
As shown in Table 1.14, the overall wage variance increased by 0.041, a 22.7% increase 
over the base period wage variance. This variance growth again is much smaller than it was for 
the whole sample. A striking difference in the production and services occupations is that the 
increase in the return to pre-college education explains more wage variance than the return to 
post-secondary education. This is the opposite of our findings for the total sample and the 
professional occupations. A possible explanation can be found in Table 1.2: the average 
education growth for this group is from 11 to 12 years of education, which does not yet represent 
general progress into post-secondary education. Thus, the increasing return to high school is 
more influential than the returns to college premium on the wage distribution change. For the 
same reason, although the returns to post-secondary education are less diversified across 
occupations in this group, the effect on wage variance change is so small that it is almost zero.   
Interestingly, within both the professional and non-professional groups, the variation in 
returns to the post-secondary education creates negative and zero changes in wage variance. 
Thus, the 5 percent positive change found in the whole sample must be between the two 
professional groups. Therefore, the positive change of total variance by the variation in the 
returns to the higher education actually enlarged the wage inequality between the professional 
and non-professional workforce. 
The increase in return to experience contributes 21.6 percent of the wage variance 
increase in the non-professional group. This portion is much larger than it is for either the 
professional group or the whole sample, making the return to experience an important source for 
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wage variance growth within production and services occupations. The change in the 
unobservable ability return largely offsets the growth of wage inequality in the services and 
production occupations. This is because that both of the average return to the unobservable 
ability by occupations and the variance of the heterogeneous unobservable ability became 
smaller over time (see Table 1.13). In summary, as the production and services occupation group 
generally gains more education and experience, the return to the unobservable ability becomes 
less important in determining the wage difference. This is generally true for the whole workforce 
and the professional group, but is particularly obvious and influential in the production and 
services group. 
The variance components of education and experience were larger in the end period (See 
Table 1.13), which explains 18 percent of the wage variance increase within the production and 
services occupations. The composition effect of education and experience explains 80 percent of 
the variance growth, which makes it the primary source of variance growth in the production and 
services group. This is consistent with the distribution change shown in Table 1.2, which shows 
that the average levels of education and experience of non-professional workers, as well as the 
variance of education of the workers have increased. 
1.5 Conclusion 
Recent studies suggest that the increasing wage gap that is concentrated at the top end of 
the wage distribution can be explained primarily by the increase in the return to post-secondary 
education. This work examines to what extent this major role of the college premium in 
explaining wage variance growth can be related to the variation in college return by skill 
differences, which are controlled for by occupations in our analysis.  
Using CPS data from 1979-81 and 2003-05 and the variance decomposition approach of 
variance components model, our empirical analysis shows that the distribution of the returns to 
the post-secondary education has been more diversified by occupations over time. Such variation 
expansion adds about five percent of the wage variance growth across the two periods. Five 
percent is relatively small compared to the overall wage variance growth due to the increasing 
return to post-secondary education. Therefore, the education-return variation by occupations 
does not explain why post-secondary education is so important to the growth of the wage 
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inequality, at least when the variation is controlled for by the 22 occupation classification in 
CPS.  
After controlling for the occupation variation, the wage variance change due to the 
increase in the return to post-secondary education is reduced from more than half to about one-
third of the total. It suggests that the variance change attributed to the college premium is 
overstated, if we do not account for the occupation effect. Our results show that the composition 
effect was the dominant source in rising wage inequality between 1979-81 and 2003-05. 
The patterns of the wage variance growth in the professional and nonprofessional 
occupations are shown to be quite different. The increasing return to education is the dominant 
driver of the wage variance growth in the professional group. In contrast, in the service and 
production group, wage variance growth is mainly due to the composition effect. This finding is 
consistent with the findings presented in Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005), which suggests that 
the growth in the 90-50 wage gap is mostly due to the price effect of education while the 50-10 
wage gap growth is mainly due to the composition effect. More importantly, within the 
professional and nonprofessional groups, the variation in college premium made no positive 
change on the wage inequality growth. Therefore, the positive effect of the variation found from 
total workforce must particularly enlarge the wage gap between the professional and non-
professional workers.  
For future study, to see how supply of education has responded to the relative demand in 
different fields of education, it would be interesting to examine the change of the wage variance 
at several periods between the two periods compared in our analysis. Then we can see if the 
college premium gaps first get larger than get smaller or if the gaps has grown continuously. In 
addition, the same methodology can be easily applied to study the impact of other interactively 
related skill characteristics on wage distribution, i.e. experience and occupations. 
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Figure 1.1 Wage Percentiles by Years of Education 
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Figure 1.1a: Wage Percentiles by Years of Education in 1979-81 and 2003-05
(With quadratic function of education)  
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Figure 1.1b: Wage Percentiles by Years of Education in 1979-81 and 2003-05
(With spline model of education)  
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Figure 1.1 Wage Percentiles by Years of Education (continued) 
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Figure 1.1c: Wage Percentiles by Years of Education in 1979-81 and 2003-05
(With spline model of education, and occ. effect is controlled for)  
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Figure 1.2 90th-10th Wage Gap Growth 
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Figure 1.2: 90th-10th Wage Gap Growth
w/o occ. controlled
with occ. controlled
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Table 1.1 Data Summary by Occupations 
 
   1979-81    2003-05  
   No. of Obs. % of Samp. Std. Dev.   No. of Obs.  % of Samp. Std. Dev. 
  Sample Size 222661    Sample Size 189655   
  Ave. Edu. 12.8917  2.9142  Ave. Edu. 13.52002  2.9265 
  Ave. Exp. 18.3455  12.6016  Ave. Exp. 20.32041  11.1281 
  Edu.>12 96967 43.55%   Edu.>12 101857 53.71%  
  Edu.>=16 52697 23.67%   Edu.>=16 59905 31.59%  
                   
Occ.Code   No. of Obs.  % of Samp. Edu>12 %of Hi_Edu.  No. of Obs.  % of Samp. Edu>12 %of Hi_Edu. 
1+2   34610 15.54% 24045 69.47%  32730 13.41% 26800 81.88% 
3   2150 0.97% 1890 87.91%  8197 3.36% 7427 90.61% 
4   13415 6.02% 10475 78.08%  8784 3.60% 7664 87.25% 
5   4002 1.80% 3558 88.91%  2948 1.21% 2654 90.03% 
6   2104 0.94% 1933 91.87%  2971 1.22% 2651 89.23% 
7   1239 0.56% 1217 98.22%  2042 0.84% 1989 97.40% 
8   6838 3.07% 6691 97.85%  7794 3.19% 7412 95.10% 
9   3026 1.36% 2447 80.87%  3589 1.47% 2942 81.97% 
10   2370 1.06% 2127 89.75%  5087 2.08% 4635 91.11% 
11   504 0.23% 214 42.46%  1122 0.46% 572 50.98% 
12   5997 2.69% 2934 48.92%  8175 3.35% 5210 63.73% 
13   2727 1.22% 736 26.99%  10339 4.24% 2951 28.54% 
14   6113 2.75% 1050 17.18%  9654 3.95% 2176 22.54% 
15   1079 0.48% 444 41.15%  2523 1.03% 1191 47.21% 
16   12677 5.69% 7895 62.28%  23663 9.69% 14604 61.72% 
17   16654 7.48% 7357 44.18%  17227 7.06% 9037 52.46% 
18   3209 1.44% 553 17.23%  2687 1.10% 525 19.54% 
19+21   60607 27.22% 12239 20.19%  51748 21.20% 14125 27.30% 
20   27215 12.22% 6530 23.99%  18060 7.40% 7096 39.29% 
22   16125 7.24% 2632 16.32%  24772 10.15% 6623 26.74% 
    
Note:  1 The first column in Table 1 is the occupation code.  See Appendix 1 for the occupations corresponding to the Occ. Code. 
 
2 Under each period, the four columns from left to the right are: Number of observations in each occupation; the percentage of 
occupation's observations over whole sample; the number of observations in each occupation whose education is greater than 12; the 
percentage of observations whose education greater than 12 over the occupation’s total number. 
 29
Table 1.2 Statistics of the General Occupation Groups 
Professional Occupation Group 
(Occ. code 1 to10, except 6) 
 
 Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
1979 Education 67650  15.08454  2.38826  0  18 
 Experience 67650  17.71007  11.47421  1  56 
 Post-
Secondary 67650  3.17082  2.203313  0  6 
       
2003 Education 58925  15.71723  2.179074  0  18 
 Experience 58925  20.03659  10.43109  1  51.5 
 Post-
Secondary 58925  3.756029  2.072275  0  6 
 
 
Production and Services Group 
(Occ. code 6, 11 to 22) 
 
 Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
1979 Education 155011  11.9347  2.5875  0  18 
 Experience 155011  18.6228  13.0534  1  57 
 Post-
Secondary 155011  0.7666  1.4405  0  6 
       
2003 Education 130730  12.5297  2.6697  0  18 
 Experience 130730  20.4483  11.4261  1  57 
 Post-
Secondary 130730  1.1256  1.6942  0  6 
 
 
  
 30
Table 1.3 OLS Estimates of Equation (1) and Equation (2) 
 
 Equation (1) Equation (2) 
 79-81 03-05 79-81 03-05 
Return to:     
     
Education 0.0599***  0.0070***  0.0633***  0.0630*** 
  (0.0016)  (0.0018)  (0.0006)  (0.0008) 
        
Education Square/10 0.0015**  0.0341***     
  (0.0006)  (0.0007)     
        
Post Secondary Edu.     0.0004  0.0452*** 
      (0.0008)  (0.001) 
        
Experience 0.0585***  0.0628***  0.0583***  0.0613*** 
  (0.0012)  (0.0016)  (0.0012)  (0.0016) 
        
Experience Square/10 
‐0.023*** 
‐
0.0224***  ‐0.0228***
‐
0.0207*** 
  (0.001)  (0.0014)  (0.001)  (0.0014) 
        
Experience Cube/100 0.0041***  0.0030***  0.004***  0.0024*** 
  (0.0003)  (0.0004)  (0.0003)  (0.0004) 
        
Experience Quad/1000 ‐0.0003***  ‐0.0001**  ‐0.0003*** 0.000 
  (0)  (0)  (0)  (0) 
        
Constant 0.6869***  0.6379***  0.6681***  0.4482*** 
  (0.0107)  (0.0129)  (0.0081)  (0.0105) 
     
Adjusted R Square 21.60% 21.59% 31.57% 31.42% 
     
     
 
Note: Single, double and triple asterisks denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 1.4 OLS Estimates of Equation (3) 
 
Variables 
Estimated Returns 
 
Returns to a year of 
Post-secondary Edu. 
79-81 03-05 79-81 03-05 
Constant  0.2626***  0.2896***     
Education  0.0515***  0.0532***     
Post‐secondary Edu.  ‐0.0483*** ‐0.0112**     
exp  0.0551***  0.0526***     
exp2 / 10  ‐0.0218*** ‐0.0165***     
exp3 / 100  0.0038***  0.0016***     
exp4 / 1000  ‐0.0002*** 0.0000     
Returns to Occ. 
dummies          
occ1_2  0.6621***  0.575***     
occ3  0.8551***  0.7005***     
occ4  0.7206***  0.5939***     
occ5  0.765***  0.4465***     
occ6  0.2699***  0.3513***     
occ7  0.8008***  0.3561***     
occ8  0.4609***  0.4236***     
occ9  0.6582***  0.5155***     
occ10  0.4874***  0.3513***     
occ11  0.2491***  0.0835**     
occ12  0.398***  0.3028***     
occ13  0.1896***  0.0172     
occ14  0.2991***  0.1172***     
occ15  0.2618***  0.1168***     
occ16  0.4827***  0.3084***     
occ17  0.5377***  0.2825***     
occ19b  0.6106***  0.3758***     
occ20  0.6357***  0.4177***     
occ22  0.5237***  0.2426***     
Returns to post‐
secondary Edu.       
occ_int1_2  0.063***  0.048***  0.0662 0.0900 
occ_int3  0.0425***  0.0305***  0.0457 0.0725 
occ_int4  0.0616***  0.045***  0.0648 0.0871 
occ_int5  0.0503***  0.0487***  0.0536 0.0907 
occ_int6  0.0205**  0.0017  0.0237 0.0437 
occ_int7  0.0535***  0.0937***  0.0568 0.1357 
occ_int8  0.0471***  0.0217***  0.0503 0.0637 
occ_int9  0.0417***  0.0236***  0.0449 0.0657 
occ_int10  0.0661***  0.0809***  0.0693 0.1229 
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Table 1.4: OLS Estimates of Equation (3) (Continued) 
 
Variables 
Estimated Returns 
 
Returns to a year of 
Post-secondary Edu. 
79-81 03-05 79-81 03-05 
occ_int11  0.0597***  0.0153  0.0630 0.0573 
occ_int12  0.0765***  0.0366***  0.0797 0.0786 
occ_int13      0.0032 0.0420 
occ_int14  0.0197**  0.0068  0.0230 0.0488 
occ_int15  0.0497***  0.0152**  0.0530 0.0572 
occ_int16  0.0807***  0.0674***  0.0840 0.1094 
occ_int17  0.0406***  0.0187***  0.0439 0.0607 
occ_int18  0.0366***  0.0138*  0.0399 0.0558 
occ_int19  0.0387***  0.002  0.0419 0.0440 
occ_int20  0.0392***  0.0127**  0.0424 0.0547 
occ_int22  0.0261***  0.0124**  0.0293 0.0544 
Adjusted R Square 30.68%  39.98%    
Average     0.0489 0.0717 
Standard dev.     0.0198 0.0267 
         
         
         
         
         
 
 
Note:  
1. The first two columns report the estimates from equation 3. Single, double and triple asterisks denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
2. The third and fourth columns report the computed returns to post-secondary education for each 
occupation, as well as the average and standard deviation of the returns.  
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Table 1.5 Quantile Regressions: without occupations 
 
A. Quadratic function of education, by equation (1) 
 
 Median 10th Quantile 90th Quantile 
 79-81 03-05 79-81 03-05 79-81 03-05 
Log wage Return to:       
Education  0.0765***  0.0057**  0.0566***  ‐0.0048*  0.0203***  0.0079** 
Educ. Square/10  ‐0.0036***  0.0373*** ‐0.0016  0.0278*** 0.0202***  0.041*** 
Experience  0.0654***  0.0653*** 0.0453***  0.0342*** 0.0544***  0.0852*** 
Exp. Square/10  ‐0.0258***  ‐0.023***  ‐0.0158***  ‐0.0078**  ‐
0.0201*** 
‐0.0364*** 
Exp. Cube/100  0.0046***  0.0031*** 0.0022***  ‐0.0002  0.0035***  0.0067*** 
Exp. Quad/1000  ‐0.0003***  ‐0.0001*  ‐0.0001  0.0001*  ‐
0.0002*** 
‐0.0004*** 
Constant  0.5328***  0.5727*** 0.3419***  0.5389*** 1.3662***  0.9248*** 
 
 
B. Spline model of education, by equation (2) 
 
 Median 10th Quantile 90th Quantile 
 79-81 03-05 79-81 03-05 79-81 03-05 
Log wage Return to:       
Education  0.0723***  0.0665***  0.0561***  0.0442***  0.0559***  0.0705*** 
Post‐secondary 
Educ. 
‐0.0073***  0.0488***  ‐0.006***  0.0317***  0.0239***  0.0608*** 
Experience  0.0655***  0.0629***  0.0449***  0.0311***  0.0539***  0.0838*** 
Exp. Square/10  ‐0.0261***  ‐
0.0204*** 
‐0.0153*** ‐0.0045**  ‐0.0195***  ‐0.035*** 
Exp. Cube/100  0.0047***  0.0022***  0.0020***  ‐0.0014*  0.0033***  0.0063*** 
Exp. Quad/1000  ‐0.0003***  0.0000  ‐0.0001  0.0003***  ‐0.0002***  ‐
0.0004*** 
Constant  0.5365***  0.3738***  0.3303***  0.3494***  1.2242***  0.7462*** 
 
 
Note:  
1. Single, double and triple asterisks denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
2. Table 4A responds to Figure 1; Table 4B responds to Figure 2. 
 
  
 34
Table 1.6 Quantile Regressions: return to post-secondary education controlled for by 
occupations 
 
 Base Period (79-81) End Period (03-05) 
 
 
Median 
10th 
Quantile 
90th 
Quantile 
 
Median 
10th 
Quantile 
90th 
Quantile 
Education  0.0581***  0.0494***  0.0425***  0.0552***  0.041***  0.0573*** 
             
Post‐secondary Edu.  ‐0.0584***  ‐0.0857***  0.0058***  ‐0.0079***  ‐0.0528***  0.0387*** 
             
Constant  0.1800***  ‐0.2023***  0.8272***  0.2308***  0.1733***  0.5992*** 
     
Additional Post‐ 
Secondary Educ. 
Payoff to occ. ( iδ ):             
occ_int1+2  0.0712***  0.1032***  0.0165*  0.0525***  0.0996***  ‐0.0159** 
occ_int3  0.0538***  0.0714***  0.0008  0.0345***  0.0787***  ‐0.0249** 
occ_int4  0.072***  0.0954***  0.0164*  0.0478***  0.0939***  ‐0.0099 
occ_int5  0.0621***  0.0751***  0.0111  0.0476***  0.0816***  0.0121 
occ_int6  0.0332***  0.047***  ‐0.0298**  0.0073  0.045***  ‐0.0461*** 
occ_int7  0.0837***  0.11***  ‐0.0101  0.1099***  0.1175***  0.0214 
occ_int8  0.0528***  0.0958***  ‐0.0004  0.0155**  0.0914***  ‐0.0285** 
occ_int9  0.0529***  0.0598***  0.0148  0.0228**  0.0598***  ‐0.0144 
occ_int10  0.072***  0.0481***  0.0711***  0.0905***  0.0841***  0.054*** 
occ_int11  0.0544***  0.0858***  0.0503**  0.0019  0.0388**  0.0183 
occ_int12  0.085***  0.1013***  0.0307**  0.052***  0.0602***  ‐0.0134* 
occ_int13             
occ_int14  0.0251**  0.0323**  ‐0.0076  ‐0.0029  0.0307***  ‐0.0167* 
occ_int15  0.0575***  0.0611***  0.0353**  0.0124  0.0436***  ‐0.0117 
occ_int16  0.0963***  0.0961***  0.0439***  0.0738***  0.0742***  0.048*** 
occ_int17  0.0427***  0.0669***  0.0128  0.0152**  0.0464***  ‐0.0076 
occ_int18  0.0401***  0.0468**  0.0338**  0.007  0.0103  0.0056 
occ_int19+21  0.0448***  0.0627***  0.0054  0.0038  0.0361***  ‐0.0328*** 
occ_int20  0.0434***  0.078***  ‐0.0004  0.011**  0.066***  ‐0.0407*** 
occ_int22  0.0304***  0.0498***  ‐0.001  ‐0.0069  0.0261***  0.0268** 
 
Notes:  
1. All quantile regressions also include quartic function of experience and occupation dummies.  
2. Single, double and triple asterisks denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 1.7 NLS Estimates of the Variance Components Model 
 
 1979-81 2003-05 
Wage Return to: 
 
  
Education 0.0714***  0.0786*** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Post-secondary Education ‐0.0095***  0.0269*** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0002) 
Experience 0.0404***  0.0474*** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0002) 
Experience Square/10 ‐0.0094***  ‐0.0111*** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0002) 
Experience Cube/100 0.0003***  ‐0.0001** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0001) 
Experience Quad/1000 0.0001***  0.0002*** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Unobserved Ability  1.0669***  0.7967*** 
(Constant) (0.0007)  (0.0011) 
  
Heterogeneous Return 
Component Variance: 
  
Unobserved ability  0.1015***  0.1639*** 
(ߪ௔ଶ) (0.0014)  (0.0033) 
 Education  0.1112***  0.1141*** 
(ߪ௕ଶ) (0.0034)  (0.002) 
Experience 0.1519***  0.1893*** 
(ߪ௖ଶ) (0.0064)  (0.0074) 
Fraction of between- 
group variance  explained 
by model 
 
94.50% 
 
95.98% 
 
 
 
Note: Single, double and triple asterisks denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 1.8 Decomposition of the 1979-81 to 2003-2005 Change in the Variance of Wage  
 
 Change in Variance 
 
 Between Group 
 
Within Group Total 
Price effects: 
 
High school and less 0.0021  0.0047  0.0068 
[4.4%]  [13.8%]  [8.3%] 
 
  Post-secondary Education 
 
0.0321  0.0114  0.0435 
[66.2%]  [33.7%]  [52.8%] 
 
Experience 
 
0.0027  0.0057  0.0084 
[5.5%]  [16.9%]  [10.2%] 
 
Unobserved Ability   ‐0.0042  ‐0.0042 
  [‐12.4%]  [‐5.1%] 
Variance Component 
change (Edu. & Exp.) 
 
  0.0137  0.0137 
  [40.6%]  [16.7%] 
 
Composition Effects 
(Distribution of Edu.&Exp.) 
 
0.0116  0.0025  0.0141 
[23.9%]  [7.5%]  [17.1%] 
 
Total changes between the 
two periods 
 
0.0485  0.0338  0.0823 
[100%]  [100%]  [100%] 
 
Total change as a 
percentage of the base 
period level 
100.1% 
 
 
20.1% 
 
 
38.5% 
 
 
 
Note: Percentage of the total column change is in square brackets. 
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Table 1.9 NLS Estimates of the Variance Components Model: post-secondary education 
are classified by occupations 
 1979-81  2003-05  
Wage Return to:     
Education 0.0585***    0.0667***   
Post-secondary Education ‐0.0555***    ‐0.0282***   
Experience 0.0384***    0.0413***   
Exp. Square /10 ‐0.0094***    ‐0.0087***   
Exp. Cube /100 0.0004***    ‐0.0004***   
Exp. Quad /1000 0.0001***    0.0002***   
Constant 0.5782***    0.5783***   
Post-Secondary Edu. By 
Occupations (઼ܑ):  
 
 
 
occ_int1+2 0.0611***  0.0641  0.0495***  0.0880 
occ_int3 0.0401***  0.0431  0.0310***  0.0695 
occ_int4 0.0595***  0.0625  0.0460***  0.0845 
occ_int5 0.0475***  0.0504  0.0497***  0.0882 
occ_int6 0.0237***  0.0266  0.0047***  0.0432 
occ_int7 0.0465***  0.0494  0.0908***  0.1293 
occ_int8 0.0396***  0.0426  0.0218***  0.0603 
occ_int9 0.0400***  0.0430  0.0253***  0.0638 
occ_int10 0.0665***  0.0694  0.0815***  0.1200 
occ_int11 0.0537***  0.0567  0.0156***  0.0542 
occ_int12 0.0725***  0.0755  0.0370***  0.0755 
occ_int13   0.0030    0.0385 
occ_int14 0.0178***  0.0207  0.0072***  0.0457 
occ_int15 0.0461***  0.0491  0.0177***  0.0562 
occ_int16 0.0783***  0.0812  0.0688***  0.1074 
occ_int17 0.039***  0.0419  0.0203***  0.0588 
occ_int18 0.0365***  0.0394  0.0174***  0.0559 
occ_int19+21 0.0367***  0.0397  0.0021**  0.0406 
occ_int20 0.0369***  0.0398  0.0117***  0.0502 
occ_int22 0.0242***  0.0272  0.0127***  0.0512 
Average   0.0463    0.0690 
Std. Dev.   0.0189    0.0263 
Heterogeneous Return 
Component Variance: 
    
Unobserved ability (ߪ௔ଶ) 0.0558***    0.0522***   
Education (ߪ௕ଶ) 0.1598***    0.1448***   
Experience (ߪ௖ଶ) 0.2501***    0.3909***   
Fraction of between- 
group variance explained by 
model 
 
93.34% 
   
96.02% 
 
 
   Notes:  1. Both estimations also include occupation dummies. 
2. Occ.18 is dropped in occupation dummy and Occ. 13 in interactive dummy. 
3. Single, double and triple asterisks denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 38
Table 1.10 Decomposition of the 1979-81 to 2003-2005 Change in the Variance of Wage: 
post-secondary education are classified by occupations 
 
 Change in Variance 
 
 Between Group 
 
Within Group Total 
Price effects: 
 
High school and less 0.0025  0.0065  0.0090 
[4.6%]  [22.9%]  [10.9%] 
 
Post-secondary Education 
 
0.0191  0.0072  0.0263 
[35.4%]  [25.3%]  [31.9%] 
Post-secondary Education 
Through Occupations 0.0039  0.0003  0.0042 
[7.3%]  [0.9%]  [5.1%] 
 
Experience 
 
0.0020  0.0055  0.0075 
[3.8%]  [19.3%]  [9.2%] 
 
Unobserved Ability 0.0100  ‐0.0274  ‐0.0173 
[18.6%]  [‐96.3%]  [‐21.1%] 
Variance Component 
change (Edu. & Exp.) 
 
  0.0159  0.0159 
  [56.0%]  [19.3%] 
 
 Composition Effects 
(Distribution of Edu.&Exp.) 
 
0.0202  0.0207  0.0409 
[37.5%]  [72.9%]  [49.7%] 
 
Total changes between the 
two periods 
0.0539  0.0284  0.0823 
 [100%]  [100%]  [100%] 
 
Total change as a 
percentage of the base 
period level 
79.9%  19.5%  38.5% 
 
Note: Percentage of the total column change is in square brackets. 
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Table 1.11 NLS Estimates of the Variance Components Model: Post-secondary education 
are classified by professionals occupations 
 
 1979-81  2003-05  
Wage Return to:     
Education 0.052***    0.0849***   
Post-secondary Education ‐0.0098***    ‐0.0257***   
Experience 0.0419***    0.0465***   
Exp. Square /10 ‐0.008***    ‐0.0088***   
Exp. Cube /100 ‐0.0003**    ‐0.0011***   
Exp. Quad /1000 0.0001***    0.0003***   
Constant 1.0598***    0.7736***   
Post-Secondary Edu. By 
Occupations (઼ܑ):  
 
 
 
occ_int1+2 0.0266***  0.0687  0.0293***  0.0885 
occ_int3 0.0057***  0.0479  0.0115***  0.0707 
occ_int4 0.0237***  0.0659  0.0271***  0.0863 
occ_int5 0.014***  0.0562  0.0298***  0.0890 
occ_int7 0.0163***  0.0585  0.0745***  0.1337 
occ_int8   0.0422    0.0592 
occ_int9 0.0042***  0.0464  0.0043***  0.0635 
occ_int10 0.029***  0.0711  0.061***  0.1202 
Average   0.0571    0.0889 
Std. Dev.   0.0109    0.0263 
Heterogeneous Return 
Component Variance: 
    
Unobserved ability (ߪ௔ଶ) 0.0636***    0.0989***   
Education (ߪ௕ଶ) 0.095***    0.0766***   
Experience (ߪ௖ଶ) 0.1685***    0.1827***   
Fraction of between-  
group variance explained by 
model 
91.26%    90.65%   
 
Notes:  
1. Both estimations also include occupation dummies. 
2. Occ.8 is dropped in both occupation dummy and interactive dummy. 
3. Single, double and triple asterisks denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 1.12 Decomposition of the 1979-81 to 2003-2005 Change in the Variance of Wage: 
post-secondary education are classified by professional occupations 
 
 Change in Variance 
 
 Between Group 
 
Within Group Total 
Price effects: 
 
High school and less 0.0016  0.0197  0.0213 
[12.0%]  [51.9%]  [41.6%] 
 
Post-secondary Education 
 
0.0170  0.0097  0.0268 
[129.6%]  [25.6%]  [52.3%] 
Post-secondary Education 
Through Occupations ‐0.0010  ‐0.0024  ‐0.0034 
[‐7.3%]  [‐6.4%]  [‐6.6%] 
 
Experience 
 
‐0.0010  0.0022  0.0012 
[‐7.3%]  [5.7%]  [2.3%] 
 
Unobserved Ability ‐0.0018  ‐0.0042  ‐0.0061 
[‐14.0%]  [‐11.1%]  [‐11.9%] 
Variance Component 
change (Edu. & Exp.) 
 
  ‐0.0023  ‐0.0023 
  [‐5.9%]  [‐4.4%] 
 
 Composition Effects 
(Distribution of Edu.& Exp.) 
 
‐0.0027  0.0129  0.0102 
[‐20.2%]  [33.9%]  [20.0%] 
 
Total changes between the 
two periods 
0.0132  0.0380  0.0512 
 
Total change as a 
percentage of the base 
period level 
28.50%  24.12%  25.13% 
 
Note: Percentage of the total column change is in square brackets. 
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Table 1.13 NLS Estimates of the Variance Components Model: post-secondary education 
are classified by production and services occupations 
 
 1979-81  2003-05  
Wage Return to:     
Education 0.0565***    0.0657***   
Post-secondary Education ‐0.0542***    ‐0.0268***   
Experience 0.0395***    0.0387***   
Exp. Square /10 ‐0.0121***    ‐0.0079***   
Exp. Cube /100 0.0012***    ‐0.0006***   
Exp. Quad /1000 0.0000    0.0002***   
Constant 0.6027***    0.6057***   
Post-Secondary Edu. By 
Occupations (઼ܑ):  
 
 
 
occ_int6 0.0255***  0.0278  0.0047***  0.0435 
occ_int11 0.0523***  0.0546  0.0152***  0.0540 
occ_int12 0.07***  0.0723  0.0358***  0.0747 
occ_int13   0.0023    0.0388 
occ_int14 0.0165***  0.0188  0.0069***  0.0457 
occ_int15 0.0453***  0.0476  0.0174***  0.0562 
occ_int16 0.0772***  0.0794  0.0678***  0.1067 
occ_int17 0.0378***  0.0400  0.0197***  0.0585 
occ_int18 0.0357***  0.0380  0.0171***  0.0559 
occ_int19+21 0.0356***  0.0378  0.0017**  0.0405 
occ_int20 0.0352***  0.0374  0.0107***  0.0495 
occ_int22 0.0224***  0.0247  0.0128***  0.0516 
Average   0.0401    0.0563 
Std. Dev.   0.0216    0.0185 
Heterogeneous Return 
Component Variance: 
    
Unobserved ability (ߪ௔ଶ) 0.0461***    0.0442***   
Education (ߪ௕ଶ) 0.3196***    0.3137***   
Experience (ߪ௖ଶ) 0.2844***    0.3532***   
Fraction of between- group 
variance explained by model 
91.29%    93.09%   
Notes:  
1. Both estimations also include occupation dummies. 
2. Occ.13 is dropped in interactive dummies of college education and occupation. 
3. Single, double and triple asterisks denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 1.14 Decomposition of the 1979-81 to 2003-2005 Change in the Variance of Wage: 
Post-secondary education are classified by production and services occupations 
 
 Change in Variance 
 
 Between Group 
 
Within Group Total 
Price effects: 
 
High school and less 0.0026  0.0120  0.0146 
[16.0%]  [49.8%]  [36.2%] 
 
Post-secondary Education 
 
0.0031  0.0042  0.0073 
[18.9%]  [17.7%]  [18.1%] 
Post-secondary Education 
Through Occupations ‐0.0001  0.0000  ‐0.0001 
[‐0.4%]  [‐0.0%]  [‐0.2%] 
 
Experience 
 
0.0028  0.0058  0.0087 
[17.4%]  [24.3%]  [21.6%] 
 
Unobserved Ability ‐0.0058  ‐0.0242  ‐0.0299 
[‐35.6%]  [‐100.7%]  [‐74.5%] 
Variance Component 
change (Edu. & Exp.) 
 
  0.0072  0.0072 
  [30.2%]  [18.0%] 
 
 Composition Effects 
(Skill level of Edu. & Exp.) 
 
0.0135  0.0189  0.0324 
[83.3%]  [78.7%]  [80.6%] 
 
Total changes between the 
two periods 
0.0045  0.0058  0.0103 
 
Total change as a 
percentage of the base 
period level 
35.79%  16.99%  21.56% 
 
Note: Percentage of the total column change is in square brackets. 
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CHAPTER 2 - U.S. Immigration Wage Differentials across the Wage 
Distributions: 1990 to 2006 
2.1 Introduction 
Accumulating evidence suggests that, when the wage differential between immigrants 
and natives is compared, the entire wage distribution should be considered. Depending on where 
in the distribution the comparison is made, a comparison based on distributions may have 
implications that differ from the conventional approach of comparing means (see for example, 
LaLonde and Topel, 1992 and Yuengert, 1994). One of the first papers to study immigration 
wage differentials along with the earning distributions was by Bucher and DiNardo (2002). They 
studied the wage gap between natives and immigrants based on a comparison of wage densities. 
To compare the wage distributions across different periods, their work used U.S. decennial 
Census data from 1960 to 1990, and the wage densities were estimated based on a non-
parametric method, Kernel density estimator. They suggest that after controlling for structural 
change in the labor market and changes in the skill level of the immigrant cohort, the distribution 
of immigrant wages does not move significantly relative to the distribution of native wages.  
Following the idea of comparing wage distributions, Chiswick et al. (2006) compared the 
wage differential of native-immigrant earnings at different quantiles of the wage distribution. In 
contrast to Bucher and DiNardo, their wage distribution estimation was based on quantile 
regression methodology. Using 2000 Census data, they highlighted the impact of English skill 
levels for immigrants on wage differentials. They found that the immigrant-native wage gap 
varies with different income levels, and it is relatively larger in the lower wage deciles. 
The present research follows this trend to study immigrant wage differentials based on 
earning distributions, and it takes advantage of recently available data to extend the study beyond 
2000 census data.20 The paper is motivated in part by an observation by Borjas and Friedberg 
(2007) of a turnaround of the growth in the immigrant-native wage differential. According to 
U.S. Census data from 1960 to 2000, they showed that the earnings of immigrants relative to 
                                                            
20 Most U.S. immigrant wage studies use Census data that is up to 2000. One exception is Smith (2006), who uses 
CPS data of 2002. 
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native workers declined continuously from 1960 to 1990, but the trend was reversed between 
1990 and 2000. Borjas and Friedberg suggest that the increase of H1B visa immigrants explains 
this upturn in the earnings of recent immigrants, because H1B immigrants are not only highly 
educated but also equipped with the skills that are demanded in the U.S. labor market.  
One objective of the present study is to test whether the narrowing of wage differentials 
has continued after 2000. Thus, 1990 to 2006 data is used to examine how the wage differential 
is distributed and developed at different wage levels. By comparing estimated earning 
distributions, we check whether the narrowing of the wage differential exists through the whole 
distribution, or is concentrated in a fraction of the distribution. In addition, taking advantage of a 
recently developed decomposition method, we attempt to ascertain which economic factors 
determine the size and the growth of the wage differential. Specifically, we want to know how 
factors, such as skills, prices or market structure, contribute to the wage gap at different levels of 
wage distribution and how they affect the growth of the wage gap. 
Based on Census data from 1990 and 2000, our research agrees with early findings that 
the immigrant-native wage differential declined from 1990 to 2000 at all wage deciles, after the 
difference in skill characteristics is controlled for. However, this decline did not continue after 
2000. According to 2006 American Community Survey (ACS) data, we find an expansion of the 
wage gap between recent immigrants and native workers from 2000 to 2006, whether we 
measure the raw gap or the gap after including basic controls. Using a decomposition approach 
based on quantile regressions, we find that in each period of 1990, 2000, and 2006, the wage 
differential was most pronounced in the lower end to the median level of the wage distribution. 
The major reason for the existing wage differential is the skill differences between immigrants 
and native workers. However, within the observed wage differential, the proportion due to the 
difference in skill prices has grown larger over time. Decomposing the growth of the wage 
differential between recent immigrants and natives from 1990 to 2006, we find the growth is 
relatively larger at the top and bottom end of the wage distribution, and the reason for the growth 
is due to the faster skill growth of native workers compared to skill growth among the recently 
arrived immigrants. 
The rest of the paper is organized as the follows. Section 2 introduces data and presents 
descriptive statistics. Section 3 discuses the results from quantile regression analysis, in which 3a 
focuses on the measurement of the immigrant-native differentials at various wage percentiles, 
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and 3b focuses on the immigrant-native difference in returns to labor market skills. Section 4 
describes the approach of decomposition based on the quantile regression method and presents 
the results. Section 5 decomposes and discusses the growth of the immigrant-native wage 
differentials between 1990 and 2006. A summary and conclusion are offered in Section 6. 
2.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Census data are standard source of information in existing studies of immigrant wage, so 
we include the 1% Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) Files of 1990 and 2000 Census for our 
analysis. To take advantage of recently released data, we also include data from the 2006 
American Community Survey (ACS), which is also a 1% sample of US population. All these 
data are provided by an online dataset of IPUMS-USA, a machine-readable database by the 
Minnesota Population Center (Ruggles et al, 2004).  
The data in our study includes full-time male workers between the age of 25 and 64, 
excluding self-employed workers and the military. Specifically, these are male workers in the 
1% US census of 1990, 2000, and ACS 2006 who are not in school, employed but not by self-
owned business or the military service branches, worked last year, and were not absent from 
work due to layoff or on vacation. Among these workers, immigrants are defined as those born 
outside of the United States and not to U.S. parents. In addition, because the immigrants who 
arrived in the United States within the last five years better represent the composition change of 
immigrants, we discuss these so-called recently arrived immigrants separately from the overall 
immigrants. This separation also partially controls for cohort effects. A summary of data is 
presented in Table 2.1.  
Following the lead of other work on immigrant wages, we choose the basic labor market 
characteristics as control variables for analyzing hourly log wages. Years of education, in a range 
of 0 to 22, is recoded from the educational attainment recorded in PUMS data.21 Potential 
experience is calculated as age minus years of education minus six.22 The data roughly records 
the English proficiency of workers, so English skill levels are controlled for by dummy variables 
in our analysis. In addition, race and metropolitan dummies are included. The hourly wage is 
computed using the yearly earning divided by usual working hours, and the wage is adjusted to 
its equivalence of the 1989 dollar value for cross-time comparison.  
                                                            
21 The education attainment is originally recorded as degrees and grades, so the “years of education” is estimated. 
22 The observations with negative potential experience are then dropped. 
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Table 2.1 shows that, in all three years, immigrant male workers on average earn a lower 
hourly wage than native male workers, but they also on average have a lower educational 
attainment and less market experience. The changes of average log wage are small for all three 
groups, but difference in trends are noticeable. The average log wage of native workers slightly 
increased over time, while the average wage for all immigrants decreased. The average log wage 
of recent immigrants first increased from 1990 to 2000, but then decreased in 2006 to a level 
lower than 1990. 
 The average schooling of overall immigrants is lower than native workers. By 2006, the 
schooling gap is 1.48 years, a slight reduction from a gap of 1.7 years in 1990. Recent 
immigrants in 2000 and 2006 are more educated compared to all immigrants of the same period, 
indicating progress in the educational attainment among recent immigrants. Native workers also 
made gains in their educational attainment at the same time but at a slower pace, so immigrants 
are slowly catching up in terms of the schooling. The variation of schooling among the 
immigrants is considerably larger than among native workers, indicated by the variance of 
schooling for immigrants, which is about two times larger than the variance for native workers.23  
The relative experience of all immigrants compared to natives was positive in 1990, 
which was 1.2 years more than native workers, but it became negative in 2000 as -0.3 yeasr and 
in 2006 as -1.1 years.24 The change can be partly explained by looking at the average experience 
of recent immigrants. In 1990, recent immigrants had 3 years less potential experience than 
native workers, and the gap became 6.5 years in 2006. This indicates that recent immigrants are 
younger and less experienced than immigrants who arrived earlier. As discussed in Smith (2006), 
such a trend can be attributed to two facts: the baby boom made native-born workers older in the 
past 50 years, and immigrants have become younger as the pace of immigration has quickened.  
 According to the measure of English skill in census data, "Poor English” is a dummy 
variable that is defined to be “one” for those who reported that they do not speak English well, or 
do not speak English at all. It is “zero” for those who speak only English and for those who 
reported they speak English well or very well.  By this measure, the proportion of good English 
                                                            
23 A relevant finding is in Smith (2006) is that the immigrants are more highly represented in both the lowest and 
highest rungs of the education ladder. According to the Borjas (1987) model, this is because immigration decision is 
a self-selection result either by the more-than-average skilled labors (positive-selection) from a country where there 
is less wage inequality than the U.S., or by less-than-average skilled labors (negative selection) from a country 
where there is more wage inequality. 
24 Because this “potential” experience is estimated from age minus years of education, if immigrants in general are 
more likely to experience a layoff period after graduation, the experience of immigrants is overestimated. 
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speakers among all immigrants and recent immigrants has decreased over time. This contrasts 
with the fact that the schooling of recent immigrants has increased at the same time. A possible 
explanation is could be that more immigrants in later years, though with more years of schooling, 
are from non-English speaking countries. Finally, immigrant workers are more likely to work in 
metropolitan areas. 
An overview of observed wage differentials in which wage densities are compared is 
presented in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. Figure 2.1 shows the differential between all immigrants and 
native workers, and Figure 2.2 shows the differential between recent immigrants and native 
workers. The wage densities are constructed with Gaussian kernel estimates using the optimal 
bandwidth that minimizes the mean integrated squared error if the data were Gaussian.25 As 
shown in Figure 2.1, compared to native workers, the wage distribution of immigrant workers is 
less symmetric and centered near the lower-than-median wage of native workers. In contrast, the 
differential at the upper tail and at the very bottom is small. Accordingly, immigrants are more 
likely to fall in the lower tail of wage distribution and less likely to be in the middle range. 
Figure 2.2 shows a similar pattern of differential between recent immigrants and natives. Recent 
immigrants are more likely to earn a wage at the lower end of the wage distribution, even 
compared to the all immigrant cohort.  
2.3 Estimated Differentials by Quantile Regressions 
2.3.1 Wage differential after control variables 
In this section, we measure immigrant-native wage differentials at different wage 
percentiles, using the quantile regression method and pooling data for both natives and 
immigrants. The wage differentials are measured by the coefficients of an immigration dummy 
variable at each wage decile. Because immigrant and native labor data are pooled together, the 
same standard of wage quantiles is applied to both groups. Wage differentials are estimated in 
two ways: 1) the observed, raw wage differential, and 2) the wage differential after skill 
variables have been controlled for. Results shown in Table 2.2a compare all immigrants to 
natives, and in Table 2.2b compare recent immigrants to natives. 
                                                            
25 We use STATA 10 to estimate the Kernel Densities, and the optimal bandwidth is set as default. 
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In Table 2.2, the first rows under each year present the observed wage differential from 
the 10th to the 90th wage percentiles. The differentials are measured by the coefficient of the 
immigration dummy “ܾ” in the following equation: 
    ݓ௜ ൌ ܽ ൅ ܾ כ ݀௜௠.         (1) 
Equation (1) is estimated by quantile regressions at the 10th, 20th ... 90th wage deciles, in which 
ݓ௜ is the log hourly wage, ܽ is a constant, and ݀௜௠ is a dummy variable for overall immigrants in 
Table 2.2a, and for recent immigrants in Table 3.2b. Because no control variables are included in 
equation (1), ܾ measures the raw wage differential that is directly observed at each wage decile. 
The second line under each year in Table 2.2 presents the wage differential after 
controlling for the skill differences. The differentials are measured by the coefficients of 
immigration dummy for each decile in the following equation:  
    ݓ௜ ൌ ܽ ൅ ݔ௜ߚ ൅ ܾ כ ݀௜௠.                  (2) 
Equation (2) is estimated by quantile regressions at the 10th, 20th ... 90th wage deciles, in which 
ݔ௜ accounts for the skill characteristics listed in Table 2.1, and ߚ is a vector of log wage returns 
to labor market skill characteristics. The coefficient ܾ measures the wage differential after 
control it for the skill variables. With a common ߚ for the natives and immigrants, equation (2) 
implies the same returns to labor market skill characteristics for both groups. We will see later 
that this "same price" assumption is unrealistic. Here we need a simple measure of the wage 
differential after controlling for the difference in skills and prices. As skill variables are included, 
the wage gap measured by equation (2) is the part of the differential that is neither explained by 
price differences nor by skill differences. Let’s call it “the wage gap after controls” to distinguish 
it from the raw wage gap measure. 
Let's first look at the wage gap between all immigrants and native workers, as shown in 
Table 2.2a. Two patterns are common in all three years. First, the wage gaps are found to be 
largest among the workers who earn a lower-than-medium wage, and the wage gap decreases as 
one moves up to higher wage levels. This pattern remains true for both the raw wage gap and the 
wage gap after controls. Alternatively, this trend can be clearly read through Figure 2.3, which is 
also measured using equation (1) and (2), but depicts “b” from every wage percentile. Another 
common pattern in all three periods is that the wage gaps after controls are much smaller than the 
raw wage gap, and they are generally less than 20 percent of the raw gaps. This means more than 
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80 percent of the raw wage gaps, depending on the wage deciles, are explainable by controlling 
for basic labor skills.  
Using Table 2.2a for a cross-time comparison, we see the raw wage gap between all 
immigrant and native workers continuously growing from 1990 to 2006 in all wage deciles 
except for the 10th and the 90th. On the other hand, the wage gaps measured after controlling for 
skills at the 10th to 40th wage deciles first enlarged from 1990 to 2000, and then decreased from 
2000 to 2006. From 1990 to 2006, the negative, after-control wage differentials at the lower end 
of the wage distribution is more than doubled. The after-control wage differentials at the upper 
end of the wage distribution were positive in 1990, but they became either smaller or negative in 
2006.  
In Table 2.2b, which presents the recent immigrant-native wage gap, the pattern still 
holds true that the wage gap is largest at the lower end of the wage distribution and getting 
smaller while moving up to the higher end. What is different in Table 2.2b is that the wage gaps 
after controlling for skills account for a large proportion of the raw gap, which ranges from one-
half to one-fourth, depending on which wage deciles are compared. Thus, controlling for basic 
skills explains only about half of the observed wage gap between recent immigrants and native 
workers. 
Another difference between Tables 2.2a and 2.2b comes from the different patterns of 
raw gap growth over time. In Table 2.2b, the raw wage gap between recent immigrants and 
natives is increasing strictly from 1990 to 2006 at the 10th and the 20th wage deciles. The raw 
wage gaps at the 30th to 70th and the 90th wage deciles first decrease from 1990 to 2000, but 
end up being larger in 2006. The raw gaps at all wage deciles, except the 80th, are larger in 2006 
compared to 1990, and the size of increases are particularly large in the lower end of the 
distribution from the 10th to 40th wage deciles. 
In terms of the gaps after controls, Table 2.2b shows that wage gaps between recent 
immigrants and natives were smaller in 2000 than in 1990. This is consistent with a finding in 
Borjas and Friedberg (2007), in which they found the long-term trend of the immigration wage 
gap increasing from 1960 to 1990 was turned around in the late 1990s. However, according to 
the data from the 2006 ACS, the immigrant-native wage gap recovered in 2006, though it did not 
return to the size it was in 1990. From 1990 to 2000, the wage differential reduction occurs 
mostly around the median of wage distribution, i.e., the 40th to 60th, and changes little at the 
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lower end, the 10th and 20th deciles. This result illustrates the advantage of making the wage 
comparison over distributions rather than basing it on point estimations like means: the 
conclusion could be different, depending on at which point the comparison is made.  
In summary, the estimates in Table 2.2 illustrate that, between all immigrants and natives, 
both the raw wage gap and the wage gap after controls are concentrated at the lower end of wage 
distributions, and they both increased from 1990 to 2006. The raw wage gap between recent 
immigrants and natives also becomes larger over the same time, but the gaps after controls 
became smaller with fluctuation. Again, the estimates of wage gap that control for skill 
differences in Table 2.2 is restricted by an assumption that immigrants and natives are paid the 
same for their labor market skills. In the next section, we will find out how skills were 
compensated differently in these groups. 
2.3.2 Different returns/prices to skills 
In this section, quantile regressions at each percentile (or 1%) are estimated separately for 
immigrants, recent immigrants, and natives, so there are 99 quantile regressions for each group. 
Thus, the returns to human capital are allowed to differ for immigrants and natives. The equation 
for quantile regression estimation is the same as equation (2), except that the dummy variable for 
immigrant workers is dropped. To save space, only the estimates for the 10th, 50th, and 90th are 
presented in Table 2.3. Corresponding OLS estimates are included for comparison. As expected 
with the given sample size, the coefficients are estimated fairly precisely, i.e., the standard errors 
are relatively small.  
According to the OLS results shown in Table 2.3, in all three selected periods, the returns 
to education and experience are higher for native workers than for the immigrants. Such a result 
is typical when the focus is on the conditional mean. In contrast, the quantile regression analysis 
shows that the increments in earnings associated with skills vary across the earnings 
distributions. Taking 2006 as an example, we see that for all three groups the log wage return to 
education at the lower end of wage distributions is lower than it is at the higher end. At the same 
quantile of each group, the wage percentage increment for one more year of education is greatest 
for native workers, lower for overall immigrants, and lowest for recent immigrants. The latter 
result suggests that, as staying time in the U.S. increases, an immigrant’s schooling becomes 
more effective as wage determinent. 
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The lower payoff for immigrants’ schooling has been well documented in extant studies. 
Some evidence suggests that the difference in returns to schooling between U.S. immigrants and 
native workers is due to a less-than-perfect international transferability of human capital, which 
can be due to the country of original language, differences in education quality (see Chiswick, 
1978 and 1979; Bratsberg and Ragan, 2002), and/or a mismatch of education and occupations 
among the foreign born workers (Chiswick and Miller, 2005). 
The quantile regression analysis of different periods produced an interesting finding for a 
cross-time comparison of the education premium at different wage levels. Table 2.3 shows a 
large increase in the return to education among the native workers over time, especially at the 
upper end of the wage distribution. However, such growth in returns is less obvious for all 
immigrants and almost nonexistent for recent immigrants.  
In the U.S. labor market, the growth of returns to education concentrated on the upper 
end of wage distribution has been discussed extensively in extant wage inequality studies, and 
the reasons for it have been attributed to the general growth of demand for skills and the trend 
toward skill biased technological change (SBTC) that favors higher education skills (see i.e. 
Deschênes, 2001 and Lemieux, 2006a).  
This trend of increasing returns to education affected native workers and immigrants 
differently. Though the growth in the education premium also exists for all immigrants, the 
growth is a much smaller than it is for native workers. On the other hand, the effect does not 
even exist for the recently arrived immigrants. Even worse, the recent immigrant workers at the 
upper end of wage distribution, who are more likely to attain higher education than median and 
lower wage workers, even encountered a decrease in the return to education in 2006, compared 
to their counterparts in 1990.  
Such a result suggests that, although the recent trend toward skill biased demand in the 
U.S. labor market has increased the return to schooling, the effect does not immediately affect 
immigrants who have just arrived. After some time in which their education skills are transferred 
to fit the domestic labor market, immigrants merged into the trend, though not fully, in that their 
education premium also increased. Such a result is also intuitively reasonable. The recently 
arrived immigrants lack country-specific information and, perhaps, language fluency. After 
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arriving, recent immigrants need time to collect relevant information and transfer their education 
skills so the skills have a market value similar to those of native workers.26  
As with education, the returns to experience for the native born are higher than for 
immigrants in general. However, in contrast to the case of the education premium, recent 
immigrants are advantaged compared to overall immigrants in returns to experience. Taking 
workers with 20 years of experience as an example and using the OLS result, the average return 
to experience for a native worker in 2006 is 0.70 log points. The numbers for immigrants and 
recent immigrants are 0.28 and 0.33. Based on the quantile analysis, the recent immigrants at the 
higher end of the wage distribution have a higher return to experience. The experience return for 
high-wage recent immigrants is not only higher than it is for overall immigrants, but also higher 
than it is for natives at the same wage quantile. 
Again, what's more interesting about the return to experience is evident in a closer 
examination of the different wage levels. Among the native workers, the difference in the return 
to experience is not large between the 10th, 50th and 90th wage percentiles. However, for the 
recent immigrants, the difference is so big that the workers at 90th wage percentile in all three 
years earned a return to experience about 4 times higher than the workers at the 10th percentile. 
In addition, in all three years, the returns to experience for the recent immigrants at the 90th 
wage decile are higher than they are for native workers at the same wage level. This suggests that 
the recent immigrants who successfully earn a wage at the top level of the wage distribution have 
market experience that is highly valued or demanded in the U.S. labor market. However, this 
higher return to experience does not accrue to overall immigrants, which is a puzzling result. A 
possible explanation is that these are generally temporary immigrants, but then the question is 
why they do not stay in the U.S. to take the advantage of the high returns to experience. 
Another notable immigrant-native earning difference evident in Table 2.3 is that the 
intercept in the immigrants’ wage equation is much larger than the one in the natives' wage 
equation.27 Such a result is not unique to our data. A similar result was reported by Chiswick et 
al, (2006), whose study based on 2000 U.S. census data. Though the result is not supposed to be 
random, there is no explicit discussion about why the difference in constants is generated. A 
possible explanation of such difference is the well known "self selectivity" effect of immigrants. 
                                                            
26 See Kubotsky (2001) for a detailed discussion about immigrants’ human capital transfer. 
27 This size difference of constants in earning equations is relevant to our later discussion about the decomposition of 
the growth of the wage differentials, so it is addressed here. 
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Immigrant workers do not represent a random sample of the population from foreign countries, 
because the immigration decision could be correlated to motivation and ability. In other words, 
immigrants in general have more unobservable abilities regardless of their observable skills. If 
the regression equation does not include such unobservable ability or motivation variables, such 
correlation is shown in the intercept.28 
2.4 Counterfactual Analysis 
In this section, we use the estimates of 99 quantile regressions for each group to 
decompose the wage difference between native and immigrant log wage distributions. The 
decomposition accounts for a component that is due to the difference in labor market 
characteristics between native and immigrant workers, as well as the different returns to the skill 
characteristics. This decomposition is in the same sprit as the Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) 
decomposition method, except that, rather than identifying the sources of the difference between 
the means of two distributions, we explain the differences by quantiles between the native and 
the immigrant log wage distributions.   
There are different techniques available in the literature for decomposing the differences 
in wage distributions based on quantile regression techniques, i.e., see Melly (2005). We use the 
approach developed by Mechado and Mata (2005). The basic idea is to generate two 
counterfactual wage densities: (i) the immigrant log wage density that would arise if immigrants 
were given natives' labor market characteristics but continued to be paid like immigrants; (ii) the 
wage density that would arise if immigrants retained their labor market characteristics but these 
characteristics were paid like natives.  
We follow the Machado-Mata approach almost exactly to construct the counterfactual 
density. The approach can be summarized as the following steps. 
Step 1. Start with 0.01, pick 99 numbers from (0, 1) with the equal distance of 0.01, 
namely ߠଵ, ߠଶ, …,ߠଽଽ. 
Step 2. Use the immigrant dataset and quantile regression approach to estimate vectors, 
ܾ௜௠ሺߠ௜ሻ, for ݅ ൌ 1 … 99. The superscript "im" indicates the coefficients are estimated from the 
immigrant dataset. ߠ௜ is from Step 1. The quantile regressions are estimated using equation (2) 
                                                            
28 In this situation, if a regression equation does not include ability or motivation variables, the intercept would be 
upward-biased and the coefficients or returns to skill characteristics would be downward-biased. For a more detailed 
discussion about the self-selection of immigrants, see Borjas (1987) and Chiswick (1999). 
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without the immigrant dummy variable. Note that steps 1 and 2 actually performed in section 3b, 
and part of the result from performing theses steps has been shown in Table 2.3.  
Step 3. Make m draws at random with replacements from the native workers dataset, 
denoted by ௝ܺ௡௔, for ݆ ൌ 1, … , ݉. The superscript "na" indicates the observations are from the 
native worker dataset. 
Step 4. Generate the counterfactual density as  ሼݕ௝|ݕ௝ ൌ  ݔ௝௡௔ܾ௜௠ሺߠ௜ሻ, where ܾ௜௠ሺߠ௜ሻ is 
randomly chosen from ሼܾ௜௠ሺߠ௜ሻ ܽݏ ݅ ൌ 1, . . .99ሽሽ, for ݆ ൌ 1 … ݉. 
We make m equal 4500, so the resulting counterfactual wage density is estimated from 
4500 counterfactual observations. The second counterfactual density (ii) is estimated by 
reversing the roles of immigrant and native workers in steps 2 and 3. 
Figures 2.4 and 2.5 illustrate a comparison of the marginal and counterfactual densities of 
log wages by applying the method described above.29 A marginal density is estimated using the 
conditional wages of step 2, which are expected wages conditional on skill characteristics and 
without the residual from the observed wages. Consequently, Figures 2.4 and 2.5 are able to 
answer this question: how much of the wage differential along the wage distributions can be 
removed if the immigrants' or recent immigrants' labor market skills are paid like native 
workers? Figure 2.4 shows the difference between all immigrants and natives, and Figure 2.5 
between recent immigrants and natives. The solid line represents the marginal wage density of 
native workers, and the dashed line the density of immigrant workers. The dash-dot line 
represents the counterfactual wage density of immigrant workers if their labor skills were paid 
like the natives.  
According to Figure 2.4, in all three periods, the dash-dot line is close to the dashed line 
and distant from the solid line. Thus, assuming the same skill prices is not influential in wage 
differential reduction. This suggests that the existing wage differential in each period is primarily 
explained by the differences in the labor skills, rather than the price difference of these skills.30 
However, though not the primary source of the wage gap, the price difference becomes more 
important to account for the wage gap over time. This can be seen by the fact that, among the 
                                                            
29 The terms of "marginal density" and "marginal distribution" is borrowed from Machado and Mata (2005). The 
marginal densities are estimated using the marginal wage effects estimated from quantile regressions. 
30 Alternatively, we can address the same question by generate the counterfactual density which would arise as 
immigrants have the same skill distributions as the native workers, but just these skills are paid as immigrants. Such 
a counterfactual density is also practiced, and it was close to the wage density of native workers, so it is confirmed 
that the wage difference is mainly due to the skill differences not the return the skills. 
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three periods, the largest movement of the counterfactual density from the dashed line to the 
solid line is observed for year 2006. In addition, a comparison of the dash-dot and dashed line 
shows that giving the same skill prices is particularly helpful for the immigrants whose wage is 
slightly lower than average. For example, in 2006, if the immigrants were paid the same return of 
skills as natives, there would be some immigrants whose wages were originally in the 1 to 2 log 
wage point range to move to the 3 to 4 point range.31 
Figure 2.5 shows wage differentials between recent immigrants and native workers. In 
contrast to Figure 2.4, the counterfactual densities for all three years are making a larger move 
from the immigrant density toward the native density. Accordingly, the price difference is a more 
important source for the observed wage differential for recent immigrants, compared to the case 
of all immigrants. This is consistent with our earlier finding that skill characteristics are valued at 
even lower prices for recent immigrants.  
In summary, Figures 2.4 and 2.5 shows that in both cases of recent immigrants and all 
immigrants, the skill gap is the main source for the observed wage differential, but an increasing 
proportion of the immigration wage gap is attributable to the price differences of observable 
skills. The disadvantage in the skill prices is greatest among the newly arrived immigrants, and it 
becomes less severe as the immigrants stay in the U.S. for a longer time. As the effect from price 
difference decreases, the major wage differential between all immigrants and native workers can 
be attributed to the skill differences. 
If the wage gap is mainly caused by the skill differences, then we want to identify how 
each of the labor market characteristics contributes to the existing wage gap. To determine this, 
we build counterfactual densities with the assumption that the immigrant and native workers 
have the same distribution of one particular skill characteristic. In this case, the counterfactual 
density reflects how one skill characteristic contributes to the observed wage gap. The procedure 
to calculate the counterfactual densities is similar to the one described in the above 4 steps, 
except that, in step 3, the randomly drawn sample of skill observations ௝ܺ is collected from 
immigrants, so it is denoted as  ௝ܺ௜௠. This ௝ܺ௜௠ is collected with a restriction that one skill 
distribution among the drawn sample of immigrants is identical to the native workers. For 
example, if we are interested in the counterfactual wage distribution of immigrants if their 
                                                            
31 There is a negative effect at the lower end of distribution in 2006, where if immigrants’ skills are paid like natives, 
they would actually earn less. This is due to the skill price substitute including a smaller constant from native 
workers, or the basic pay without education or experience. 
 56
schooling is distributed as it is for native workers, the ௝ܺ௜௠ in step 3 is randomly selected to 
create an immigrant sample that has the same distribution of schooling as the native workers. 
The counterfactual distributions are shown in Figures 2.6 and 2.7 for all and recent immigrants, 
respectively. Because similar patterns hold, only figures for 1990 and 2006 are presented for 
comparison. 
Before we examine the figures, it is worth noting that, while the initial purpose here is to 
isolate the effect of one skill characteristic from the others, if there is correlation between skills, 
this approach may actually draw a sample that also features a different distribution of a related 
skill besides the target skill. For example, better education may imply better English skills. 
Therefore, when we examine the counterfactual wage distribution in case that immigrants’ 
schooling distribution is like native workers’, the drawn sample of immigrants will have more 
schooling compared to all immigrants. A byproduct of this drawn sample is that those in the 
sample may also on average have better English skills. In this case, the demonstrated impact may 
not exclusively result from the change in schooling distribution. This is, on the other hand, a 
meaningful outcome, because it is reasonable to have more educated people with better language 
skills when the impact of education on wage differential is examined. 
The top graphs in Figures 2.6 and 2.7 illustrate the counterfactual wage density of 
immigrants that would arise if the immigrant workers' schooling distribution were the same as 
the native workers. The dash-dot line presents the counterfactual wage density that would arise if 
immigrants' schooling distribution were like native workers, while the return to education is still 
in the same pattern for immigrants. Because assuming the same schooling distribution affects the 
wage gap similarly in all three years, we use the 2006 result as an example. The means of the 
three densities are 2.34, 2.53, and 2.46 for immigrants, natives, and the counterfactual ones, 
respectively. In terms of the means, the wage gap is largely associated with schooling 
differences. Based on Figures 2.6 and 2.7, giving immigrants the same schooling distribution as 
natives would help some immigrants to move from the wage range between 1 to 2 log wage 
points to the range between 2 to 3.5 log wage points. In other words, the impact is focused on 
those slightly below and slightly above the median wage, and less noticeable at the extremes.  
In contrast to education, when assuming the immigrants' experience distribution were the 
same as the natives’, it has little impact on the wage densities.  The middle graphs in Figures 2.6 
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and 2.7 show that in all three years the counterfactual wage density is very close to the original 
wage density of immigrants, leaving the wage gap little changed.  
By assuming that the English proficiency of immigrants was same distributed as the 
native workers, wage gap at the lower tail was expected to be particularly reduced, because lack 
of English efficiency is supposed to be a major issue that affects the wages of low income 
immigrant workers. As shown by the bottom graph in Figure 2.7, assuming the same distribution 
of English skills between immigrants and natives reduced the wage gap similarly to the case of 
assuming same distribution of schooling, but giving same English skills is particularly effective 
in gap reduction at the lower end of the wage distribution. As argued earlier, the impact showing 
in the middle and higher wage range could be caused by the correlation between education and 
English proficiency.  
Figures 2.8 and 2.9 show the counterfactual wage gaps that exist between recent 
immigrants and native workers, as if the recent immigrants were the same as natives in terms of  
skill distributions with respect to schooling, experience, or English efficiency. The result is 
similar to Figures 2.6 and 2.7, except for the effect of experience. In all three years, the 
experience difference affected the wage gap more dramatically than the case of all immigrants. 
Such a result is expected because the recent immigrants typically have less experience than the 
other two groups, as shown in Table 2.1. 
2.5 Wage differential Growth: 1990 vs. 2006 
In the previous section, we examined the wage gap composition within each period. In 
this section, we explore how the wage gap composition has changed over time. Specifically, we 
decompose the immigrant/native wage differential growth into the causal factors that are 
associated with the relative skill differential growth and that are relevant to the wage structure 
change. On one hand, the wage structure in the U.S. has changed in favor of highly educated 
workers, as we have seen in Table 2.3. However, the increasing returns to education among the 
native workers did not work the same way as it did for the immigrants. Such change in the wage 
structure could potentially increase the wage gap between immigrants and native workers. On the 
other hand, recent immigrants in the later period are better educated compared to early 
immigrants, and the relative skill growth could reduce the wage differential.  
 58
The effect of the wage structure change in the U.S. on the immigration wage differential 
has been documented in the literatures. For example, Lubotsky (2001) uses CPS and SIPP data 
from the 1990s to study the effect of the wage structure change on the immigrant-native wage 
gap. We take a different approach in our study by examining the impact of the wage structure 
change separately for immigrants and native workers, rather than assuming that a general wage 
structure change affects both groups in the same way. With this approach, an increase in the 
return to education only applies to the native workers, and not necessarily to recent immigrant 
workers, which is consistent with our earlier finding. 
We use the standard approach of the Blinder/Oaxaca framework and decompose the 
change of the immigrant-native wage gap into the relative skill change and the wage structure 
change. The growth to be decomposed occurred between 1990 and 2006. The following equation 
illustrates this idea: 
       ∆ܩ ൌ ൣ ௌܰబల
௉బల െ ܫௌబల
௉బల൧ െ ൣ ௌܰవబ
௉వబ െ ܫௌవబ
௉వబ൧ 
                      ൌ ൣ൫ ௌܰబల
௉బల െ ௌܰవబ
௉బల൯ െ ൫ܫௌబల
௉బల െ ܫௌవబ
௉బల൯൧ ൅ ൣ൫ ௌܰవబ
௉బల െ ௌܰవబ
௉వబ൯ െ ൫ܫௌవబ
௉బల െ ܫௌవబ
௉వబ൯൧   (3) 
where ∆ܩ is the change of the wage gap between 1990 and 2006. ௌܰ௫
௉௬ refers to the wage of 
native workers (denoted as N) with skills (denoted as S in subscript) in year x and wage structure 
(denoted as P as price in superscript) of year y. ܫௌ௫
௉௬ is defined analogously for immigrants. The 
first row of equation (3) simply defines the differential growth between the two periods. The 
second line of equation (3) is constructed by adding and subtracting the term ௌܰవబ
௉బల െ ܫௌవబ
௉బల.  
According to the second row of equation (3), the first bracket measures the wage 
differential growth due to the relative growth of skills, or by covariates. Because the wage 
structure of each group is set to be the same as the second period, it measures a would-be growth 
in case that labor skills of each group are updated to the second period, but the returns to skills 
are unchanged. Note that the two groups are still paid different skill prices in the same period, 
only the cross-time price change within each group is eliminated. Similarly, the second bracket 
measures the wage differential growth attributed to the changes in the wage structure, or by 
coefficients. Because all covariates are from the first period, the second bracket in equation (3) 
measures the would-be growth in case that the wage structure is updated to the second period, 
but the skill level of each group is unchanged.32 
                                                            
32 Alternative approach is computed. The results are only different in terms of the scales, but in the same direction. 
 59
Using the same decomposition method as described in the steps 1 to 4, we can build the 
counterfactual densities representing the cases of ௌܰవబ
௉బల and ܫௌవబ
௉బల, so the decomposition can be 
made in every percentage or any moment of the wage distribution. Because the recent 
immigrants better represent the composition change of immigrant workers, the decomposition 
comparison is made between the recent immigrants and native workers. The decomposition 
results at the wage percentiles of 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th are presented in Table 2.4.  
The first or “raw gap” column in Table 2.4 presents the observed wage differentials of 
different wage quantiles and their changes. The observed wage differential is computed by 
differencing the log wage of recent immigrants and native born workers.33 The changes are all 
positive, indicating the raw gaps at all wage levels are enlarged from 1990 to 2006. We have 
seen in Table 2.2 and Figure 2.3 that the raw wage gap in both periods is concentrated from the 
lower end to the medium level of wage distribution. In contrast, the growth of the wage gap is 
concentrated at both ends of the wage distribution. The growth is 3.5 percent at the 10th 
percentile and 11.6 percent at the 90th wage percentile. The growth at the median is less than 1 
percent.  
The column of “estimated marginal gap” in Table 2.4 presents the marginal wage gaps 
and their changes. The marginal wage gaps are estimated in the same way as we draw Figures 
2.4 and 2.5, and they measure the portion of the raw wage gap that is explained by skills and 
wage structures. The marginal wage is calculated using the estimated coefficients multiplied by 
observable skill variables. Therefore, the marginal wage gaps can be decomposed into the parts 
by changes in covariates or by the changes in coefficients. The difference between the observed 
wage gap growth and the marginal growth is attributed to the residuals, which are listed in the 
third entry of the "aggregate contribution" column in Table 2.4. For example, the majority of the 
observed wage gap growth at the 10th wage decile is due to the gap in residuals, which is 0.065 
minus 0.014. In contrast, the wage gap growth at the higher end, the 75th and 90th deciles, is 
mostly attributed to the changes in relative skills and the returns to the skills.  
The decomposition result is shown in the "aggregate contribution" column of Table 2.4. 
The first entry of the column presents the change of marginal wage gap that is due to the 
covariates, or "relative skill change," which in equation (3) is described as ൫ ௌܰబల
௉బల െ ௌܰవబ
௉బల൯ െ
                                                            
33 The observed immigration wage gap decomposed in this section is corresponding to the raw wage gap in Table 2, 
the one that is not controlled by skill characteristics. 
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൫ܫௌబల
௉బల െ ܫௌవబ
௉బల൯. Again, this is the counterfactual wage differential growth that would arise if the 
skill distributions of immigrants and native workers are updated from 1990 to 2006 while the 
wage structure is kept the same as it was in 2006. According to our simulation, both ൫ ௌܰబల
௉బల െ
ௌܰవబ
௉బల൯ and ൫ܫௌబల
௉బల െ ܫௌవబ
௉బల൯ are positive in all wage levels, as shown in Table 2.5, so both groups 
generally became more “skilled” and would make higher wages with this level of skills in 1990. 
However, as the progress for natives is greater than immigrants at all levels, the net outcome is 
an increase of the wage gap by covariates. Therefore, without the change in wage structures, the 
relative growth in skills could have increased the wage gap more than observed. To understand 
this increasing skill differential, let's reconsider Table 2.1.  
As shown in Table 2.1, the most obvious skill growth of natives relative to immigrants is 
in experience. The recent immigrants in 2006 are younger and less experienced, compared to 
those in 1990. At the same time, the experience of native workers increased by 13 percent. This 
leads to a much larger skill gap in labor market experience in 2006.  In terms of English skills, 
five percent fewer of the recent immigrants in 2006 "speak English well," compared to 1990. In 
summary, the growing skill advantage of natives over recent immigrants enlarged the wage 
differential, but this is primarily due to the recent immigrants being younger than their 
counterparts in 1990. 
The change of the wage structure drives the wage gap in the opposite direction of the skill 
attributes change, but this is due to an ambiguous change in the intercept in the wage equations.  
The second entry in the "aggregate contribution" column shows the marginal wage gap change 
that is due to the coefficient or price change of each group between 1990 and 2006. In equation 
(3), this is described as ൫ ௌܰవబ
௉బల െ ௌܰవబ
௉వబ൯ െ ൫ܫௌవబ
௉బల െ ܫௌవబ
௉వబ൯,  which measures wage differential 
growth that would occor if the returns to skills for immigrants and native workers are 
respectively updated to 2006, while the skill distributions for each group remain the same as it 
was in 1990. Note that, when we compute this counterfactual growth, we update all of the 
coefficients from the later period to the early period within each group, including the intercept of 
each group. As shown in the second entry of the "aggregate contribution" column, the results are 
negative at all wage deciles, so the change in wage structures would have reduced the wage gap 
between immigrants and native workers over time.  
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To be more clear about the impact of the wage structure change within each group, the 
result of ൫ ௌܰవబ
௉బల െ ௌܰవబ
௉వబ൯ and ൫ܫௌవబ
௉బల െ ܫௌవబ
௉వబ൯ are listed in Table 2.5. Both ൫ ௌܰవబ
௉బల െ ௌܰవబ
௉వబ൯ and 
൫ܫௌవబ
௉బల െ ܫௌవబ
௉వబ൯  are negative in all quantiles, so both natives and recent immigrants would have 
earned less in 1990 if they were paid based on the wage structure of 2006. The negative price 
effect is more severe among the native workers. Therefore, the wage gap reduction is not a result 
of a relative increase of the returns to skills of immigrants, but a result of a more severe 
reduction in skill prices among the native workers. 
This outcome of negative price effect on wages is surprising: we observed in Table 2.3 
that the skill prices, at least for native workers, have greatly increased. To understand the 
negative effect of 2006 skill prices, let's reconsider Tables 2.3a and 2.3c. Comparing the OLS 
estimates from 1990 and 2006, we see that the returns for education and experience have 
increased for a typical native worker, while the corresponding prices for immigrants changed 
little or decreased. If these are the only change in skill prices, updating the wage structure would 
result in a positive wage growth for natives and a negative one for immigrants, and it would be 
an overall positive growth in wage differential. However, the intercept in the wage equation also 
changed. The intercept typically refers to the basic return with zero education and experience. 
For natives it decreased from 0.87 in 1990 to 0.48 in 2006. As can be easily tested, this is the 
negative factor that offsets the potential wage growth of natives by skill price increases in 
education and experience.34 
In summary, the main finding based on Tables 3.4 and 3.5 is that, from 1990 to 2006, the 
growth in wage differential is concentrated at the bottom and top ends of the wage distribution, 
and the change at median wage level is almost nonexistent. The main source for this growth is 
the enlarged skill difference between the recent immigrants and natives, particularly due to the 
lack of experience among younger recent immigrants. In terms of implications, the recent growth 
of the wage gap should not raise concerns for new immigrants lack of competitively with natives, 
since the gap growth is a outcome of the new immigrants being younger. The impact from the 
wage structure change is negative overall, which is a consequence by two opposing forces. The 
traditional skill prices for education and experiences have increased in favor of natives relative to 
                                                            
34 In another simulation to compute ቀNSవబ
Pబల െ NSవబ
Pవబቁ and ቀISవబ
Pబల െ ISవబ
Pవబቁ, skill prices are updated without intercept. The 
results are as expected: native workers wage increases in all wage levels and immigrants’ wage decreases. However, 
it is not clear what the meaning of the counterfactual wage change is by leaving out the intercept. 
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immigrants, but the overall negative outcome is caused by a decrease in the intercept in natives' 
wage equation, while the intercept does not change as much for immigrants.  
2.6 Conclusion 
To analyze the recent growth of immigrant/native wage differentials, this paper compares 
PUMS data from 1990 and 2000, and ACS data from 2006, and applies a decomposition method 
based on quantile regressions. The empirical results show that the wage disadvantage of 
immigrants was concentrated in the bottom half of the wage distribution, and the scale of the 
wage disadvantage is becoming larger over the selected periods. The main reason for the wage 
differential is the labor market skill disadvantage of immigrants. The proportion in the wage 
differential that can be attributed to the skill price differences is becoming larger over time. This 
is because the advantage of natives in returns to schooling and experience has been growing, as 
there is an increasing demand for skills in U.S. labor market, which raises the skill prices.  
Between all immigrants and natives, the wage differential after controlling for labor 
market skills first expanded from 1990 to 2000 and then decreased from 2000 to 2006. In 
contrast, the after-control wage differential between recent immigrants and natives first 
decreased from 1990 to 2000 and then expanded from 2000 to 2006. The overall growth of the 
recent immigrant/native wage differential between 1990 and 2006 is small, but the growth is 
concentrated at the top and bottom ends of the wage distribution. Our growth decomposition 
shows the main reason for the growth is that recent immigrants being younger and having less 
market experience than their counterparts, which results in a larger gap in market experience, 
compared to the contemporary native workers. 
Our analysis of skill price differences shows that the recent trend of increasing returns to 
the U.S. labor market skills does not affect immigrants as much as it does native workers, and it 
does not have any impact on recent immigrants. Compared to native workers, recent immigrants 
at high wage percentiles enjoy a higher return to their experience.  
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Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics for Men: Native-Born, Immigrants, and Recent Immigrants, by Year 
  1990    2000    2006 
  Recent    Recent    Recent 
Variable Name    Natives  Immigrants Immigrants   Natives  Immigrants  Immigrants   Natives  Immigrants Immigrants
Observations    360110  34237  6164    388109  55493  9859    403592  70565  10135 
Log hourly wages    2.52  2.38  2.15    2.53  2.35  2.21    2.54  2.33  2.13 
  (0.62)  (0.71)  (0.74)    (0.65)  (0.75)  (0.81)    (0.67)  (0.74)  (0.77) 
Education    13.45  11.72  11.66    13.81  12.11  12.36    14.08  12.6  12.65 
  (2.88)  (5.25)  (5.5)    (2.64)  (4.98)  (5.13)    (2.6)  (4.7)  (4.84) 
Experience    21.11  22.32  17.9    22.31  21.98  17.13    23.97  22.84  17.43 
  (10.87)  (11.41)  (10.22)    (10.25)  (10.85)  (9.94)    (10.56)  (10.87)  (9.78) 
Metropolitan    57.42%  75.43%  76.88%    52.24%  77.47%  75.23%    73.84%  88.38%  86.08% 
Black    7.86%  6.13%  5.99%    8.34%  5.84%  4.45%    7.58%  6.59%  6.63% 
Asian    0.71%  22.16%  28.21%    0.71%  22.46%  23.18%    1.01%  24.17%  22.66% 
Other race    2.28%  21.36%  21.40%    3.94%  30.36%  28.58%    4.08%  24.59%  23.12% 
English wellness    99.58%  75.34%  58.83%    99.59%  73.10%  57.84%    99.62%  71.05%  53.85% 
 
1. Table contains sample averages; sample standard errors in parentheses. 
2. “White” is omitted as it serves as control group of all races.  
3. “English wellness” is a dummy variable, which is defined to be “zero” if a worker speaks only English, or reports to speak 
English very well or well. It is “one” if a worker speaks English unwell or do not speak English. 
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Table 2.2 Estimated Immigration Wage Gaps by Percentiles 
 
Table 2.2a. Estimated Immigration Wage Gaps by Percentiles: Native Born vs. All Immigrants
                   
Quantiles  10th  20th  30th  40th  50th  60th  70th  80th  90th 
1990 
Observed Gap  ‐0.247  ‐0.262  ‐0.260  ‐0.208  ‐0.178  ‐0.127  ‐0.090  ‐0.017  0.000 
Gap after Controls  ‐0.050  ‐0.039  ‐0.029  ‐0.014  0.004  0.020  0.033  0.054  0.096 
2000 
Observed Gap  ‐0.324  ‐0.325  ‐0.298  ‐0.261  ‐0.227  ‐0.182  ‐0.133  ‐0.056  0.010 
Gap after Controls  ‐0.107  ‐0.082  ‐0.063  ‐0.045  ‐0.029  ‐0.009  0.012  0.038  0.086 
2006 
Observed Gap  ‐0.306  ‐0.325  ‐0.319  ‐0.300  ‐0.260  ‐0.203  ‐0.144  ‐0.074  ‐0.032 
Gap after Controls  ‐0.089  ‐0.076  ‐0.062  ‐0.041  ‐0.023  ‐0.007  0.012  0.032  0.058 
Table 2.2b. Estimated Immigration Wage Gaps by Percentiles: Native Born vs. Recent Immigrants
                   
Quantiles  10th  20th  30th  40th  50th  60th  70th  80th  90th 
1990 
Observed Gap  ‐0.431  ‐0.470  ‐0.514  ‐0.506  ‐0.494  ‐0.427  ‐0.362  ‐0.245  ‐0.101 
Gap after Controls  ‐0.288  ‐0.286  ‐0.269  ‐0.256  ‐0.218  ‐0.179  ‐0.117  ‐0.067  0.034 
2000 
Observed Gap  ‐0.468  ‐0.508  ‐0.504  ‐0.472  ‐0.439  ‐0.357  ‐0.252  ‐0.083  0.011 
Gap after Controls  ‐0.284  ‐0.249  ‐0.204  ‐0.157  ‐0.098  ‐0.049  ‐0.003  0.046  0.105 
2006 
Observed Gap  ‐0.496  ‐0.528  ‐0.544  ‐0.549  ‐0.511  ‐0.490  ‐0.365  ‐0.241  ‐0.161 
Gap after Controls  ‐0.277  ‐0.278  ‐0.242  ‐0.197  ‐0.146  ‐0.112  ‐0.074  ‐0.036  0.019 
 
1. All estimates in Table 2 are significant at 5% level;  
2. Results in the second rows of each year are estimated with the control variables listed 
in Table1.  
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Table 2.3 OLS and Quantile Regression Estimates 
 
Table 2.3.a OLS and Quantile Regression Estimates, 1990  U.S. Census,  1% PUMS 
   Natives  Immigrants  Recent Immigrants 
Variable 
OLS 
Quantile 
OLS 
Quantile 
OLS 
Quantile 
   0.1  0.5  0.9  0.1  0.5  0.9  0.1  0.5  0.9 
Constant  0.8745  0.3414  0.8441  1.3727  1.2896  0.7799  1.265  1.8651  1.3193  0.9174  1.3558  1.6475 
   (0.0062)  (0.0123)  (0.0064) (0.0091)  (0.0199) (0.0343)  (0.0219)  (0.033)  (0.0503) (0.0744)  (0.0575) (0.0871)
Education  0.0822  0.0759  0.0848  0.0882  0.0589  0.0503  0.0614  0.0615  0.0519  0.0393  0.0515  0.0666 
   (0.0003)  (0.0007)  (0.0004) (0.0005)  (0.0008) (0.0014)  (0.0009)  (0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0026)  (0.0023) (0.0038)
Exp  0.0348  0.0348  0.037  0.0332  0.0295  0.0204  0.0302  0.0345  0.0305  0.0098  0.0232  0.0537 
   (0.0004)  (0.0007)  (0.0004) (0.0005)  (0.0012) (0.0019)  (0.0012)  (0.0019) (0.003)  (0.0053)  (0.0036) (0.0043)
Exp Squared 
/100 
‐0.0464  ‐0.0558  ‐0.0497  ‐0.0364  ‐0.0336  ‐0.0216  ‐0.0332  ‐0.039  ‐0.0454  ‐0.0133  ‐0.0316  ‐0.077 
(0.0007)  (0.0014)  (0.0008) (0.0011)  (0.0022) (0.0037)  (0.0023)  (0.0036) (0.0062) (0.0121)  (0.0077) (0.0077)
Black  ‐0.1894  ‐0.2419  ‐0.1937  ‐0.1463  ‐0.1768  ‐0.1285  ‐0.1962  ‐0.2074  ‐0.179  ‐0.0353  ‐0.1623  ‐0.2742 
   (0.0034)  (0.0073)  (0.004)  (0.0053)  (0.014)  (0.0273)  (0.0159)  (0.0211) (0.0368) (0.034)  (0.041)  (0.0581)
Asian  0.0651  0.0979  0.0634  0.0596  ‐0.0821  ‐0.1046  ‐0.0827  ‐0.0638  ‐0.0591  ‐0.0816  ‐0.0641  0.038 
   (0.0109)  (0.0182)  (0.0105) (0.0124)  (0.0085) (0.0148)  (0.0097)  (0.0149) (0.0206) (0.0303)  (0.0238) (0.0425)
Other Races  ‐0.1093  ‐0.1727  ‐0.1088  ‐0.0491  ‐0.129  ‐0.1085  ‐0.1247  ‐0.1635  ‐0.2014  ‐0.1672  ‐0.1747  ‐0.2889 
   (0.0062)  (0.0133)  (0.0069) (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.0154)  (0.01)  (0.0146) (0.0233) (0.0321)  (0.0219) (0.0379)
Metropolitan  0.1451  0.1592  0.146  0.1257  0.0937  0.0903  0.0897  0.0847  0.0469  0.0342  0.0376  0.0467 
   (0.0019)  (0.0038)  (0.0019) (0.0027)  (0.0076) (0.0134)  (0.0087)  (0.0125) (0.02)  (0.0302)  (0.0215) (0.0359)
Speak English 
Unwell 
‐0.0378  ‐0.0834  ‐0.059  0.0742  ‐0.2595  ‐0.2634  ‐0.2905  ‐0.2018  ‐0.2329  ‐0.1763  ‐0.2316  ‐0.248 
(0.0143)  (0.0263)  (0.0137) (0.0241)  (0.0086) (0.0144)  (0.0097)  (0.0148) (0.0197) (0.0269)  (0.0203) (0.0357)
 
Standard errors are in parenthesizes.  
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Standard errors are in parenthesizes.  
 
  
Table 2.3b. OLS and Quantile Regression Estimates, 2000  U.S. Census,  1% PUMS 
   Natives  Immigrants  Recent Immigrants 
Variable 
OLS 
Quantile 
OLS 
Quantile 
OLS 
Quantile 
   0.1  0.5  0.9  0.1  0.5  0.9  0.1  0.5  0.9 
Constant  0.7698  0.3935  0.7416  1.141  1.4087  0.9172  1.3499  1.9725  1.5064  1.0045  1.6532  1.7838 
   (0.0068)  (0.0125)  (0.0069)  (0.0109) (0.0175)  (0.0268) (0.0189)  (0.0304) (0.0426)  (0.0725) (0.0506)  (0.0721)
Education  0.0916  0.0775  0.0925  0.1049  0.0587  0.0423  0.0616  0.0663  0.0519  0.0351  0.0465  0.0718 
   (0.0004)  (0.0007)  (0.0004)  (0.0006) (0.0007)  (0.0011) (0.0008)  (0.0013) (0.0018)  (0.003)  (0.0021)  (0.0033)
Exp  0.0306  0.0295  0.0324  0.0296  0.0149  0.0129  0.0148  0.0178  0.0121  0.0005  0.0037  0.0339 
   (0.0004)  (0.0007)  (0.0004)  (0.0007) (0.001)  (0.0015) (0.0011)  (0.0017) (0.0025)  (0.0044) (0.003)  (0.0042)
Exp Squared 
/100 
‐0.0433  ‐0.0515  ‐0.0458  ‐0.0317  ‐0.0116  ‐0.0151  ‐0.0099  ‐0.011  ‐0.0157  ‐0.0033  ‐0.0008  ‐0.0411 
(0.0008)  (0.0015)  (0.0008)  (0.0014) (0.002)  (0.0029) (0.0023)  (0.0033) (0.0053)  (0.01)  (0.006)  (0.0094)
Black  ‐0.1813  ‐0.2302  ‐0.1816  ‐0.1418  ‐0.1429  ‐0.055  ‐0.1115  ‐0.2084  ‐0.2043  ‐0.0761  ‐0.2075  ‐0.2254 
   (0.0034)  (0.0065)  (0.0036)  (0.005)  (0.0124)  (0.02)  (0.0125)  (0.019)  (0.0354)  (0.0429) (0.03)  (0.0366)
Asian  0.0266  ‐0.0169  0.0326  0.0347  0.0273  ‐0.0215  0.0491  0.0474  0.1189  0.0462  0.189  0.1535 
   (0.0112)  (0.0263)  (0.0101)  (0.0164) (0.0075)  (0.0137) (0.0086)  (0.0133) (0.0188)  (0.0306) (0.0277)  (0.0314)
Other Races  ‐0.1218  ‐0.1644  ‐0.1185  ‐0.0717  ‐0.1068  ‐0.073  ‐0.102  ‐0.1563  ‐0.14  ‐0.0802  ‐0.1333  ‐0.16 
   (0.0049)  (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.0099) (0.0072)  (0.0123) (0.0177)  (0.0315) (0.0184)  (0.0319)
Metropolitan  0.1831  0.1456  0.1778  0.2184  0.097  0.0661  0.0993  0.1164  0.1025  0.0771  0.084  0.1187 
   (0.0019)  (0.0036)  (0.0019)  (0.0031) (0.0067)  (0.0098) (0.0071)  (0.0125) (0.0165)  (0.0297) (0.0186)  (0.0268)
Speak English 
Unwell 
‐0.0446  ‐0.1402  ‐0.0656  0.0476  ‐0.2662  ‐0.2577  ‐0.2839  ‐0.2061  ‐0.3383  ‐0.2166  ‐0.3859  ‐0.3546 
(0.0148)  (0.0263)  (0.0163)  (0.0288) (0.0071)  (0.01)  (0.0076)  (0.0128) (0.0168)  (0.0282) (0.0191)  (0.0297)
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Table 2.3c. OLS and Quantile Regression Estimates, 2006  ACS 
   Natives  Immigrants  Recent Immigrants 
Variable 
OLS 
Quantile 
OLS 
Quantile 
OLS 
Quantile 
   0.1  0.5  0.9  0.1  0.5  0.9  0.1  0.5  0.9 
Constant  0.4835  0.0624  0.4372  0.856  1.2627  0.8256  1.2333  1.7749  1.3969  1.0958  1.4994  1.6958 
   (0.007)  (0.0125)  (0.0066) (0.0119)  (0.016)  (0.0243)  (0.0175)  (0.0263) (0.0428) (0.0574)  (0.0467) (0.0631)
Education  0.1038  0.0905  0.1062  0.1182  0.066  0.047  0.0674  0.0751  0.0529  0.0298  0.0474  0.0688 
   (0.0004)  (0.0007)  (0.0004) (0.0006)  (0.0007) (0.001)  (0.0007)  (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0021)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Exp  0.0363  0.037  0.0381  0.0364  0.0144  0.0103  0.0143  0.0184  0.0172  ‐0.0008  0.0119  0.0429 
   (0.0004)  (0.0007)  (0.0004) (0.0007)  (0.0009) (0.0013)  (0.001)  (0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0031)  (0.0026) (0.0033)
Exp Squared 
/100 
‐0.0585  ‐0.0688  ‐0.0614  ‐0.0503  ‐0.0131  ‐0.0112  ‐0.012  ‐0.0137  ‐0.0281  ‐0.0001  ‐0.0208  ‐0.0595 
(0.0008)  (0.0014)  (0.0008) (0.0014)  (0.0017) (0.0024)  (0.0019)  (0.0028) (0.0053) (0.0059)  (0.005)  (0.007) 
Black  ‐0.2286  ‐0.28  ‐0.2215  ‐0.1915  ‐0.1783  ‐0.1185  ‐0.169  ‐0.2359  ‐0.2295  ‐0.1273  ‐0.2197  ‐0.3098 
   (0.0036)  (0.0077)  (0.0036) (0.0057)  (0.0099) (0.014)  (0.0098)  (0.0181) (0.0272) (0.0378)  (0.0283) (0.058) 
Asian  0.0254  ‐0.0143  0.0363  0.0314  0.0514  ‐0.0028  0.0952  0.0552  0.0575  0.0044  0.125  0.0781 
   (0.0094)  (0.0156)  (0.009)  (0.0115)  (0.0062) (0.0111)  (0.0075)  (0.0102) (0.0175) (0.0254)  (0.0246) (0.0252)
Other Races  ‐0.1113  ‐0.1649  ‐0.1075  ‐0.078  ‐0.1053  ‐0.0723  ‐0.0895  ‐0.1337  ‐0.1266  ‐0.1003  ‐0.0987  ‐0.1512 
   (0.0048)  (0.0083)  (0.0048) (0.0093)  (0.0061) (0.009)  (0.0061)  (0.0104) (0.0168) (0.0195)  (0.0168) (0.0266)
Metropolitan  0.2015  0.1751  0.1972  0.225  0.1217  0.107  0.116  0.1342  0.0949  0.0581  0.0805  0.1297 
   (0.0022)  (0.0038)  (0.002)  (0.0035)  (0.0074) (0.0111)  (0.0084)  (0.0129) (0.0188) (0.0298)  (0.0173) (0.0263)
Speak English 
Unwell 
‐0.0672  ‐0.1666  ‐0.0869  0.0535  ‐0.3078  ‐0.2316  ‐0.3138  ‐0.3142  ‐0.3773  ‐0.2266  ‐0.3964  ‐0.5179 
(0.0152)  (0.026)  (0.022)  (0.0286)  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.0064)  (0.0103) (0.0161) (0.0214)  (0.0191) (0.026) 
 
Standard errors are in parenthesizes.  
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Table 2.4 Decomposition of the Changes in the Wage distribution, Recent Immigrants vs. Native-Born 
 
  Raw Gap    Est. Marginal Gap    Aggregate Contributions 
  1990  2006  Change  %Change    1990  2006  Change    Covariates  Coefficients  Residuals
10th    0.431  0.496  0.065  3.50%    0.476  0.490  0.014    0.080  ‐0.066  0.051 
25th    0.523  0.547  0.023  1.09%    0.504  0.538  0.034    0.093  ‐0.060  ‐0.010 
50th    0.494  0.511  0.017  0.84%    0.457  0.492  0.035    0.111  ‐0.076  ‐0.018 
75th    0.313  0.325  0.012  0.94%    0.320  0.330  0.011    0.109  ‐0.098  0.001 
90th    0.101  0.162  0.061  11.59%    0.145  0.207  0.062    0.100  ‐0.038  ‐0.001 
 
The observed gap change is decomposed to marginal changes and the changes by residuals, so the “Change” under “Raw Gap” is equal to the sum 
of the “change” under “Estimated Marginal Gap” plus the “Residuals”. The marginal change is further decomposed to divide it between skills and 
prices, which are represented by the “Covariates” and “Coefficients”, respectively. Thus, the change under “estimated marginal gap” is equal to 
the sum of “Covariates” plus “Coefficients”. 
 
 
Table 2.5 Components of the decomposition for Immigrant-native Wage Gap Change 
 
ௌܰబల
௉బల െ ௌܰవబ
௉బల   ܫௌబల
௉బల െ ܫௌవబ
௉బల   ௌܰవబ
௉బల െ ௌܰవబ
௉వబ   ܫௌవబ
௉బల െ ܫௌవబ
௉వబ  
10th  0.1254  0.0455  ‐0.1394  ‐0.0737 
25th  0.1260  0.0326  ‐0.1447  ‐0.0851 
50th  0.1278  0.0171  ‐0.136  ‐0.0601 
75th  0.1315  0.0229  ‐0.0949  0.0032 
90th  0.1366  0.0364  ‐0.0308  0.0076 
 
The differences of the first two columns in Table 2.5 is equal to the “Covariates” in Table 2.4, and the differences of the last two columns of Table 
2.5 are equal to the “Coefficients” in Table 2.4. 
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Figure 2.1  Density of Log Wages, Native Born vs. All Immigrants 
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Solid line is for Native born; Dash line is for All Immigrants 
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Figure 2.2  Density of Log Wages, Native Born vs. Recent Immigrants 
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Figure 2.3  Wage Differentials by Percentiles in 1990, 2000 and 2006 
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Figure 2.4  Marginal and Counterfactual Wage Densities: Natives vs. All Immigrants 
 (What if immigrants’ skills are paid as natives?) 
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Figure 2.5  Marginal and Counterfactual Wage Densities: Natives vs. Recent Immigrants 
 (What if recent immigrants' skills are paid as natives?)  
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Figure 2.6  Log Wage Densities: All Immigrants vs. Natives, 1990 
(What if one skill factor had been same distributed between all immigrants and natives?)  
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Figure 2.7  Log Wage Densities: All Immigrants vs. Natives, 2006 
 (What if one skill factor had been same distributed between all immigrants and natives?)  
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Figure 2.8  Log Wage Densities: Recent Immigrants vs. Natives, 1990 
 (What if one skill factor had been same distributed between recent immigrants and natives?) 
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Figure 2.9  Log Wage Densities: Recent Immigrants vs. Natives, 2006 
 (What if one skill factor had been same distributed between recent immigrants and natives?) 
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CHAPTER 3 - Admission Standards and Student Effort: An 
Example35 
3.1 Introduction 
Workers with college degrees tend to earn more than those without.36 This notion is a key 
motivation for many students. Combined with the notion of education externalities, it also 
motivates much government policy. Governments around the world participate in funding 
education and anticipate higher enrollment and a higher paid workforce in return.37 
Such responses to the college premium rely on hopeful assumptions regarding the process 
of human capital accumulation. Colleges combine student time and school resources to generate 
human capital. Through this process, graduates acquire more human capital than non-graduates. 
With increased human capital, the marginal product of a graduate is higher and the college 
premium is a simple reflection of improved productivity.38 
When these assumption hold, students are right to expect higher human capital and wages 
from schooling. Furthermore, governments are right to expect higher average income from 
policies which increase enrollment. In settings with externalities, government can expect an 
amplification of this positive impact. However, different assumptions of the human capital 
accumulation process often preserve private returns to college while leading to quite different 
expectations for government policy. Most famously, Spence (1973) and Arrow (1973) show that 
education can serve simply to signal innate ability. In this case, governments cannot increase 
average wages through expanding enrollment but able students expect higher wages through 
stratification allowed by schooling.39 
Blankenau and Camera (2006, 2009) highlight another 'weak link in this chain of events' 
from expanding schooling to expanding skill. They include student effort as an input into the 
production of human capital. Subsequent to the enrollment decision, students decide whether to 
make an imperfectly observable effort investment in human capital. Some students earn a degree 
                                                            
35 This essay is coauthored with my dissertation advisor Dr. William Blankenau. 
36 See Goldin and Katz (2007) for a comprehensive historical review of the college premium. 
37 Education at a Glance (2008), Table B2.4 shows that on average public spending on education accounted for 5 % 
of GDP in OECD countries in 2005. Of this, 1.5% of GDP was spent on tertiary education. 
38 This is the standard human capital approach of Becker (1964) and Ben Porath (1967). 
39 The literature on signaling is immense. See Bedard (2001) as an example of recent evidence supporting its 
empirical relevance. 
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but avoid effort. These students earn a degree only as a means of mimicking truly skilled agents. 
This allows them to appropriate some of the returns intended for the skilled. In this environment, 
graduates have a higher income on average. However, by encouraging an increased share of 
students to mimic skilled workers rather than earn skill, some government policies which 
encourage enrollment can lower average human capital and wages in equilibrium. 
A further example is provided by Costrell (1994) and Betts (1998). They consider 
environments where government or colleges can directly affect enrollment by setting education 
standards. A key feature of both papers is that firms cannot observe ability but only credentials. 
As such, students put forth no effort beyond what is required to earn the degree. Costrell shows 
that in this setting increasing enrollment through lower standards can yield lower average output 
and wages. In Betts' model, low standards have no effect on the human capital at either end of 
the ability distribution but in the center force a quality/quantity trade-off. Thus there is again a 
negative side effect of increasing enrollment. 
These papers encourage caution in drawing policy implications from the correlation 
between schooling and wages. In environments where the correlation arises endogenously, more 
schooling may nonetheless fail to yield higher average wages. This paper reiterates the call for 
caution by showing another example where more education can be poor policy.40 
In our paper, government (or colleges) choose enrollment by selecting education 
standards. In this sense, it is related to the work by Costrell and Betts.41 However, two key 
mechanism at work in our model are not present in theirs. The first mechanism is an education 
externality along the lines of Acemoglu (1996), though simplified. In his model, as in ours, the 
return to investment by agents and firms is increasing in the investment of their counterpart in 
production. A friction arises since investments must be made prior to matching. As such, 
investment decisions are based on the expected productivity in a match and are muted by fear of 
unproductive matches. When all students are skilled, an increase in their numbers improves 
expectations of a productive match for firms. They respond with greater investment and this 
increases expected returns to all skilled workers. Hence the externality. When standards are high 
                                                            
40 In Costrell (1994) and Betts (1998) the focus is on selected standards in relation to optimal standards. Since too 
high or low standards are suboptimal lowering standards under some circumstances is poor policy. 
41 Other recent theoretical work on standards includes Gary-Bobo, et al. (2008) and Epple, et al. (2006). However, 
they are primarily interested optimization of objective functions of the university, an issue not considered here. 
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in our model, all students who earn degrees also earn skill. When this holds, the Acemoglu 
externality results in favorable outcomes from lower standards. 
The second mechanism is a market failure in the spirit of Blankenau and Camera (2006, 
2009). The setting is one in which firms can post skilled positions at a cost or unskilled positions 
at no cost. Heterogeneity in the cost assures that some, and maybe all, will post skilled positions. 
Workers take an exam, earning a score directly related to ability and government chooses the 
cutoff score for admission. Once enrolled, workers can earn a degree at a cost normalized to zero 
or skill at a positive cost. Heterogeneity in ability maps into heterogeneity in the cost of skill. 
This assures that some, and maybe all, enrollees will earn skill. After agents and firms have 
made investment decisions, they are randomly matched for purposes of production. Skilled firms 
and skilled workers benefit only in reciprocal matches; i.e. only when their production 
counterpart is also skilled. Matches with a skilled firm and unskilled degree holder provide a 
benefit only to the worker. With this benefit positive, workers for whom skill acquisition is 
costly may choose to remain unskilled. This is the source of market failure. 
This gives an example of the perils of standards set too high or too low or equivalently of 
enrollment set too low or too high. When standards are high, the externality outlined above goes 
unexploited. With few graduates, firms have a low probability of being matched to a graduate 
and so few post skilled positions. As such, graduates have a low probability of being matched 
with a skilled firm. Relaxing standards benefits all through the externality. However, beyond a 
cutoff point the marginal worker finds the cost of skill too high and instead remains unskilled. As 
an equilibrium outcome, firms no longer increase investment in response to increased 
enrollment. While graduates continue to earn more than non-graduates in equilibrium, a larger 
share of graduates are in unproductive matches. 
The key problem is that firms know that some degree holders are unskilled and that in 
hiring them they will gain nothing from having created a skilled position. Too few skilled 
positions will be created for graduates and many will find themselves working in unskilled 
positions. There is significant anecdotal evidence of this which will be discussed in the 
subsequent version of this paper. 
In Section 1 we consider the model with the return structure above set exogenously. In 
the subsequent section we describe environments that give rise to this structure. In Section 4 we 
consider generalizations. The first generalization demonstrates that low standards can lead to 
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fewer skilled postings. The second shows that our results are robust to the case where exam 
scores give imperfect information regarding an agent's true ability to acquire skill. Section 5 
provides a summary and conclusion. 
3.2 A Simple Case 
We present a stylized model with several key features. Government funds college for 
those who gain admission. Admission is based on entrance exam scores and enrollment is 
regulated through the choice of the cutoff score. Those who go to college have the opportunity to 
become skilled by incurring an effort cost. They also have an opportunity to earn a degree but no 
skill at a lower effort cost. Firms can create unskilled or skilled jobs. Skilled jobs are more costly 
to create and can pay off only if the firm hires a skilled worker. 
In this section we take as given that earning a degree increases the expected wage even if 
no skill is earned while earning skill provides a higher expected wage. We also take as given that 
the expected gross profit of creating a skilled position exceeds that of creating an unskilled 
position. There are many settings that could give rise to these relationships and we sketch several 
example environments in Section 3. However, there are two advantages to simply assuming them 
for now. First, it highlights that our results hold for any setting generating the relationships. 
Secondly, it allows us to delay some of the complexity of the model in order to focus first on the 
implications of these relationships. 
3.2.1 Workers 
We consider a static economy populated by a mass of workers, a mass of firms, and a 
government. Workers are heterogeneous in innate ability and are indexed by 
݆ ൌ ݆ሺܽሻ       (1) 
with డ௝ሺ௔ሻ
డ௔
൏ 0 so that higher ability agents have lower indices. We drop the ܽ notation in this 
when no confusion arises. Let the continuous increasing cdf Jሺ݆ሻ be the distribution of ݆ with ݆ 
normalized such that ݆ א ሾ0,1ሿ. For tractability we initially assume a uniform distribution where 
Jሺ݆ሻ ൌ ݆. As the period begins, each worker ݆ takes an exam and receives a grade ݃௝ which is 
inversely related to ݆ (and thus directly related with ability) such that ݃௝ ൐ ݃௝ᇲ for all ݆ ൏ ݆ᇱ. 
Government sets a cutoff point for the exam, ݃, such that ݃଴ ൑ ݃ ൑ ݃ଵ. Workers who score at 
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this level or above costlessly can attend college. Let ݆௚ identify the worker for whom ݃௝ ൌ ݃. 
This worker and those with a lower index can attend college. 
This education environment is useful in that it allows simple analytical results. It also 
reflects the reality of many education systems where competitive exams are required for 
enrollment and tuition is then free or heavily subsidized.42 It is a less precise description of other 
economies and so it is useful to point out that our specification generalizes along several 
dimensions. First, we can add a tuition cost without consequence. All that is required is that 
some set of workers is constrained in college attendance by standards; i.e. the private expected 
gain to college for this set exceeds the tuition but they are not admitted. Secondly, rather than 
thinking about increasing or decreasing standards, we can think of decreasing or increasing the 
capacity of the education system. So long as students are ordered such that, for example, the 
most able are the first to attend and the least able are the last, the two interpretations are 
equivalent. Increasing capacity will require a lowering of standards. A minor caveat to this 
assertion is discussed in Section 4.1. 
Contingent on attending college, workers decide whether to make an effort investment to 
gain skill. This effort cost is worker-specific and the effort required by worker ݆ to become 
skilled is 
ܧ௝ ൌ ݁൫݆ሺܽሻ൯
ఎ
      (2) 
where ݁ ൐ 0 is a scalar governing the cost and ߟ gauges the curvature of this function. Notice 
that this function gauges how the cost of earning skill depends on ability. Those enrolled can 
instead earn a degree but no skill at a lower effort cost normalized to zero. We normalize wages 
so that the wage of a worker with no degree is zero. Workers with a degree but no skill on 
average find more favorable employment than those without degrees and the expected wage is 
given by ܩௗ ൐ 0. Workers with a degree and skill have an expected wage of ܩ௦ ൐ ܩௗ. In this 
simple environment, wage and consumption are equivalent. Assuming lifetime utility to be linear 
in consumption and effort we have 
௦ܸ,௝ ൌ ܩ௦ െ ݆݁ఎ; ௗܸ,௝ ൌ ܩௗ; ௨ܸ,௝ ൌ 0 
where ௦ܸ,௝, ௗܸ,௝, and ௨ܸ,௝ are expected utility as a skilled worker, a schooled worker (i.e. a worker 
possessing a degree but no skill) and an unskilled worker (no degree). Notice that ௗܸ,௝ and ௨ܸ,௝ 
                                                            
42 China is a good example. The subsequent version of this paper will elaborate. 
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are common for all workers. Heterogeneity along these lines is easy to handle but heterogeneity 
in effort costs proves sufficient to make our points. 
Since ܩௗ ൐ 0 and the effort cost of a degree is 0, each eligible worker strictly prefers to 
go to college and the share of the population going to college is ݆௚.
43 Thus the only meaningful 
decision made by workers is whether to obtain skill contingent on being admitted to college. A 
worker will choose skill if ௦ܸ,௝ ൐ ௗܸ,௝; i.e. if 
ܩ௦ െ ܩௗ ൒ ݆݁ఎ.       (3) 
The left-hand side of this is the increased expected wage when skill is earned. Since the 
structure assures that ݆݁ఎ is strictly increasing with ݆݁ఎ א ൣ0, ݆݁௚
ఎ൧, this holds for all degree 
holders if ܩ௦ െ ܩௗ ൐ ݆݁௚
ఎ.  In this case ௦݆ ൌ ݆௚ where ௦݆ is the highest indexed agent who earns 
skill. All workers with a lower index will be skilled and the remainder will be unskilled so that in 
this case the mass of skilled graduates equals the mass of graduates. Otherwise equation (3) will 
hold with equality for some worker ௦݆ where now ௦݆ ൏ ݆௚. The mass of skilled workers in this 
case is smaller than the mass of graduates. Considering the two cases we have 
௦݆ ൌ ቐ
 ݆௚      if   ܩ௦ െ ܩௗ ൐ ݆݁௚
ఎ 
ቀீೞିீ೏
௘
ቁ
భ
ആ  if   0 ൑ ܩ௦ െ ܩௗ ൑ ݆݁௚
ఎ
.     (4) 
Note that the share of the population with skill is ௦݆, the share of the population with degrees is 
݆௚ ൒ ௦݆ and the share of the degree holders with skill is 
௝ೞ
௝೒
. 
3.2.2 Firms 
We index firms by ݅. Let the continuous increasing cdf Iሺ݅ሻ be the distribution of ݅ with ݅ 
normalized such that ݅ א ሾ0,1ሿ Again we assume a uniform distribution so that Iሺ݅ሻ ൌ ݅. Taking 
labor outcomes as given, firms create job openings in order to maximize expected profits. There 
are two types of openings that a firm might create: skilled and unskilled. Firms are 
heterogeneous in their ability to create skilled openings. The cost to firm ݅ of creating a skilled 
position is ܥ௜ൌc݅ఉ while the cost of creating an unskilled position is normalized to 0. An 
unskilled position earns profits normalized to 0 while a skilled position yields expected profits 
net of job creation costs equal to ݌௦ െ c݅ఉ where ݌௦ ൐ 0 is the gross expected profits from a 
                                                            
43 Results are identical with a positive effort cost of schooling or a tuition cost small enough that ܩ݀ always 
compensates for the cost. 
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skilled position. The environment assures that some firms will create skilled vacancies and we 
refer to these as skilled firms. 
A firm will be skilled if ݌௦ െ c݅ఉ ൒ 0. Since the structure assures that c݅ఉ is strictly 
increasing with c݅ఉ א ሾ0, ܿሿ, this holds for all firms if ݌௦ ൐ ܿ. Otherwise it will hold with equality 
for some firm which we refer to as ݅௦. All firms with a lower index will be skilled and the 
remainder will be unskilled so that the share of skilled firms will be ݅௦. Thus 
݅௦ ൌ ቊ
1         if   ௦ܲ ൐ ܿ 
ሺܿିଵ ௦ܲሻ
భ
ഁ  if   0 ൑ ௦ܲ ൑ ܿ
.    (5) 
3.2.3 Equilibrium 
After firms and workers have made their decisions regarding skill acquisition and job 
creation, bilateral matching occurs. The production technology is such that an unskilled firm 
matched with any worker generates output normalized to zero. With no output, the gain to 
working for such a firm, whether skilled, schooled, or unskilled, is 0. Furthermore, any firm 
matched with an unskilled worker yields output of zero and thus no gain to the worker. 
The interesting features of our model stem from the cases where workers with degrees are 
matched with skilled firms. By our assumption that ܩௗ ൐ 0, schooled workers have an expected 
gain in such cases and by our assumption that ܩ௦ ൐ ܩௗ, those with skill have a larger expected 
gain. Let ܩ ൐ 0 be the expected wage increment of a skilled worker when matched with a skilled 
firm. Then since ݅௦ is the chance of such a match occurring 
ܩ௦ െ ܩௗ ൌ ݅௦ܩ.      (6) 
From the firm's perspective, gains can occur only if the firm is matched with a skilled 
worker. A skilled firm's expected profit then depends on the share of workers with skill and the 
expected gain in a skilled match. Letting ܲ ൐ 0 be the firm's expected gain in a skilled match we 
have 
௦ܲ ൌ ௦݆ܲ.       (7) 
It proves convenient to define ܹ ൌ ܩ݁ିଵ and ܨ ൌ ܲܿିଵ. Notice that for any workers 
with a degree, the benefit-cost ratio of skill is ௜ೞ
௝ആ
ீ
௘
ൌ ௜ೞ
௝ആ
ܹ. Thus ܹ is a scalar determining the 
rate of return to skill for workers in a best match. Similarly, ܨ is a scalar determining the rate of 
return for firms from creating a skilled opening in a best match. With these definitions we can 
use equations (6) and (7) to rewrite equations (4) and (5) as 
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௦݆ ൌ ൝
݆௚            if  ܩ݅௦ ൐ ݆݁௚
ఎ 
ሺܹ݅௦ሻ
భ
ആ          if  0 ൑ ܩ݅௦ ൑ ݆݁௚
ఎ
     (8) 
݅௦ ൌ ቊ
1           if  ܲ ௦݆ ൐ ܿ 
ሺܨ ௦݆ሻ
భ
ഁ         if  0 ൑ ܲ ௦݆ ൑ ܿ
 .    (9) 
As mentioned in the introduction, the model blends some features of Acemoglu (1996) 
and Blankenau and Camera (2006, 2009). In Acemoglu's paper, firms and workers also make 
uncoordinated investment decisions prior to random matching. Thus as in our model firms and 
workers have to make decisions based on the expected productivity of their production partner. 
In our model entities face a dichotomous choice to invest or not. This is to match the 
dichotomous choices faced by workers in going to college and by firms in posting jobs requiring 
degrees. Acemoglu is not concerned with the college choice per se and entities in his model 
choose a level of investment. However, an equivalent coordination problem results in an 
equivalent externality. We see this in equations (8) and (9). Except for corner solutions (i.e. 
when ௦݆ ൏ ݆௚ and ௦݆ ൏ 1) an increase in skilled workers motivates an increase in skilled firms 
and vice versa. 
Absent the Blankenau and Camera market failure, policy implications from our model 
would align closely with those in Acemoglu. In his model, anything that increases investment by 
workers would increase investment by firms and improve outcomes through this externality. In 
ours, anything that increases the number of students would increase the number of skilled 
workers and in turn would increase the number of skilled firms. With the market failure however 
the chain of events can break down at its first link. An increase in the number of students may 
not increase the number of skilled workers. While the remaining link is unbroken, it is also 
unexploited when there is no gain in skill. 
To see this more clearly, we consider equilibrium outcomes. An equilibrium in this 
setting is a set ( ௦݆ א ሺ0, ݆௚ሿ, ݅௦ א ሺ0,1ሿ) such that ௦݆ satisfies equation (8) with workers taking 
݅௦ and ݆௚ as given and ݅௦ satisfies equation (9) with firms taking ௦݆ and ݆௚ as given. Proposition 1 
below characterizes the equilibrium. 
Proposition 1. Let ଔ̃ ؠ ൫ܨܹఉ൯
భ
ഁആషభ. If ܹ
భ
ആܨ ൐ 1 
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ሺ ௦݆, ݅௦ሻ ൌ
ە
ۖ
۔
ۖ
ۓ ൬݆௚, ൫ܨ݆௚൯
భ
ഁ൰     if  ݆௚ ൏ ܨିଵ
൫݆௚, 1൯      if  ܨିଵ ൏ ݆௚ ൏ ܹ
భ
ആ
൬ܹ
భ
ആ, 1൰         if  ݆௚ ൐ ܹ
భ
ആ
.    (10) 
and if ܹ
భ
ആܨ ൏ 1 
ሺ ௦݆, ݅௦ሻ ൌ ൞
൬݆௚, ൫ܨ݆௚൯
భ
ഁ൰               if   ݆௚ ൏ ଔ̃ 
൬ଔ̃ , ሺܨఎܹሻ
భ
ഁആషభ ൰      if  ݆௚ ൐ ଔ̃ 
.    (11) 
Proposition 1 shows that there are two distinct cases delineated by ܹ
భ
ആܨ. When this value 
is greater than 1, ሺ ௦݆, ݅௦ሻ is governed by equation (10) and when it is smaller, they are governed 
by equation (11). The first line of each shows that with ݆௚ sufficiently small, ሺ ௦݆, ݅௦ሻ is the same 
in each case. With ݆௚ small, any worker allowed entrance to college has a relatively low cost of 
acquiring skill and all choose to do so; i.e. ௦݆ ൌ ݆௚. From the firm´s perspective, the relative 
scarcity of skilled workers makes creating skilled positions less attractive and few skilled 
positions are created. Here ݅௦ ൌ ൫ܨ݆௚൯
భ
ഁ. In this case, a loosening of standards, that is a rise in ݆௚, 
yields more skilled workers, more skilled firms and has no negative effect on the average skill 
level of graduates. 
As ݆௚ rises, the cost to the marginal worker of obtaining skill increases, making skill 
acquisition less attractive for the marginal agent. At the same time, the number of skilled firms 
rises, increasing the chances of being matched with a skilled firm. This makes skill acquisition 
more attractive. Eventually, though, the return does not justify the high effort cost for the 
marginal agent and a group of schooled workers arises ሺ ௦݆ ൏ ݆௚ሻ. 
The cases delineated by ܹ
భ
ആܨ differ in whether ௦݆ ൏ ݆௚, arises when all firms are skilled 
(equation (10)) or when a subset of firms are skilled (equation (11)). When ܨ is larger, ݅௦ is 
larger for any given ݆௚ and thus more readily hits its upper bound of 1. The proposition shows 
that for ܨ large enough, this upper bound is reached when ௦݆ ൏ ݆௚. When ܨ is smaller, the upper 
bound is never reached as discussed below. 
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We will focus mostly on the case where ܹ
భ
ആܨ ൏ 1. However, we first point out some 
interesting features of the other case. As mentioned above, with ݆௚ small, increasing enrollment 
yields more skilled workers and firms. Furthermore, when ݆௚ exceeds ܨିଵ, an equilibrium arises 
where all graduates are skilled and all are matched with skilled firms as in the second line of 
equation (10). It seems that this setting is one in which lowering standards (increasing  ݆௚) would 
be most advisable. However, the third line shows the perils of low standards in this case. When 
݆௚ is sufficiently large, some workers find it best to be schooled workers even with ݅௦ ൌ 1. 
Lowering standards further yields no increase to the average skill level of the population and 
decreases the average skill level of a college graduate. 
The case where ܹ
భ
ആܨ ൏ 1 is more relevant since it assures ݅௦ ൏ 1and we do not observe 
݅௦ ൌ 1 in actual economies. It is also more interesting since it allows the case where both ௦݆ and 
݅௦ are interior solutions. With ݆௚ ൏ ଔ ̃lowering education standards has a positive effect on both 
the number of skilled workers and the number of skilled firms as discussed above. 
We refer to matches with a skilled worker and a skilled firm as productive matches. With 
݆௚ ൏ ଔ̃ the number of such matches, ௦݆݅௦, clearly increases as standards fall. Unproductive 
matches occur when at least one party to a match is not skilled; i.e. they occur with probability 
1 െ ௦݆݅௦. Changing the composition of matches in favor of skilled matches and away from 
unproductive matches is one positive effect of lower standards. However, even in this simple 
setting the model demonstrates a potential problem with lowering standards: while the number of 
unproductive matches falls, the number of wasteful unproductive matches can rise. 
To see it, note that unproductive matches can be of three types. If both parties to the 
match are unskilled, the match represents no wasted effort; neither the worker nor the firm has 
unrequited costly potential. The number of such matches is ሺ1 െ ௦݆ሻሺ1 െ ݅௦ሻ and they are clearly 
less prevalent when ௦݆ and ݅௦ increase. In other unproductive matches, one party has skill and the 
other does not. These matches imply a wasted effort on the part of the skilled party. They have 
paid a cost to become skilled but end up in an unproductive situation. In the case of workers, 
there is also a wasted tuition payment by government. We refer to a skilled worker in an 
unproductive match as underemployed. The number of such matches is ௦݆ሺ1 െ ݅௦ሻ. We refer to a 
skilled firm in an unproductive match as underperforming since it has the potential to be 
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productive but is unable to hire the requisite skilled labor. The number of such matches is 
ሺ1 െ ௦݆ሻ݅௦. Corollary 1 summarizes the effect of lower standards when ݆௚ is small. 
Corollary 1. Let ݆௚ ൏ ଔ̃ and ܹ
భ
ആܨ ൏ 1. As enrollment standards are lowered (as ݆௚increases) 
there are more skilled firms, more skilled workers, and more productive matches. The share of 
degree holders with skill is constant at 1. For ݆௚ ൏ ሺ൐ሻ
ଵ
ଵାఉ
 there are more (fewer) 
underperforming firms. For ݆௚ ൏ ሺ൐ሻ ቀ
ఉ
ଵାఉ
ቁ
ఉ ଵ
ி
 there are more (fewer) underemployed graduates. 
However, the share of degree holders who are underemployed is lower. 
The first claim (second sentence) restates that  ௦݆ , ݅௦, and ௦݆݅௦ are increasing in ݆௚. The 
second is a restatement of ௦݆ ൌ ݆௚. The third claim is proven in the appendix. An implication is 
that in a neighborhood of ݆௚ ൌ 0 lowering standards yields more wasteful unproductive matches 
of each type. The reason is that with ݆௚ low, ݅௦ is low so that skilled workers will be unlikely to 
match with skilled firms and ௦݆ is low so that skilled firms will be unlikely to match with skilled 
workers. Lower standards can increase underemployment over the entire range ݆௚ א ሾ0, ଔ̃ሿ if 
ଔ̃ ൏ ଵ
ଵାఉ
 and can increase underperformance by skilled firms over this range if  ଔ̃ ൏ ቀ ఉ
ଵାఉ
ቁ
ఉ ଵ
ி
. 
We emphasize that these results stem solely from the matching structure. Since all degree 
holders are skilled, the option of being a schooled worker is never chosen and this feature of our 
model is not operative. Thus lower standards have no negative effect on the average skill of 
graduates. Lowering standards simply increases human capital and firms respond positively. The 
potential increase in wasteful unproductive matches is an artifact of more skill subjected to 
random matching. This problem is more severe when graduates (and hence skilled firms) are few 
in number, i.e. when ݆௚ is small. When ݆௚ ൐ ቀ
ఉ
ଵାఉ
ቁ
ఉ ଵ
ி
 , further increases in the number of college 
graduates will decrease the number of underemployed graduates so long as all earn skill. 
While increasing graduates can increase the number of underemployed skilled workers, 
the final claim states that at as a share of degree holders, underemployment always falls. Since 
the number of underemployed workers is ௦݆ሺ1 െ ݅௦ሻ, this as a share of degree holders is simply 
ሺ1 െ ݅௦ሻ. Thus the algebra of the claim is simple. The intuition is also straightforward. More 
skilled agents begets more skilled firms so each skilled worker has a better chance of an 
appropriate match. Thus a larger share of those with skill are in skilled matches. 
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The above policy implications only hold when all graduates choose to earn skill. When ݆௚ 
exceeds the ଔ̃ threshold a group of unskilled graduates emerges and the implications of a further 
lowering of standards are much different. These are summarized in Corollary 2. 
Corollary 2. Let ݆௚ ൐ ଔ̃ and ܹ
భ
ആܨ ൏ 1. As enrollment standards are lowered there is no change 
in the number of skilled firms, skilled workers, or skilled matches. The share of degree holders 
with skill falls and there are more underemployed graduates. The number of underperforming 
firms does not change but the share of such firm employing college graduates rises. 
As ݆௚ crosses a threshold, the marginal worker finds that the expected return to skill does 
not compensate for the effort cost of its acquisition. As a result, this worker opts for the lower 
expected wage of being a schooled agent. Beyond this threshold, additional students will make 
the same decision so that ௦݆ no longer increases in ݆௚. With no additional skilled workers, the 
number of skilled firms does not expand. The mechanism driving the earlier results is shut down. 
As a result both ௦݆ and ݅௦ are independent of ݆௚ beyond the threshold. This is clear from the 
second line of equation (11) and is stated as the first claim of Corollary 2. 
The second claim is evident from rising enrollment with a fixed number of skilled 
workers and skilled firms. A group of degree holders with no skill arises with sufficiently low 
standards and expands as standards continue to fall. Since no new skilled positions are created as 
enrollment rises, the number of underemployed college graduates rises. 
Since this new class of workers does not acquire skill, this is not wasteful of student 
effort. Also, workers and firms with skill are no less likely to be in a productive match. Thus the 
cost of the failure is not wasted effort or lower output but rather futile education expenditures. 
The third claim points out that with ௦݆ and ݅௦ fixed, there is no change in the number of 
underperforming skilled firms. However, if we consider firms who are able to hire college 
graduates, we find that their average productivity will be lower. This is because more skilled 
firms are hiring graduates but the same number are in fact hiring skilled workers. Thus two 
measures of economic performance are adversely affected: the underemployment rate of degree 
holders and the average productivity of degree holders who find skilled positions. While neither 
the number of skilled workers nor skilled matches falls, skilled workers may nonetheless be 
made worse off by lower standards. It is shown in Section 3 that if the skill level of a worker is 
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difficult for a firm to assess, the expected wage to a skilled worker may decrease in response to 
the lower expected output from hiring a degree holder. 
In summary, lowering standards can have a variety of effects. When ݆௚ is small these can 
be both positive and negative. On the negative side, lower standards may increase the number of 
underemployed skilled workers and/or underperforming skilled firms. On the positive side, lower 
standards increase the number of skilled workers, the number of skilled firms, and output. When 
݆௚ is larger, the ability of government to increase output through allowing greater enrollment is 
eliminated and the only results are negative. Increasing ݆௚ beyond a threshold increases the 
number of graduates but has no effect on the number of skilled workers. Thus the number of 
unskilled graduates is positive and increasing in ݆௚. While underemployment among the skilled 
does not increase, there are more graduates in unskilled positions so that apparent 
underemployment rises. Furthermore, though output does not fall, the productivity of firms 
contingent of being matched with a skilled worker falls. 
While lowering standards (or increasing enrollment) beyond a threshold proves to be 
poor policy, the model is suggestive of more robust policies for improving outcomes. Recall that 
ܨ and ܹ are the rates of return for skilled firms and workers in best matches. It is easy to suggest 
ways in which government might influence either. Lower corporate income taxes, subsidies to 
skilled firms, or lowering the cost of posting a skilled position might increase ܨ.44 Lower income 
taxes (or less progressive income taxes) might lower ܹ. Lowering the private cost of acquiring 
skill, perhaps through improved education quality, would have the same effect. Rather than 
complicating the model with the particulars of such policies at this point, we simply argue that 
these rates of return might be influenced by policy. Corollary 3 shows how outcomes respond to 
changes in ܨ and ܹ. 
Corollary 3. When ݆௚ ൏ ଔ̃, an increase in ܨ increases ݅௦ and has no effect on ௦݆ while an increase 
in ܹ has no effect on either ݅௦ or ௦݆ . When ݆௚ ൐ ଔ,̃ an increase in either ܨ or ܹ increases both ݅௦ 
and ௦݆. An increase in either also increases ଔ̃. 
The corollary, which derives directly from equations (10) and (11), shows that increasing 
the rate of return for firms is always helpful. When standards are high ( ௦݆ low), it motivates more 
firms to post skilled positions. As a result more of the graduates land high paying jobs. When 
                                                            
44 Investment tax credits can be considered an example of lowering the cost of posting a skilled position. 
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standards are lower, this effect still operates and another kicks in. Due to improved chances of a 
skilled match, more students earn skill. This causes an even greater increase in the number of 
firms posting skilled positions. 
Increasing the returns to skilled labor is not effective when all earn skill. Since 
government is choosing admission and all agents are already choosing skill, there is no margin 
along which the increased return can work to increase skill. However when standards are low 
and some students choose to earn no skill, increasing returns to skill can be helpful. It motives a 
larger share of the workforce to earn skill, and through this increases also the number of skilled 
postings. 
There is a large literature suggesting that with production externalities government has a 
role in funding education. Often this work focuses on tuition subsidies (ex. Hanushek, Leung and 
Yilmaz (2004)). Our work complements this by considering an environment where the 
externalities arise endogenously. By evaluating the source of the externalities we show that 
subsidizing firms can be an appropriate response to what we typically think of as an education 
externality. In fact, from equation (11) we see that with ݆௚ ൏ ଔ̃ it is the only sort of subsidy that is 
effective since changes in ܹ have no effect. Concerning education, our work also focusses on 
the need for subsidies to quality rather than to tuition. In this, it mirrors the findings of 
Blankenau and Camera (2009). 
3.3 Foundations 
There are several key assumptions that give rise to the results above. First, there needs to 
be some advantage to going to school even if the worker does not become skilled; i.e. ܩௗ ൐ 0. 
Second, earning skill must have an additional advantage; i.e. ܩ௦ ൐ ܩௗ. Finally, firms must have 
some expected benefit from creating a skilled position; ௦ܲ ൐ 0. In this section we describe 
several example environment that can support these assumptions. We then discuss some possible 
extensions to this foundation that would preserve the key findings. The main point is that a 
variety of intuitive settings can support the required assumptions. 
3.3.1 Productive schooling 
Suppose that in any match the wage is set to ݖܻ where ܻ is the output from the match and 
ݖ א ሺ0,1ሻ is the exogenously determined share paid to the worker. A match between a skilled 
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worker and a skilled firm yields output of ௛ܻ. Since a skilled worker matches with a skilled firm 
with probability ݅௦ we have 
ܩ௦ ൌ ݅௦ݖ ௛ܻ . 
Similarly, a match between a schooled worker and a skilled firm yields output of ௟ܻ where 
0 ൏ ௟ܻ ൏ ௛ܻ . This gives 
ܩௗ ൌ ݅௦ݖ ௟ܻ . 
Thus ܩ௦ ൐ ܩௗ ൐ 0 as required. 
We assume that firms pay a fixed cost of production. For unskilled firms this is 
normalized to 0 and for skilled firms it is equal to ܥ. The firm matches with a skilled worker 
with probability ௦݆ and with a schooled worker with probability ሺ݆௚ െ ௦݆ሻ. Thus the benefit to 
being a skilled firm is 
௦ܲ ൌ ௦݆൫ሺ1 െ ݖሻ ௛ܻ െ ܥ൯ ൅ ൫݆௚ െ ௦݆൯൫ሺ1 െ ݖሻ ௟ܻ െ ܥ൯. 
To simplify the algebra, we assumed in the previous section that firms benefit only when 
matched with skilled agents. It is easy to relax the assumption so that firms benefit in any match 
and benefit more in a skilled match. However, numerical solutions are required and little is 
gained in terms of intuition. Thus we preserve the assumption by setting ܥ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݖሻ ௟ܻ. Then 
௦ܲ ൌ ௦݆൫ሺ1 െ ݖሻ ௛ܻ െ ܥ൯ so that the final assumption is also satisfied. To be more explicit, in this 
setting ܹ ൌ ௭ሺ௒೓ି௒೗ሻ
௘
 and ܨ ൌ ሺଵି௭ሻ௒೓ି஼
௖
. With theses definitions, the math from the previous 
section applies directly. Results are similar when 0 ൏ ܥ ൏ ሺ1 െ ݖሻ ௟ܻ though closed form 
solutions are not available. 
3.3.2 Asymmetric information 
An alternative foundation builds on an information asymmetry and also maps directly 
into setting in the previous section. Consider an economy where the information structure is 
similar to that in Blankenau and Camera (2006, 2009). Suppose that in any match the wage is set 
to ݖܧሺܻሻ where ܧሺܻሻ  is the expected output from the match and ݖ א ሺ0,1ሻ is the exogenously 
determined share paid to the worker. The output expectation is contingent on information 
available prior to production. A match between a skilled worker and a skilled firm yields output 
of ܻ ൐ 0 while all other matches yield output normalized to 0. As a result, if the skill level of a 
degree holder is observable, schooled workers will always earn 0. This violates ܩௗ ൐ 0. If 
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instead the skill level cannot be observed, the expected output from a match with a degree holder 
is ܻ ௝ೞ
௝೒
. Thus the common wage for all degree holders is ݖܻ ௝ೞ
௝೒
. This violates ܩ௦ ൐ ܩௗ. 
To satisfy both restrictions, we assume that the skill level of a worker is revealed with 
probability ߠ א ሺ0,1ሻ. The idea here is that the degree only indicates that a worker has had an 
opportunity to earn skill, not that the opportunity was taken. As such the firm may request 
additional information such as grades, letters of recommendation, and interview assessments. 
These give additional but noisy information and may reveal a worker's skill level. 
In this setting schooled workers earn ݖܻ ௝ೞ
௝೒
 when they are matched with a skilled firm and 
are not recognized and they earn nothing otherwise. In other matches they earn 0. Since we have 
already shown that ݅௦, ௦݆ ൐ 0, we have 
ܩௗ ൌ ݅௦ሺ1 െ ߠሻݖܻ
௝ೞ
௝೒
൐ 0      (12) 
as required. Skilled workers earn ݖܻ when they are matched with a skilled firm and recognized. 
Otherwise they earn the same as a schooled worker. Thus 
ܩ௦ ൌ ݅௦ߠݖܻ ൅ ܩௗ       (13) 
and obviously ܩ௦ െ ܩௗ ൌ ݅௦ߠݖܻ ൐ 0. It is straightforward to show that in this setting 
௦ܲ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݖሻ ௦݆ܻ ൐ 0       (14) 
so that the final assumption is also satisfied. To be more explicit, in this setting ܹ ൌ ఏ௭௒
௘
 and 
ܨ ൌ ሺଵି௭ሻ௒
௖
 so that the math above applies directly. 
This setting makes explicit the effect of ݆௚ on the expected wages of different types of 
workers and on the productivity of skilled firms. We summarize these is Corollary 4. 
Corollary 4. Let ܹ
భ
ആܨ ൏ 1 and ݆௚ ൐ ൫ܨܹఉ൯
భ
ഁആషభ in the environment described above. Then an 
increase in ݆௚ decreases the expected wage of both skilled workers and schooled workers and 
decreases the expected output of a match with a skilled firm and a degree holder. 
The information asymmetry presents the worker with the option of mimicking a skilled 
worker by earning identical credentials. In cases where the skill level is obscured, the schooled 
workers appropriate some of the rent due skilled workers. The share of rent confiscated by 
schooled workers rises as the share of schooled workers rises. Thus lower standards do not lower 
the productivity of a skilled worker but rather lower the share of output retained by the worker. 
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Schooled workers are also hurt by an enrollment expansion. With few schooled workers, the 
expected output of a degree holder is high and the wage to unrecognized degree holders reflects 
this. As more schooled workers enter the labor force, expected output and wages fall. 
Firms are not hurt by the expansion since they are risk averse and wages adjust to keep 
their expected profit the same whenever matched with a degree holder. However, productivity 
measures are affected. A larger number of schooled workers will decrease the expected output of 
a firm who hires a schooled worker. 
A variety of generalizations of this setting are possible. For example, one may be 
concerned that the information asymmetries would be temporary. Production should reveal skill 
levels and future wages should adjust. However in another setting Blankenau and Camera (2009) 
generalize a similar information structure to one where workers live several periods. There is 
uncertainty regarding productivity in the first period but not in subsequent periods. This 
generalization has little effect on their results. The same is true here. So long as schooled 
workers can mimic the skilled at least initially, the results hold. Thus for algebraic simplicity, we 
consider only the static case. 
As another example, the split of expected output could be endogenized. All that is 
required is that workers and firms agree to a split prior to production and that this split be 
conditional only on information available at that time. It is not important that this split be equal 
in cases where the skill level is known and unknown but only that it not be a corner in either 
case. 
3.3.3 Different compensation strategies 
The foundation provided above shows in a simple setting how information asymmetries 
can influence the effectiveness of increasing enrollment by lowering the required score for entry 
to college. Moreover, it is a setting which has proven useful elsewhere in the literature. Its 
simplicity, though, requires a somewhat cumbersome assumption. The government knows exam 
scores before college begins but firms do not know initial exam scores when college is 
completed. If they did, they could work through the calculations above and discern which 
graduates are skilled and which are not based on exam scores. Instead, for any individual, they 
only know whether college was completed. Other information is revealed only with probability 
ߠ. 
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It may be reasonable to assume that government does not provide this information and 
that individuals cannot credibly reveal the information. If anything prevents the perfect 
transference of this information to firms, we can subsume the possibility of revelation into the 
parameter ߠ. So long as ߠ ൏ 1, our results hold. However, there are several alternatives to this 
information structure which get around this feature. One alternative which requires a bit more 
structure is discussed in Section 4.2. The other is a simple reinterpretation of the ߠ parameter and 
allows the math above to hold in an identical manner. 
Suppose that the skill level is recognized by firms so that they can calculate the skilled 
agents from the schooled agents. However, only a share of firms use this information to set 
wages. That is, a share ߠ of firms compensate degree holders according to their ability and the 
remainder compensate degree holders according to the expected ability of a degree holder.45 In 
the environment above, firms earn the same regardless of the compensation strategy and so this 
does not violate optimality on their part. There are many reasons a firm might choose to 
compensate all degree holders equally. For example, there may be a union, wage negotiations or 
monitoring may be costly, or there may be some residual uncertainty not modeled here. There is 
in fact a large literature that identifies and explains different compensation strategies by firms. 
See, for example, Lazear (1986, 2000a, and 2000b). This literature shows why some workers are 
paid piecemeal so that wages reflect output directly while others are paid a salary which 
essentially relates pay to input, at least initially. The first case more closely resembles pay 
according to marginal product and the second more closely resembles pay according to expected 
marginal output. Our model can be seen as taking as given some exogenous impetus for variation 
in compensation schemes. As argued above, this wage equality across ability levels need not 
endure. If it occurs at least initially, our requirements are satisfied. 
The math in the previous subsection maps precisely into this new environment. From this 
we see that the essential requirement is not the information structure but the payment structure. 
So long as the schooled worker can at times be overcompensated at some cost to the skilled 
worker, the required conditions for our results can arise. 
3.4 Extensions 
                                                            
45 Pay according to expected ability is a common feature in signaling models. See for example Bedard (2001). 
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In previous sections, college enrollment influences neither the skill level nor the share of 
skilled firms unless all students are skilled. This highlights the separation of schooling from skill 
accumulation in a simple setting but likely understates the importance of enrollment. In this 
section we consider several environments which allow ௦݆ and ݅௦ to depend on education levels. 
We then consider how this consideration modifies our findings. We show that despite the more 
complex setting, the mechanism described above serves to mitigate the effects of increased 
enrollment on skill accumulation and the creation of skilled jobs. 
3.4.1 Generalized cost and return functions 
To this point we have implicitly assumed that education quality is stable as enrollment 
increases. To see it, note that as enrollment increases, the effort cost of earning skill is fixed for a 
particular agent. This is why in Section 2.1 we could state that expanding and using capacity was 
the same as lowering standards. There is evidence however, that per capita government spending 
on education falls as enrollments rise. For example, OECD Factbook (2009) states that "in many 
OECD countries the expansion of enrolments, particularly in tertiary education, has not always 
been paralleled by changes in educational investment." To the extent that per capita expenditures 
influence education quality, this makes earning skill more difficult for those enrolled. 
In this subsection we make assume that the cost of skill can be mitigated by per-student 
spending on education and that per student spending falls as enrollment rises. Suppose ܧ௝ ൌ
݁ ቀ
௝೒
௞
ቁ
ఈ
݆ఎ where ݇ is total government spending on education so that ൬ ௞
௝೒
൰ is expenditure per 
student. Government finances expenditure through lump-sum taxation.46 We assume ߙ ൒ 0 so 
that the effort cost of skill decreases as per-student expenditure rises.  The idea here is that higher 
quality education makes skill acquisition simpler. In this setting, when ݆௚ increases without a 
proportional increase in ݇, per-student expenditure falls. This causes a decrease in educational 
quality. As a result, it is more difficult for a worker to earn skill. 
Proposition 2 demonstrates the extent to which our results generalize to include this 
effect. This is analogous to the second part of Proposition 1. The first part also generalizes and is 
given in the unpublished proof available from the authors. 
                                                            
46 This assures that taxes do not distort choices; i.e. generalizations of equations (8) and (9) are independent of taxes 
and depend on government only through expenditure. 
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Proposition 2. In the generalized setting, if ሺܹ݇ఈሻ
భ
ആశഀܨ ൏ 1 
ሺ ௦݆, ݅௦ሻ ൌ ൞
൬݆௚, ൫ܨ݆௚൯
భ
ഁ൰   if   ݆௚ ൏ ൫ܨܹఉ݇ఈఉ൯
భ
ሺആశഀሻഁషభ 
ሺ݆כ, ݅כሻ             if  ݆௚ ൐ ൫ܨܹఉ݇ఈఉ൯
భ
ሺആశഀሻഁషభ
     (15) 
where ݆כ ൌ ቀܹఉܨ݇ఈఉ݆௚
ିఈఉቁ
భ
ആഁషభ, ݅כ ൌ ൫ܹܨఎ݇ఈାଵ݆௚ିఈ൯
భ
ആഁషభ. When ሺ ௦݆, ݅௦ሻ ൌ ሺ݆כ, ݅כሻ, the number 
of skilled firms, skilled workers, and skilled matches fall as enrollment standards are lowered. 
Furthermore the share of degree holders with skill falls, there are more underemployed 
graduates, and the share of underemployed graduates rises. 
Comparing this with Proposition 1, we see that when ݆௚is small, the results are unchanged 
except that the cutoff point is different. However, when ݆௚ is large enough to ensure interior 
solutions for both workers and firms, ݆௚ influences both ௦݆ and ݅௦. In the earlier case, lower 
standards failed to bring about more skilled firms, workers or matches. Now, each of these 
measures falls. Higher enrollment lowers the productivity of education so fewer workers decide 
to earn skill. Anticipating this, fewer firms create skilled positions.  
3.4.2 Imperfect correlation between ability and scores 
This final example extends the work in two useful ways. First it provides an alternative 
information structure. This structure is robust to the concern that agents could identify true 
ability through knowledge of exam scores. Secondly, it relaxes a somewhat extreme finding of 
earlier settings. In those settings, once a threshold is reached allowing additional enrollment 
always means increasing the number of schooled agents without increasing the number of skilled 
agents. In the current setting, at every grade level there is a distribution of ability levels. As a 
result, allowing more students can increase both the number of skilled and schooled agents. 
Due to imperfections in the examination system and an element of randomness in exam 
performance, it is possible that some high ability agents perform poorly on entry exams while 
some low ability agents do well. That is, scores and ability may not be perfectly correlated. In 
this case uncertainty about productivity remains when exam scores are revealed. 
To capture this notion, suppose that agents are assigned both an ability level ܽ and an 
exam score ݃. These are realizations of the random variables ܣ and ܩ with joint probability 
distribution ݂ீ ஺ሺ݃, ܽሻ and support ݃, ܽ א ሺ0,1ሻ. Test scores reveal the conditional probability 
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distribution of ability, ஺݂|ீሺܣ|ܩ ൌ ݃ሻ  but not the realization of ability. An agent know both ܽ  
and ݃  while those granting admission know only ݃. This is a simple way to model the common 
theme that workers may have information about ability unavailable to government. 
In this environment we no longer have a mapping from test scores to ability. Thus 
defining a cutoff exam score is no longer equivalent to identifying a cutoff ability level and 
index. As such, we no longer use the ݆௚ notation. Rather than defining a cutoff index, we define a 
cutoff exam score, ݃௖. In general, some agents at each ability level will score above this cutoff 
score and go to college while others will score below and not be admitted. 
Unobservable ability removes the possibility of a cutoff ability level for college 
attendance. Since agents know their ability level, however, their choice of skill upon admission 
is not changed and there remains a cutoff ability level and index for skill acquisition. It proves 
more convenient going forward to refer to agents by their ability level rather than their index. 
Thus there is an ability level, ܽ௦, such that agents with ability above ܽ௦ will earn skill if they 
enroll in college and the remainder will not. This is related to our earlier ௦݆ through the functional 
relationship in equation (1). 
The output and compensation structure are the same as in the previous two subsections 
and true ability is again revealed with probability ߠ. That is, an agent receives a share of output 
with probability ߠ and otherwise receives the same share of expected output. This gives 
ܩௗሺ݃ሻ ൌ ݅௦ሺ1 െ ߠሻݖܻ න ஺݂|ீ݀ܽ
ଵ
௔ೞ
 
ܩ௦ሺ݃ሻ ൌ ݅௦ߠݖܻ ൅ ܩௗሺ݃ሻ. 
These are equivalent to equations (12) and (13) except that the integral replaces ௦݆݆௚ିଵ. This 
integral is the share of workers with exam score ݃ whose ability exceeds ܽ௦ just as ௦݆݆௚ିଵ is the 
share of graduates with skill in earlier representations. 
Agents for whom ܽ ൐ ܽ௦ will be skilled only if their exam scores warrant college 
admission. Thus the share of the population with skill, ߨሺܽ௦, ݃௖ሻ, is 
ߨሺܽ௦, ݃௖ሻ ൌ ׬ ׬ ݂ீ ஺ሺ݃, ܽሻ
ଵ
௚೎
ଵ
௔ೞ
      (16) 
and the analog to equation (14) is 
௦ܲ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݖሻߨܻ ൐ 0. 
 99
Considering interior solutions for brevity, the second lines of equations (8) and (9) 
become 
 ௦݆ሺܽ௦ሻ ൌ ሺܹ݅௦ሻ
భ
ആ      (17) 
and 
 ݅௦ ൌ ൫ܨߨሺܽ௦, ݃௖ሻ൯
భ
ഁ      (18) 
where again ܹ ൌ ఏ௭௒
௘
 and ܨ ൌ ሺଵି௭ሻ௒
௖
. These differ from their earlier counterparts in that ௦݆ in 
equation (9) is replaced by ߨ in equation (18). 
Equations (1) and (16)-(18) define four equations in ௦݆, ݅௦, ߨ, and ܽ௦. Further analysis 
requires that we specify the relationship between ݆ and ܽ in equation (1) and the joint distribution 
in equation (16). In general this will require numerical solutions. However, we note that in a 
special case, the model reverts precisely to the math in Section 3.2. Suppose that we choose 
some joint distribution ݂ீ ஺ሺ݃, ܽሻ  and use equation (16) to find ߨሺܽ௦, ݃௖ሻ for an arbitrary ܽ. Then 
in choosing ݆௔ we simply choose ݆௔ equal to the derived ߨሺܽ௦, ݃௖ሻ. So long as this is decreasing 
in ܽ, we will have violated none of the assumptions of this section. Furthermore, equations (17) 
and (18) will reduce to the second lines of equations (8) and (9). As the cases are identical, no 
new analysis is required. 
An example serves to make this more clear. Let 
݂ீ ஺ሺ݃, ܽሻ  ൌ 2ሺ1 െ ܽሻ ൅ 4ሺܽ െ .5ሻ݃ሻ 
with support ݃, ܽ א ሺ0,1ሻ. With this specification ݂ீ ሺ݃ሻ ൌ ஺݂ሺܽሻ ൌ 1 while ஺݂|ீ ൌ ݂ீ |஺ ൌ ݂ீ ஺. 
That is, the unconditional distributions of ability and skill are uniform while conditional 
distributions are given by equation (19).For a given exam score, ݃, any ability level is possible 
but the expected level of ability is ଵ
ଷ
ሺ1 ൅ ݃ሻ. Similarly, for a given ability level, ܽ, any score is 
possible but the expected score is ଵ
ଷ
ሺ1 ൅ ܽሻ. The more able have higher expected test scores and 
higher test scores indicate a higher expected ability. Using equation (16), we find 
ߨሺܽ௦, ݃௖ሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݃௖ሻሺ1 െ ܽ௦ሻሺ1 ൅ ܽ௦݃௖ሻ . 
Next we specify equation (1) as 
݆ሺܽሻ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݃௖ሻሺ1 െ ܽሻሺ1 ൅ ܽ݃௖ሻ .    (20) 
 100
It is straightforward to show that this is decreasing in ܽ and thus allowable. Clearly if ݆ and ܽ are 
related as in equation (20), the math from Sections 2 and 3 applies directly. The same is true for 
any specification where ݆ሺܽሻ ൌ ߨሺܽ௦, ݃௖ሻ. 
The mapping in equation (20) is useful in that it allows this much richer setting to be an 
alternative foundation for the simple results in Section 2. A drawback is that the mapping is 
somewhat contrived since it depends on ݃௖. It is illuminating to consider why this is needed. 
With the current setup, lowering standards increases the number of skilled agents since 
some share of agents with every score will become skilled. Firms respond to this by creating 
more skilled positions. Since this effect is not present in the earlier case, the cases cannot be 
identical unless something undoes this effect. 
In equation (20), ݆ሺܽሻ is decreasing in ݃௖. Thus when ݃௖ increases and fewer go to 
college, the index for agents at every ability level falls. Recall that ݆, as well as serving as an 
index, determines the cost of skill as indicated in equations (1) and (2). Because of this, by 
increasing ݆ at each ability level, we are increasing the private cost of earning skill at each ability 
level. This serves to decrease the number of skilled agents and firms and counters the upward 
pressure from lower standards mentioned in the previous paragraph. With equation (20) as the 
mapping from cost to ability, (from ݆ to ܽ), the two effects precisely offset. This is the same 
mechanism as developed in Section 4.1 except there we explicitly model the effect as depending 
on per capita expenditures. The current setting can be given the same interpretation. 
We need these effects to offset perfectly only to match the earlier model perfectly. The 
mechanism at work in Sections 2 and 3 is still operative for different specifications of equation 
(1). To demonstrate we consider additional possibilities numerically. We find results to be quite 
similar. A discussion will be provided in a future version of this work. 
3.5 Conclusions 
In this paper, we extend the framework adopted by Blankenau and Camera (2009, 2006), 
and construct a model in which firms' investment decision to create skilled vacancies depends on 
the expectation of skilled labor. This analysis demonstrates that lower education standards do not 
necessarily result in human capital accumulation or skill section expansion. We show that, in 
some cases, a lower standard increases underemployed skilled workers, decreases the 
productivity of skilled firms, and lowers the return of schooled workers. This analysis suggests 
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that a lower standard of education can cause more educated people to work in unskilled 
positions, which is a type of over-education.  
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Appendix A - Occupation Codes and Occupations 
Occ. Code Occupations 
1+2 Management occupations + Business and financial operations occupations 
3 Computer and mathematical science occupations 
4 Architecture and engineering occupations 
5 Life, physical, and social science occupations 
6 Community and social service occupations 
7 Legal occupations 
8 Education, training, and library occupations 
9 Arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations 
10 Healthcare practitioner and technical occupations 
11 Healthcare support occupations 
12 Protective service occupations 
13 Food preparation and serving related occupations 
14 Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance occupations 
15 Personal care and service occupations 
16 Sales and related occupations 
17 Office and administrative support occupations 
18 Farming, fishing, and forestry occupations 
19+21 Construction, extraction and production occupations 
20 Installation, maintenance, and repair occupations 
22 Transportation and material moving occupations 
 
 
 
Note:  
1. The occupation classification is based on the most general definition of occupation 
classification in MORG available since 1994. There are 23 occupations defined including army 
occupations. Army occupations are not included in my sample.   
 
2. Because the available occupation classification during 1979 to1981 is different, the base 
period occupations are regrouped based on current classification. It is hard to separate 
management and business observations in the base period, occupation coded as 1 and 2 in the 
end period are combined to be consistent. For the same reason, occupations coded as 19 and 21 
in the end period are combined. 
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Appendix B - Proofs for Chapter 3 
Proof of proposition 1. Suppose where the dot notation means an interior value. We 
need to demonstrate that given this supposition, ݅௦ indeed lies between 0 and 1 and that the 
conditions for ௦݆ ൌ ݆௚ are satisfied. Recall ௦݆, ݅௦ ൐ 0 always so that ݅௦ is interior if ݅௦ ൏ 1. Using 
௦݆ ൌ ݆௚, from the second line of equation (9) ݅௦ ൌ ൫ܨ݆௚൯
భ
ഁ so ݅௦ ൏ 1 requires  ݆௚ ൏ ܨିଵ. Putting 
this value of ݅௦ into the first line of equation (8), ௦݆ ൌ ݆௚ requires ܩ൫ܨ݆௚൯
భ
ഁ ൏ ݆݁௚
ఎ or ܹ൫ܨ݆௚൯
భ
ഁ ൏
݆௚
ఎ which simplifies to ݆௚ ൏ ଔ.̃ Thus to satisfy both ሺ ௦݆, ݅௦ሻ ൌ ሺ݆௚, . ሻ ݅௦ ൏ 1 and ௦݆ ൌ ݆௚, we must 
have ݆௚ ൏ ݉݅݊ ሾܨିଵ, ଔ̃ሿ. It is straightforward to show that ݉݅݊ሾܨିଵ, ଔ̃ሿ ൌ ܨିଵ when ܹ
భ
ആܨ ൐ 1. 
Thus when ܹ
భ
ആܨ ൐ 1, ݆௚ ൏ ܨିଵ binds giving the first line of equation (10). When ܹ
భ
ആܨ ൏ 1, 
݉݅݊ ሾܨିଵ, ଔ̃ሿ ൌ ଔ̃ so that  ݆௚ ൏ ଔ̃  binds giving the first line of equation (11). 
Next consider the case where ሺ ௦݆, ݅௦ሻ ൌ ሺ. , . ሻ. In this case, solving the second lines of 
equations (8) and (9) for ௦݆ and ݅௦ gives ௦݆ ൌ ܨ
భ
ഁആషభܹ
ഁ
ഁആషభ and ݅௦ ൌ ܨ
ആ
ഁആషభܹ
భ
ഁആషభ. We need to 
demonstrate that both are interior. Since we have shown ௦݆, ݅௦ ൐ 0 this requires only showing that 
௦݆ ൏ ݆௚ and ݅௦ ൏ 1. Using the above expressions for ௦݆ and ݅௦ this requires ݆௚ ൐ ଔ̃ and ܹ
భ
ആܨ ൏ 1, 
giving the second line of equation (11). 
Now consider the case where ሺ ௦݆, ݅௦ሻ ൌ ሺ݆௚, 1ሻ. From equation (9), with ௦݆ ൌ ݆௚, ݅௦ ൌ 1 
requires ݆௚ ൐
௖
௉
൐ ܨିଵ. From equation (8) with ݅௦ ൌ 1, ௦݆ ൌ ݆௚ requires ݆௚ ൏ ܹ
భ
ആ. Both can hold 
only if ܹ
భ
ആܨ ൐ 1. This gives the second line of equation (10). 
Finally suppose ሺ ௦݆, ݅௦ሻ ൌ ሺ. ,1ሻ. From equation (8) with ݅௦ ൌ 1, ௦݆ ൏ ݆௚, requires  ݆௚ ൐
ܹ
భ
ആ. In this case, from equation (8), ௦݆ ൌ ܹ
భ
ആ. Putting this into equation (9), ݅௦ ൌ 1 requires 
ܹܲ
భ
ആ ൐ ܿ or ܹ
భ
ആܨ ൐ 1. This gives the third line of (10). 
Proof of corollary 1: As noted in the text, the first claim (second sentence) restates that 
௦݆, ݅௦ and ௦݆݅௦ are increasing in ݆௚. The second is a restatement of ௦݆ ൌ ݆௚. The fourth requires that 
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ሺ1 െ ݅௦ሻ is decreasing in ݆௚ and thus follows from the direct relationship between ݅௦ and ݆௚. Thus 
we only need to prove the third sentence. 
The measure of underperforming firms is ݅௦ሺ1 െ ௦݆ሻ. From the first line of equation (11) 
݅௦ሺ1 െ ௦݆ሻ ൌ ܨ
భ
ഁ݆௚
భ
ഁ െ ܨ
భ
ഁ݆௚
భశഁ
ഁ . Thus డ௜ೞሺଵି௝೒ሻ
డ௝೒
൒ 0 requiresଵ
ఉ
ሺ݆௚ሻ
భ
ഁ
ିଵ െ ଵାఉ
ఉ
݆௚
భ
ഁ ൐ 0 or ݆௚ ൏
ଵ
ଵାఉ
. 
The measure of underemployed workers is ௦݆ሺ1 െ ݅௦ሻ. From the first line of equation (11) 
௦݆ሺ1 െ ݅௦ሻ ൌ ݆௚ െ ܨ
భ
ഁ݆௚
భశഁ
ഁ . Thus డ௝ೞሺଵି௜ೞሻ
డ௝೒
൒ 0 if 1 െ ଵାఉ
ఉ
ܨ
భ
ഁ݆௚
భ
ഁ or ݆௚ െ
ଵାఉ
ఉ
ܨ
భ
ഁ݆௚
భ
ഁ ൏ ቀ ఉ
ଵାఉ
ቁ
ఉ ଵ
ி
. 
Proof of proposition 2: The proof is a straightforward generalization of the proof to 
Proposition 1. This is available from the authors upon request. 
 
